• 1. In Lexikon Geschichtswissenschaft. Hundert Grundbegriffe by contrast, there is an entry on time written by Koselleck (2003) himself.
  • 2. Also see Ogle (2015b, October 12); Bevernage (2016).
  • 3. The classical singular conception of periodization was phrased in 1854 by Von Ranke (Von Ranke, 1854/2011) as follows: “The historian thus has to pay particular attention first of all to how people in a certain period thought and lived. Then he will find that, apart from certain unchangeable eternal main ideas, for instance those of morality, every epoch has its own particular tendency and its own ideal. But although every epoch has its justification and its worth in itself, one still must not overlook, what came forth from it. The historian must therefore, secondly, perceive the difference between the individual epochs, in order to observe the inner necessity of the sequence. One cannot fail to recognize a certain progress here. But I would not want to say that this progress moves straight line, but more like a river which in its own way determines its course” (pp. 22-23). For the conceptual history of ‘Zeitgeist’, see Jung (2012).
  • 4. Koselleck (2000): “After acceleration has become a specific temporal category of historical experience, retrospectively history as a whole transforms into one succession of increasing acceleration” (p. 200).
  • 5. For the ‘Koselleck-boom’. see e.g. Jordheim (2012); Zammito (2004). Given the fact that Koselleck has developed a periodization of history, Jordheims thesis that he was ‘against periodization’ remains perplexing.
  • 6. See Koselleck (2000: 78-97, 150-177, 177-203).
  • 7. Koselleck (2000): “There are presently still tribes that just have left the Stone Age behind while leading nations like the USA already have put a man on the moon” (p. 292).
  • 8. See Landwehr (2012), 23: “Within a linear model of time, that implicates the idea of progress, by necessity, ‘we’ are superior to all others simply because ‘we’ are ahead of the others in time. Where ‘we’ are, it is up front.” ‘Eurocentrism’ thus manifests itself as ‘chronocentrism’. Also see pp. 6-7: “Who uses this term (nonsimultaneity, CL) must be able to say according to which criterion something or someone is apostrophized as ‘nonsimultaneous’ because a specific norm ofsimultaneity’ is implied—if not, the word ‘non simultaneous’ would make no sense”.
  • 9. Also see Bevernage’s critique of the idea of one ‘container-time’ (Bevernage, 2012: 116).
  • 10. For a more skeptical view see, Smith Rumsey: “Oblivion can begin as soon as the next software update” (Smith Rumsey, 2016).
  • 11. In the meantime also, the concept of Sattelzeit itself did not escape its ‘pluralization’ (Leonard, 2011; Osterhammel, 2014: 59-63).
  • 12. Therefore, ‘the Middle Ages’ as a period were not an invention of ‘the Renaissance’, as is often stated, just as ‘feudalism’ was not an invention of ‘the Middle Ages’. Both ‘the Middle Ages’ as a period and ‘feudalism’ were inventions of ‘modernity’ (Le Goff, 2015).
  • 13. Conrad (1999); Tanaka (2013); Osterhammel (2014).
  • 14. In Le Poidevin’s (2003) words, most people—including historians— are ‘objectivists’, meaning that they assume that time is somehow ‘objectively’ real and not an entity that does not exist independent from what clocks measure by some standard. The latter position is taken by so-called conventionalists (pp. 5-8).
  • 15. In the metaphysics of time, the so-called B-Theory of time posits that time can be conceived of in terms of space, while the A-Theory denies that this is the case. See Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman (2008: 209-239); Le Poidevin (2011).
  • 16. See Sato (2015: 410).
  • 17. For a recent critique of the idea of one ‘Islam time’ and a plea for ‘multiple temporalities’: Bashir (2014).
  • 18. Chakrabarty (2000): 16), however, also refers to ‘different Europes’, dependent on the ‘diversity’ of the ‘margins’.
  • 19. This conflation of periodization and chronology still continues, for instance, in a recent historical lexicon in which periodization is defined as ‘a tool of historical research, that allows the historian to establish the temporal order of past events’ (Becker, 2003).
  • 20. Doering-Manteufel and Raphael (2012: 25) refer to the ‘dacadological method’ of contemporary historians.
  • 21. Nipperdey (2015: 174-180) argues that the unease concerning the chronological caesura between the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period has led to an increasing use of the conjunction of ‘late-medieval’ and ‘early-modern’ labels.
  • 22. 1800 was the first ‘turn of a century’ that was experienced as a ‘turning point’ by a substantial number of intellectuals—obviously in connection to the French Revolution and its consequences for the ‘Old Regime’.
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