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Game Theory and Public Policy

I Historical and critical survey Objectives and scope of the book Representing games GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS THE GAME IN EXTENSIVE FORM THE GAME IN STRATEGIC NORMAL FORM UNCERTAINITY AND CALIBRATION COOPERATIVE GAMES “IMPERFECT RECALL”NON-NUMERICAL OBJECTIVES SUMMARY NOTES A brief interpretive history of game theory THE FOUNDING BOOK THE DICHOTOMY OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES GAME THEORY AS DECISION THEORY TWO THEORIES, COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE THE TURN TOWARDS NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY TOWARD UNITARY GAME THEORY?BRIEF SUMMARY NOTES Nash equilibrium and public policy SOCIAL DILEMMAS Symmetrical Dilemmas The Special Case of Price Competition Other Dilemmas, Nash Equilibria and Public Policy RANDOMIZATION OF STRATEGIES COORDINATION AND ANTICOORDINATION GAMES RATIONALIZATION, ERRORS, AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM COALITIONS IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES REFINEMENTS EVOLUTIONARY GAMES CONCLUSION NOTES Correlated equilibrium INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE AND DEFINITION COORDINATION AND ANTICOORDINATION GAMES Stoplights as a Paradigm Other Historical Instances DIFFICULT CASES SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA AND ECONOMIC POLICY PLURAL NASH EQUILIBRIA AND THE RATIONALITY POSTULATE CONCLUSION NOTES Noncooperative games in extensive form and public policy SUBGAME PERFECTION AND TREMBLING HANDS PRAGMATICS: PROBLEM SPECIFICATION Ulysses and the Sirens Agency IMBEDDED GAMES REPEATED PLAY The “Folk Theorem”Case 1 M repetitions Case 2 Indefinite repetitions An Extension Interim Summary ON SOME EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION NOTES Social mechanism design CUTTING THE CAKE NASH AND OTHER EQUILIBRIA AS OBJECTIVES OF MECHANISM DESIGN A NEGATIVE RESULT: NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND ELECTIONS Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Elections CAP AND TRADE REGULATION THE SHAPLEY-ROTH MATCHING ALGORITHM ASSESSMENT OF MECHANISM DESIGN SUMMARY NOTES Superadditive games in coalition function form SOLUTION CONCEPTS The Core and Related Concepts Arbitrational Concepts Nash bargaining Shapley value Nucleolous Interpretations of the Solution Concepts Stability interpretation Rhetorical interpretation THE PROBLEM OF APPLICABILITY The Market as Implementation of the Core Telser on the Core in Games with Production Values, Power and Accounting SUMMARY NOTES Recall, rationality and political economy “BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES SUFFICE”EXCHANGE GAMES AND IMPERFECT RECALL TOWARD POLITICAL ECONOMY A Corn Economy The exchange game The production game The Government Game RATIONALITY Weakness of Will and Rationality Intertemporal Inconsistency Weakness of Will in a Game in Extensive Form Perfect and Ideal Rationality Bounded Rationality Perfect Rationality and the Manipulation of Elections Coalition Formation SUMMARY NOTES II Mixed cooperative and noncooperative decisions: extensions Biform games and considerable solutions A FRAMEWORK FOR A THEORY OF THE MIDDLE GROUND BIFORM GAMES BARGAINING AND THREAT PLAN OF THE PART NOTES The firm as a coalition PRELIMINARIA A COALITION FOR PRODUCTION AND SALE Normalization Efficient Resource Allocation Within the Coalition SOME POLICY ISSUES Monopoly Reconsidered Regulation of Monopoly Price The Incidence of Excise Taxes and Subsidies SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL SUMMARY NOTES What coalitions will be formed?RECONTRACTING The Core Bargaining Power Marginal Productivity Profit Customers Interim Summary SEARCH AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LINKS Search in Labor Markets Search for New Customers CONCLUSION NOTES Monopoly and monopsony revisited MONOPSONY POWER Intermediate Case The Case of Positive Monopsony Power Minimum Wage Laws Entry Equilibrium in Labor Markets MONOPOLY POWER Intermediate Case Positive Monopoly Power CONCLUSION Bargaining and the determination of wages THREATS AND THEORIES OF BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAGE AND UNEMPLOYMENT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Bargaining power and majority rule NONCOOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE MODELS OF MAJORITY RULE BARGAINING POWER AND MAJORITY RULE Bargaining Power Games and Voting Games Linear and TU Games A TU Game with Nonnegativity Constraints Linear Games in General TU Games with Idiosyncratic Rationality Constraints Visualization and Imperfections “SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY”SUMMARY NOTES

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