REPRESENTATIVENESS AND INFORMED DECISIONS: THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL DIVERSITY
Having separate institutions with separate personnel offers the possibility of increased representativeness across the affected population in situations where the institutions must interact to create an outcome. If different groups in society - distinct socioeconomic classes, minorities, generations, geographical groups and so on - predominate in a particular institution, then decision-making or action across institutions offers the potential for increased inclusivity and for less one-sided decision-making. In principle at least, the 'mixed regime' of monarch, aristocracy and commoners aimed to benefit from this sort of pluralism, intermingling the different institutions to form a larger political whole in which each group had a voice. Equally, some held that the system balanced the tax consumers of the monarchy and the tax payers of the commons (Vile, 1998, p. 189). In a similar fashion, the conservative and historical nature of judicial decision-making can allow the generation of the past to check the generation of the present (Little, 2000, p. 57).
In the increasingly classless societies of the modern era, this type of class-based institutional diversity is of course less attractive. Even so, the insight still finds a place in modern democracies with bicameral legislatures. Here, two houses of parliament, each populated through different methods of election and selection, interact to craft legislation acceptable to both houses (Montesquieu, 1748/1989, p. 160). Similarly, federalist arrangements can foster a diversity of inputs into policy formulation and implementation. Decisions that have implications for one region can be informed by institu- tions local to that region, allowing local representatives to have a voice on federal decisions affecting them. 'Community participation clauses' often appear in local government acts, allowing municipal voices a more direct mode of participation in governmental decisions, especially if the local gov- ernment has a degree of autonomy from state or federal powers (Grant & Dollery, 2012). The same method has been recommended for the adminis- trative branch of government. Rather than gaining legitimacy through transmission of authority from the elected legislature or executive (both of which lie at a considerable distance from administrative decision-making), some separation of powers theorists have argued that administrative discre- tion can achieve democratic legitimacy by engaging directly with stake- holders in its decisions (Carolan, 2009).
This representativeness has consequences for institutional integrity. Increased responsiveness to stakeholders and diverse social groups means that more parts of the society have access to the decision-making process, which helps them to monitor what is happening and how decisions are made. Further, because they have input into the process, there is less likeli- hood of the subsequent policies meeting resistance on the ground and over time. The policies can therefore be more realistic, because they include not merely political elites, but those whom the policy is intended to benefit, or those who will suffer its restrictions.
TWO REMAINING INTER-RELATIONS
The makeup of the personnel of a particular institution is always a key fac- tor in consideration of its capacity to play a role in an integrity system. Although the separateness of personnel can often be a virtue, the reverse is sometimes true. An example already noted is Locke's legislators, who are taken from the general population, and must subsequently return to it, in order to ensure the fairness of the laws they pass. Similarly Montesquieu (1748/1989, p. 165) and Machiavelli (1961/1514, p. 85) urged that the armies of a republic be drawn from the people and share their values to prevent the military force becoming a source of oppression.
Locke too gives reasons why it is sensible to have one actor - the executive - responsible for the two distinct tasks of enforcing domestic rule of law and dealing with foreign affairs (Locke's 'federative' power). Because the same type of capacities and processes are involved in each of these tasks, it makes sense to assign the two distinct tasks to a single institutional agent (Locke, 1690/1947, pp. 146-148).
A further example is jurying by the people. Montesquieu reflects that this practice makes it easier for people to fear the law, rather than fearing particular persons or even groups of persons:
the power of judging, so terrible among men, being attached neither to a certain state nor a certain profession, becomes, so to speak, invisible and null. Judges are not continually in view; one fears the magistracy, not the magistrates. (1748/1989, p. 158)
The complexity of the myriad inter-relations and governance strategies sketched above has hopefully buried any notions of the simplistic tripartite separation of powers. Indeed, it is arguable that messiness - in the sense of a complex and unsystematic tangle of checks and balances, divisions and overlaps - can itself be a virtue for an integrity system. The skeins of over- lapping responsibilities, fickle public attention, unclear jurisdictions, murky rivalries, shifting memberships and so on can create an ethical me´ lange where corrupt agents cannot be confident their abuses will go undetected and unpunished. They cannot be certain who they need to hide their actions from, and who they must fool, bribe or threaten. If Machiavelli was right that few are corrupted by few, it might in an analogous spirit be posited that simple regimes can be corrupted simply. We can see this quality of informal messiness in the metaphors used to capture integrity systems. Wueste (2005, p. 22) draws on Allen's idea of webs of accountability; Sampford et al. (2005, pp. 105-107) advocate the image of a functional but complexly interwoven bird's nest; and Buchanan and Keohane (2006, p. 432) advance an ecological conception of legitimacy in emphasizing the significance of the broader institutional environment.