Given the events of the past decade, there are few issues more salient in the international political economy today than the management of international financial crises. Yet nearly all of the recent literature on the political economy of international financial crisis management has focused on IMF lending. Although important, this work has neglected the fact that for decades the United States regularly extended emergency loans to countries facing financial crises outside the Fund. Scholars of international political economy have failed to systematically investigate the political and economic determinants of bailouts that flow from one sovereign to another. This book takes the first step toward addressing these gaps by bringing the incredibly important role that the United States has played in managing international financial crises back into the discussion of the political economy of international bailouts. Indeed, I have shown that in many cases, the US role as an ILLR has been far more important than the IMF itself. In the end, one thing seems clear: So long as the IMF suffers from institutional inadequacies as an ILLR, so long as the United States retains this capacity, and so long as the US financial system has a global balance sheet, selective ILLR actions will remain a part of the US international economic policy toolkit. All that is missing is another crisis.