Suppose that some party A takes or damages something, g, which is in B’s control, and is not able to restitute it—or at least, not in the condition in which it was when A took it: food he has consumed, property which he has destroyed, B’s body, her ability to work, her life. Or suppose that A still has g but that the loss of g
harms B in ways that merely restituting g will not make good. What, if anything, does A owe to B or her estate? In restitution cases, as we saw, if A does not have rights over g at t2 and if g still fully belongs to B, it is incoherent to deny B a right to have g returned to her. But in reparations cases, g no longer exists, or is no longer intact, or its return will not suffice, and so we cannot simply advert to B’s continuing ownership of g to justify A’s duty to compensate her. In ss.6.2.1 and 6.2.2, I take for granted the rough and ready intuition that someone who has been wrongfully harmed is owed reparations, and examine, first, when reparations are due and to what level, and, second, who is owed them. In s.6.2.3, I defend the intuition by showing why wrongdoers are under reparative duties. In the course of defending the Reparative Principle as a requirement of a just peace, I show that feasibility constraints mandate rescinding from implementing such a peace, and I articulate what a justifiedATC peace both permits and demands.