Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira
Parliaments are often seen as institutions peculiar to the Euro-American world. In contrast, their establishment elsewhere is frequently thought of as a derivative and mostly defective process. Such simplistic tales of unilateral and imperfect transfers of knowledge have led to a suboptimal understanding of non-Western experiences, as well as of their contribution to the shaping of the global political landscape of the modern world. The present volume challenges Eurocentric visions by retracing the evolution of modern institutions of collective decision-making in Eurasia, more specifically in the Russian/Soviet, Qing/Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman/Turkish cases. It argues that, over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, intellectuals and political actors across Eurasia used indigenous as well as foreign elements to shape their versions of parliamentary institutions for their own political purposes. It was through the creative agency of these often understudied actors that representative institutions have acquired a wide range of meanings throughout Eurasia and become a near-ubiquitous element of modern statehood.
This volume approaches two main questions: what made concepts like parliamentarism, deliberative decision-making, and constitutionalism so appealing throughout the world, and how were these ideas reflected in historical practices related to parliamentarism? Even in Europe, constitutions - and the representative organs instituted by these - served a multitude of sometimes seemingly contradictory purposes, including those of liberalism, nationalism, militarism, and imperialism.1 But it is the broader Eurasian context which demonstrates that parliamentarization was not the result of a clear-cut teleological development from autocracy to participative democracy but rather of a variety of alternative approaches to political modernization which unfolded between and within individual polities.
As Eurasian parliaments often wielded rather limited powers, approaches departing from a normative Euro-American ideal have understood them as façade institutions. Such an assessment was already common at the time of the imperial transformations of Russia and the Qing, for example, when Max Weber termed the 1906 Russian Duma an exercise in “sham constitutionalism” (Scheinkonstitutionalismus),1 and Chinese revolutionaries lambasted the Qing court for attempting the same as Russia had done.3 Later, the notions of “sham constitutionalism” and “nominal constitutionalism”4 became even more
DOI: 10.4324/9781003158608 prominent in the case of the socialist “rubber-stamp” parliaments, even though this label had been challenged already during the Cold War.5
Although legislatures and parliamentary democracy attract much scholarly attention, the refusal to look beyond the sham aspect and the accompanying persistent focus on the Western European and North American experiences in detriment of the Eurasian context have made it difficult to theoretically grasp these parliamentary formations. As institutions such as the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaia duma) and the Political Consultative Council (Zizhengyuari) were abolished when the Russian and Qing Empires perished, and as other parliamentary institutions have not developed into liberal democratic parliaments, they tend to be dismissed as constitutional experiments doomed to fail.6 For example, the standard interpretation in Chinese scholarship for the demise of the Qing Empire is that the reforms of the 1900s went against the “spirit of constitutionalism” and the “tide of the times,” for their purpose was to maintain the imperial rule rather than to protect the rights of the citizens.7
In studies concerned with the transnational history of parliamentarism, Eurasian contexts are still frequently overlooked or treated as secondary, in particular as to their historical dimension. Even recent comparative studies in the conceptual and intellectual history of parliamentarism tend to remain focused on the European experience, treating it as a merely “European concept.”8 Nonetheless, there has been a discernible shift in various disciplines toward more nuanced analyses of the roles of parliaments in the Eurasian context. Legal scholarship has expanded our knowledge about global constitutionalism, demonstrating that contemporary constitutions fulfill important roles in authoritarian regimes and that the respective governments spend significant time and effort in crafting them.9 Political science has begun to move its focus from parties to the role of parliaments within the various contemporary political systems of Asia.10 Finally, in the historical scholarship, studies on individual imperial constitutions and parliaments have begun to offer more nuanced analyses of the institutions on their own terms.11 Some studies have also probed into the transnational entanglements underlying the emergence of the tools of government shared by most contemporary states.12
It is on this historiography on Eurasian contexts that this volume builds, adding a transnational and transcultural outlook that encompasses the most significant (post)imperial polities of Eurasia. There, more than being mere instruments of “sham” and “nominal constitutionalism,” parliamentary institutions acquired and fulfilled functions and meanings which were not necessarily predominant in Western parliaments. In a time of emerging nationalisms across the world, they provided for at least a degree of popular representation and functioned as avenues of political mobilization in the nationalizing or newly emerging nation-states. They were designed not only to bring up political talents from across the people but also to manage imperial and postimperial diversities. Due to the multiplicity and versatility of their functions, parliamentary institutions were useful during imperial transformations just as they continued to be useful in the socialist contexts of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.
