In light of the previous debate and in order to help us conceptualize non-state actors in the later text, it is crucial to develop an understanding of a state as the primary component of the contemporary international system. There are many streams of thought dealing with the theory of the state origin like the contractual theory (stemming from Hobbes' Leviathan), but this work will focus on the evolutionary stream of thought connected mainly to the work of C. Tilly on the evolution of the organization of the political space. State origins in this particular context are based on the struggle for resource extraction. It is not necessary to
Territoriality and politics in the 21st century 17 present this approach in considerable detail, but we will just focus on a few key points that are crucial for the development of the argument regarding the territoriality of the violent non-state actors.4 First of all, the institution of state developed in a highly specific context of the late European medievalism. Second, the development of the territorial institutions was based on a need to protect the tax base that would support the leading elites. Third, the dominance of the state was not the only possible development, and the institution was challenged by other forms of political organization - a point discussed in depth by Spruyt (1994). Finally, the contemporary outlook of the state is based on centuries of development and interaction among political units, and this process is domestic only to specific regions in the world. In places where the institution is externally enforced, it does not necessarily constitute the most effective means of organization of the political space.
In the post-Second World War international system, a state is usually defined by several criteria that are rooted in the development of the territorial administrative system derived from the primarily European history. If we look at just one of these definitions, the state is a political institution characterized by a defined territory, permanent resident population, government, organized economy and a circulation system, state sovereignty, and international recognition (Glassner 1996, 45^16). This is, nevertheless, an idealized vision of the political map as in many parts of the globe, state institutions do not meet most of the criteria. Usually, the only factor that sets apart state from other alternative forms of the political organization of space is international recognition (Jackson 1993, 27-29). Cooper and Sorensen presented their understanding of the nature of statehood and sovereignty in the post-Cold War world as divided into three types of states - pre-modem/post-colonial. modern, and post-modern (Cooper 2000; Sorensen 2005,100-107). This division points not only to the changes in the networked part of the world but also at the limitations of the state institution in the pre-modern or post-colonial regions. These limitations mainly stem from the fact that the institution of modern state is alien to these regions and that its hasty application throughout the process of decolonization, coupled with an artificial delimitation of borders and lack of prior or consequent institution-building, did not establish strong administrative powers over usually vast territory and geographically and demographi-cally challenging territory. The administrative institutions that existed in many of these regions were not adapted to the needs of a modem state as a specific form of political administration of territory. Given the fact that the nature of state differs, throughout this book, a state is an institution internationally recognized as a state as the process of recognition is no longer connected to the other criteria, as described, for example, in Fabry (2010). The ability of states to fulfill their role in relation to society and population living on its territory also differs significantly. Consequently, this leads to an appearance of territorial and functional holes that are being partially filled by some alternative actors.