The character questionWhy the character question is hard: the external-internal puzzleWhy the character question is important: the significance of experienceThe organization of this bookThe sense datum view: Experiencing virtual realityNaïve realism: the window shade modelThe sense datum view: the brain as a virtual reality deviceThe act-object assumptionThe argument from hallucination for the sense datum view over naïve realismThe argument from illusionism about sensible properties for the sense datum view over naïve realismThe sense datum view neatly solves the external-internal puzzleThe percipi problem about painCan the sense datum view explain our access to the external world?Do simplicity considerations undermine the sense datum view?Where are sense data?Hard cases: perceptual imprecision and incompletenessSummaryFurther ReadingThe internal physical state view: Experiences as inner modificationsWhat is the internal physical state view?From experiential internalism to the internal physical state viewCan the internal physical state view accommodate the transparency observation?The externally directed nature of some experiencesThe argument from essential external directedness against the internal physical state viewCould a brain-in-the-void have a favorite shape?Papineau’s reply: rejecting essential external directednessSummaryFurther ReadingThe representational view: Experiencing as representingWhat is the representational view?The argument for the representational view: an inference to the best explanationCan the representational view explain all sensory-perceptual experiences?How rich is the content of experience?The question of skepticism and the dogmatist answerDoes the representational view explain perceptual presence?Is the representational view intrinsically implausible?Can the representational view explain the laws of appearance?SummaryFurther ReadingHow does experience represent the world?Two questions for representationalistsResponse-independent representationalismArmchair arguments against response-independent representationalism?The problem of internal dependence about sensible propertiesOther problems about sensible propertiesResponse-dependent representationalismTwo problems with response-dependent representationalismInternalist-nonreductive representationalism: the basic ideaMust internalist representationalists treat color as illusory?Is internalist representationalism plausible for spatial experience?Is internalist representationalism mysterious?SummaryFurther ReadingThe return to naïve realism: Experience as openness to the worldA basic form of contemporary naïve realismHow naïve realism differs from representationalismNaïve realism v representationalism: intrinsic plausibilityNaïve realism v representationalism: explanatory roleRepresentationalism v naïve realism: hallucination and illusionRepresentationalism v naïve realism: two arguments from scienceCan internalist-selectionist naïve realism answer the arguments from science?Can ways-based naïve realism answer the arguments from science?SummaryFurther ReadingExplaining essential external directedness at the cost of denying internal dependenceExplaining internal dependence at the cost of denying essential external directednessAccepting both essential external directedness and internal dependenceFurther ReadingGlossary