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Home arrow Law arrow United States law and policy on transitional justice : principles, politics, and pragmatics

United States law and policy on transitional justice : principles, politics, and pragmatics


I. Terms and ParametersII. Central Research QuestionsA. SCHOLARLY RELEVANCEB. POLICY RELEVANCEIII. Focus of AnalysisIV. MethodologyA. CASE STUDY APPROACHB. CASE STUDY SELECTIONC. SOURCESSource Sets—TypesSource Sets—Potential Pitfalls and MitigationsD. OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTOverview of Transitional Justice Options and the United States Role in Transitional JusticeI. IntroductionII. Transitional Justice OptionsA. ACTION VERSUS INACTIONB. AMNESTYC. LUSTRATIOND. EXILEE. LETHAL FORCEF. PROSECUTIONG. INDEFINITE DETENTIONIII. ConclusionCompeting Theories of United States Policy on Transitional Justice LEGALISM VERSUS PRUDENTIALISMI. IntroductionII. Transitional Justice as an International Relations PhenomenonA. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYB. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONTransitional Justice as a Special Case of International CooperationA. DILEMMA of Common INTEREsT oR INDIFFERENcEB. NO ZERO-SUM GAMEc. relative versus absolute gainsd. cheatingE. Low PoLITicsf. free ridersg. returnsh. costPotential Benefits and Drawbacks of International Cooperation on Transitional JusticeIII. Traditional International Relations TheoriesA. REALISMB. LIBERALISMIV. Frameworks for Explaining State Behavior on Transitional JusticeA. LEGALISMB. PRUDENTIALISMC. COMPARATIVE HYPOTHESESLegalismPrudentialismComparative HypothesesV. ConclusionThe United States Role in Transitional Justice for GermanyI. BackgroundA. NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO “NUREMBERG”January 1942: Declaration of St. James’sOctober 1942: Establishment of the United Nations War Crimes CommissionOctober 1943: Moscow Declaration-1945: The Allies’ Deliberations: The U.S. Government Reaches Internal Consensus and Agreement with AlliesAugust 1945: London AgreementB. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL’S TRIALSII. Transitional Justice Options Seriously Considered and Actually Implemented for Alleged Nazi Atrocity PerpetratorsA. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS SERIOUSLY CONSIDEREDTransitional Justice Options the Allied Powers Seriously ConsideredTransitional Justice Options the U.S. Government Seriously ConsideredB. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTEDMultilateral Prosecution Through an Ad Hoc International Military TribunalUnilateral Prosecution Through Ad Hoc Allied Military TribunalsConditional AmnestyLustrationC. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS NOT SERIOUSLY CONSIDEREDIII. Explaining the United States Role in Transitional Justice for GermanyA. THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S GENERAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PREFERENCESB. JACKSON’S THREATS TO PURSUE A UNILATERAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INSTITUTIONC. THE u.s. government’s preference FOR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTIV. ConclusionThe United States Role in Transitional Justice for JapanI. BackgroundA. NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO “tOKYO”Early American Responses to Japanese Atrocities During WWIIJuly 1945: Potsdam DeclarationAugust-September 1945: Critical DevelopmentsOctober-December 1945: Negotiating the Specific Features of Transitional JusticeDecember 1945: Moscow Agreement and American ReflectionsEarly-1946: Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far EastB. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST’S TRIALSII. Transitional Justice Options Seriously Considered and Actually Implemented for Alleged Japanese Atrocity PerpetratorsA. THE PRECEDENT OF ADDRESSING NAZISB. PRIMARY JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALSProsecutionUnconditional AmnestyLustrationC. LOWER-LEVEL JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALSProsecution in U.S. Military TribunalsAppeal in a U.S. Civilian CourtProsecution in Military Courts Established by Other StatesDe Facto Conditional AmnestyLustrationIII. The United States Role in “Tokyo”IV. Explaining the United States Role in Transitional Justice for JapanA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S MOTIVATIONS TO LEAD THE PRIMARY TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INSTITUTION For JApANB. OTHER STATES’ MOTIVATIONS TO DEFER TO THE UNITED STATES IN LEADING THE PRIMARY TRANSITIONAL Justice Institution For JApANC. THE APPOINTMENT OF A NON-AMERICAN AS PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL for The Far EAsTD. AMERICAN PROVISION OF AMNESTY TO ALLEGED JAPANESE ATROCITY PERPETRATORSV. ConclusionThe United States Role in Transitional Justice for Libya, Iraq, and the Former YugoslaviaI. BackgroundA. INTERNATIONAL IMPUNITY FOR ATROCITIES DURING THE COLD WARB. CODIFYING GENOCIDEC. DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES DURING THE COLD WARd. the Balkan atrocitiesE. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO THE BALKAN ATROCITIESGeneral ChronologyThe Commission of Experts and the TribunalThe U.S. Government’s Multilateral Intentions and FrustrationsA Permanent or Ad Hoc International Criminal TribunalII. Transitional Justice Options Seriously Considered and Actually Implemented for Alleged Balkan Atrocity PerpetratorsA. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS SERIOUSLY CONSIDEREDTransitional Justice Options the UN Seriously ConsideredTransitional Justice Options the U.S. Government Seriously ConsideredB. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS POSSIBLY AND ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED ALONGSIDE THE ICTYConditional AmnestyImplicit Unconditional AmnestyIII. Explaining the United States Role in Transitional Justice for the Former YugoslaviaA. DECISION POINTSU.S. Government Support for ActionU.S. Government Support for Punitive ActionU.S. Government Support for ProsecutionU.S. Government Support for Multilateral ProsecutionU.S. Government Support for Multilateral Prosecution Organized by the UN Security CouncilB. PUZZLESDefendants in CustodyA. LIBYAB. IRAQThe Present “Nuremberg” Precedent and Absent “Tokyo” PrecedentChange in Presidential AdministrationsIV. ConclusionThe United States Role in Transitional Justice for RwandaI. BackgroundA. APRIL-JULY 1994: DURING THE GENOCIDEB. JULY-SEPTEMBER 1994: AFTER THE GENOCIDEC. SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1994: THE NARROWING OPTION: ICT-TIEDD. NOVEMBER 8, 1994: THE DECISION TO CREATE THE ICTRE. ADDITIONAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INSTITUTIONSRwandan Transitional Justice InstitutionsForeign Transitional Justice InstitutionsII. Transitional Justice Options Seriously Considered and Actually Implemented for Alleged Rwandan GenocidairesA. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS THE UN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED AND ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTEDb. transitional justice options the u.s. government seriously considered and actually implementedIII. Explaining the United States Role in Transitional Justice for RwandaA. DECISION POINTSU.S. Government Support for ActionU.S. Government Support for ProsecutionU.S. Government Support for Prosecution through the UNU.S. Government Support for Prosecution through the UNSC’sU.S. Government Support for Prosecution through the ICT-Tied OptionA. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOMMODATION OF OTHER STATES’ PREFERENCESв. un/icer’s OPPOSITIONC. GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA’S OPPOSITIOND. NARROW FocusE. ICTY PROGRESSIV. ConclusionI. IntroductionII. Summary of FindingsIII. Legalism Versus PrudentialismA. EMPIRICAL CLAIMSLiberal StatesIlliberal StatesWar Crimes TribunalsB. CAUSAL LOGICWar Crimes Tribunals Versus Other Transitional Justice OptionsTypes of ProsecutionConcern for Own Soldiers and CitizensSecurity InterestsIV. ConclusionBIBLIOGRAPHY
 
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