Contrary to the idea of parliamentarism being a belated transplant from European sources, one of the elements which made modern parliamentary institutions attractive was that they offered strong connections to the own past to those who adopted them. Although political modernization and the establishment of modern deliberative assemblies in Eurasia took place in contact with Western Europe and the United States, it also made frequent references to indigenous political mythologies, consciously adapting the vernacular traditions to the changing circumstances in imperial and postimperial contexts. Even if new institutions were not necessarily traditional in themselves, they were conceived of as having been reestablished from old times or were at least justified with local intellectual traditions. Where it has been acknowledged at all, this phenomenon has been belittled as a negligible device "used by elites to construct a democratic legacy where in fact there was none.”13 However, it should be taken seriously, as it reveals the substantial non-European contributions to the formation of the modern world. While one can trace the origins of the modern concepts of democracy, constitution, and parliament to Atlantic intellectuals, these only became universal in a process of a global “circulation of forms,”14 in which their application was synthesized with vernacular political ideas. The search for representative institutions was informed by the respective local contexts, and the heterogeneous imperial practices contributed to the development of vernacular political mythologies and vocabularies. These have become constitutive for the current global toolkit of political instruments.
The empires15 analyzed in this volume shared some characteristics which engendered different developments than those experienced in Western Europe. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan as well as the Ottoman and the Qing Empires had to cope with encroachment by the Western imperialist powers but managed to maintain their independence and escape full-scale colonization. After undergoing a thorough program of nation-building, Japan was the first of them to revert this situation and be accepted as a first-rate international power, thus playing a pivotal role as a global example of a non-Western path to modernity. In a similar manner, the perpetual exclusion of the Russian Empire from the West16 and its military defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) raised the issue of modernization. Unlike Japan, the Qing, Ottoman, and Russian Empires shared similar imperial legacies. Despite introducing some political novelties, such as a constitution and a parliament in the Ottoman case or modern self-government and judiciary in the Russian case, they had resisted pressures to undertake more thorough political reforms throughout the nineteenth century, and ended up facing their own deep structural crises.
The existential problems faced by these empires meant that their newly formed parliamentary institutions were predominantly aimed at strengthening the state or reorganizing it from the perspective of the political elites. The justifications of constitutional and parliamentary reforms often were explicitly etatist, with the state presented as the greater good. The modernization of legislative procedures was one of, and perhaps the most important of, a series of reforms pertaining to the transformation of empires by the instruments of power which were adopted from the model of the nation-state but applied creatively to produce vernacular projects of imperial modernization. Among many others, these included the restructuring of the military and police forces, the introduction of mass education, the establishment of financial and banking systems, the building of crucial infrastructure, and the introduction of modern statistics. If the parliaments established in the wake of such reforms were often not democratic, this was due to the concrete political needs they were designed to satisfy rather than to an innate inclination toward Oriental despotism.
At the same time, the observation of a tendency toward bureaucratic parliamentarism is not absolute. A closer look at the various parliamentary experiences of Eurasia also reveals how parliamentary institutions reflected shifting powerrelations behind the reforms. Several examples discussed in this volume evince the diversity and variability of Eurasian approaches to parliamentarism, such as the development of Japan's contemporary parliament out of oligarchic concerns in the second half of the nineteenth century, the shifting status of the Ottoman and Turkish parliaments, and the unplanned, though not unexpected, role of the Qing Political Consultative Council as a catalyst for the republican revolution of 1911-1912. Generally, the parliamentary reforms in the Ottoman, Russian, and Qing contexts involved the issue of representing and managing diverse interest groups, defined in ethnic, religious, regional, and other terms. Whereas empires traditionally bound together these groups by patrimonial arrangements, parliamentary representation offered the chance to foster national cohesion in the era of constitutional inclusionary nation-states or modernized empire-states.17 In this sense, these Eurasian parliamentary formations could at times offer even more representation than the parliaments of the European colonial empires, as they granted political representation to dependent territories.
To address these issues, the volume sets out to trace the relevant transnational interactions among imperial and postimperial intellectuals, their engagement in global discussions, and the parliamentary practices through which parliaments have come into being outside the Atlantic context. It offers nine case studies covering the extreme East of Eurasia and the Eastern part of the European subcontinent, including the former Russian, Qing, Ottoman, and Japanese Empires, as well as their successor states. Chapter 1, co-written by Ivan Sablin, Egas Moniz Bandeira, Jargal Badagarov, Martin Dorn, and Irina Sodnomova, traces how vernacular concepts and mythologies of parliamentarism were created as local refractions of a global process. This chapter compares the formation of new parliamentary institutions in the two largest land empires of Eurasia - Russia and the Qing - and their postimperial transformations until the 1920s. The authors chart the genealogies of the Russian State Duma and the Qing Political Consultative Council, positioning them in the vernacular conceptual contexts and the wider discussions about imperial and postimperial modernizations. Although the main point of reference during the attempted imperial modernizations was the Western parliament as a generalized idea, the State Duma and the Zizhengyuan were often explicitly distinguished from it. Thereby, the chapter shows that both organs were conceived of as etatist rather than popular institutions reacting to internal pressures and external crises.
