CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have delineated conditions under which belligerents, ought, or as the case may be ought not, to return the movable and immovable property and resources which they seized during the war; I have also shown when they ought, or as the case may be ought not, to allow people displaced by war to return to their territory/country of origin. Throughout, we saw that the moral status of a belligerent as just or unjust has limited bearing on its post-war restitutive obligations.

That said, although restitution of some kind is likely to be a key component of most justifiedATC peace settlements, it is unlikely to be enough as far as reparations go, for two reasons. First, the loss of territory, land, dwellings, and objects leads to further harms above and beyond the initial act of taking. Second, war destroys what is in victims’ possession or control—and not just their property (whether individually or jointly owned) but their lives, health, and limbs, which cannot be restituted. The question, then, is whether those harms ought to be compensated for, and if so how, as part of a justifiedATC settlement.

 
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