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Game Theory and Public Policy


I Historical and critical survey Objectives and scope of the bookRepresenting gamesGENERAL CONSIDERATIONSTHE GAME IN EXTENSIVE FORMTHE GAME IN STRATEGIC NORMAL FORMUNCERTAINITY AND CALIBRATIONCOOPERATIVE GAMES“IMPERFECT RECALL”NON-NUMERICAL OBJECTIVESSUMMARYNOTESA brief interpretive history of game theoryTHE FOUNDING BOOKTHE DICHOTOMY OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE GAMESGAME THEORY AS DECISION THEORYTWO THEORIES, COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVETHE TURN TOWARDS NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORYBEHAVIORAL GAME THEORYTOWARD UNITARY GAME THEORY?BRIEF SUMMARYNOTESNash equilibrium and public policySOCIAL DILEMMASSymmetrical DilemmasThe Special Case of Price CompetitionOther Dilemmas, Nash Equilibria and Public PolicyRANDOMIZATION OF STRATEGIESCOORDINATION AND ANTICOORDINATION GAMESRATIONALIZATION, ERRORS, AND NASH EQUILIBRIUMCOALITIONS IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMESREFINEMENTSEVOLUTIONARY GAMESCONCLUSIONNOTESCorrelated equilibriumINTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE AND DEFINITIONCOORDINATION AND ANTICOORDINATION GAMESStoplights as a ParadigmOther Historical InstancesDIFFICULT CASESSUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA AND ECONOMIC POLICYPLURAL NASH EQUILIBRIA AND THE RATIONALITY POSTULATECONCLUSIONNOTESNoncooperative games in extensive form and public policySUBGAME PERFECTION AND TREMBLING HANDSPRAGMATICS: PROBLEM SPECIFICATIONUlysses and the SirensAgencyIMBEDDED GAMESREPEATED PLAYThe “Folk Theorem”Case 1 M repetitionsCase 2 Indefinite repetitionsAn ExtensionInterim SummaryON SOME EXPERIMENTAL STUDIESSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONNOTESSocial mechanism designCUTTING THE CAKENASH AND OTHER EQUILIBRIA AS OBJECTIVES OF MECHANISM DESIGNA NEGATIVE RESULT: NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND ELECTIONSArrow’s Impossibility TheoremElectionsCAP AND TRADE REGULATIONTHE SHAPLEY-ROTH MATCHING ALGORITHMASSESSMENT OF MECHANISM DESIGNSUMMARYNOTESSuperadditive games in coalition function formSOLUTION CONCEPTSThe Core and Related ConceptsArbitrational ConceptsNash bargainingShapley valueNucleolousInterpretations of the Solution ConceptsStability interpretationRhetorical interpretationTHE PROBLEM OF APPLICABILITYThe Market as Implementation of the CoreTelser on the Core in Games with ProductionValues, Power and AccountingSUMMARYNOTESRecall, rationality and political economy“BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES SUFFICE”EXCHANGE GAMES AND IMPERFECT RECALLTOWARD POLITICAL ECONOMYA Corn EconomyThe exchange gameThe production gameThe Government GameRATIONALITYWeakness of Will and RationalityIntertemporal InconsistencyWeakness of Will in a Game in Extensive FormPerfect and Ideal RationalityBounded RationalityPerfect Rationality and the Manipulation of ElectionsCoalition FormationSUMMARYNOTESII Mixed cooperative and noncooperative decisions: extensions Biform games and considerable solutionsA FRAMEWORK FOR A THEORY OF THE MIDDLE GROUNDBIFORM GAMESBARGAINING AND THREATPLAN OF THE PARTNOTESThe firm as a coalitionPRELIMINARIAA COALITION FOR PRODUCTION AND SALENormalizationEfficient Resource Allocation Within the CoalitionSOME POLICY ISSUESMonopoly ReconsideredRegulation of Monopoly PriceThe Incidence of Excise Taxes and SubsidiesSOME LIMITATIONS OF THE MODELSUMMARYNOTESWhat coalitions will be formed?RECONTRACTINGThe CoreBargaining PowerMarginal ProductivityProfitCustomersInterim SummarySEARCH AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LINKSSearch in Labor MarketsSearch for New CustomersCONCLUSIONNOTESMonopoly and monopsony revisitedMONOPSONY POWERIntermediate CaseThe Case of Positive Monopsony PowerMinimum Wage LawsEntry Equilibrium in Labor MarketsMONOPOLY POWERIntermediate CasePositive Monopoly PowerCONCLUSIONBargaining and the determination of wagesTHREATS AND THEORIES OF BARGAININGBARGAINING POWER AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONWAGE AND UNEMPLOYMENTSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONBargaining power and majority ruleNONCOOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE MODELS OF MAJORITY RULEBARGAINING POWER AND MAJORITY RULEBargaining Power Games and Voting GamesLinear and TU GamesA TU Game with Nonnegativity ConstraintsLinear Games in GeneralTU Games with Idiosyncratic Rationality ConstraintsVisualization and Imperfections“SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY”SUMMARYNOTES
 
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