Both the Russian and Qing governments’ decision to institute the respective deliberative organs were accelerated by the emergence of Japan as a new and vigorous international player, which managed to militarily defeat the Qing in 1894-1895 and Russia in 1904-1905. Japan had undergone a stunning political transformation in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was coronated by the establishment of a constitutional government and the convening of the Imperial Diet in 1890. In Chapter 2, Yuri Kono challenges the view that at the roots of Japanese parliamentarism lay transplants from Western Europe made in the wake of the so-called Meiji Restoration. Instead, his study takes us back to the last years of the Tokugawa government (bakumatsu), showing that the bakumatsu intellectuals grasped parliamentarism in terms of existing debates on the Confucian notions of hôken (commonly translated as “feudal” government) and gunken (government by division into districts and provinces). At the same time, contemporary intellectuals who were studying "Western learning” comprehended the new idea in the context of Montesquieu’s theory of the division of powers and its practice in the American continent. Thereby, Kono reconstructs the 1860s as a pivotal momement which remained influential after the abolition of the domain system and the establishment of prefectures by the Meiji government in 1871 and contributed to the formation of the peculiar features of Japan’s present-day representative democracy.
Bruce Grover’s Chapter 3 continues Yuri Kono’s contribution into the 1880s and 1890s by offering a case study of the parliamentary ideas of Torio Koyata, a conservative Meiji-time military commander and politician. Grover explains that Torio aggressively promoted a constitutional parliamentarianism suited for Japanese culture to oppose both the rise of liberalism and the despotism of the ruling oligarchy. Just as bakumatsu intellectuals had stressed the importance of “public opinion” in governance, Torio attributed it to the ancient philosopher Mencius and approached liberal terms such as “liberty,” “equality,” and “natural law” from similar Confucian and Buddhist angles. This parliamentarian construct was designed to offset the rise of individualism, value-pluralism, and economic liberalism and protect a system of ethical cultivation under a benevolent Emperor. Furthermore, it had certain egalitarian consequences for perceptions of the people’s role in politics. This discourse not only facilitated Torio’s participation in the public sphere but also impacted a later generation of nationalists. The example of Torio’s philosophy, which drew from modern reinterpretations of strains of thought that had been long discussed on the Japanese archipelago, again shows how global and local elements were adapted to construct a specifically Japanese understanding of parliamentarism.
In other cases, parliamentary institutions not only were derived from and justified with familiar political philosophy but also expressly sought to revive ancient institutions of collective decision-making in the guise of modern parliamentarism. In Chapter 4, Ivan Sablin and Kuzma Kukushkin explore the historiographies of the early modem Russian assemblies, which were later termed zemskii sobor (“assembly of the land”), as well as the autocratic and democratic mythologies connected to the concept. W’hereas the current growing historiographic consensus does not see the zemskii sobor as a coherent institution, nineteenth-early twentieth century history writing integrated a mythologized zemskii sobor into the argumentations of both the opponents and the proponents of parliamentarism in Russia. Sablin’s and Kukushkin’s contribution reveals how constitutions and parliaments were often the result of governmental appropriation of such concepts for conservative goals. Although the autocratic approach to the zemskii sobor was idealistic, it became more practical at the summit of its popularity during the Revolution of 1905-1906/1907, when it was discussed by the government as a way to avoid bigger concessions. At the same time, regionalist approaches to Russia’s past and future became formative for the democratic mythology of the zemskii sobor, which persisted well into the Russian Civil War of 1918-1922.
If the foregoing examples referred to parliaments as elected representations, Chapter 5, by Egas Moniz Bandeira, unearths the significance of another type of collective decision-making institution: privy councils or councils of state as advisory bodies to the head of state. Whereas the Sûmitsuin - the Japanese refraction of the phenomenon - has been thought of as a historical anomaly next to the extinct or ceremonial privy councils of Central Europe, Moniz Bandeira shows that it was not. Using the cases of Japan, the Qing Empire, and the Republic of China, his chapter reconstructs how the idea of the head of state as a fourth -“neutral” or “moderating” - power within the state merged with the notion of the privy council as the formalized organ of said power, akin to the ministers of state as instruments of the executive branch and the parliament as the instrument of the legislative branch of government. Hence, far from being a moribund relic of the pre-constitutional past, such councils were a productive global element of constitutional architecture, which was variously adapted according to local needs and conditions. According to the circumstances, they provided a connection to the past, but also intervened substantially in the correlation of powers at the highest levels of state architecture. Eventually, they did not fall into disuse because of being useless, but because they became too closely associated with authoritarian politics and presidential strongmanship.
Oleksandr Polianichev’s Chapter 6 moves to an examination of how mythological underpinnings informed the implementation of parliamentary concepts in practice. In the aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, Cossack conservatives in the northwest of the Caucasus Viceroyalty of the Russian Empire, namely, the land of the Kuban Cossack Host, devised a rada (“council” or “assembly”) as a platform to assert their loyalty to the throne in Saint Petersburg. However, soon after its establishment, the institution mined into a representative assembly with parliamentary ambitions. Celebrating local cultural distinctiveness, the rada fashioned itself as a “restored” ancient political practice of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. Hence, the chapter is an example that parliamentary institutions often developed a life of their own not necessarily intended by their founders.
In Chapter 7, Ellinor Morack continues the analysis of imperial and postimperial parliamentary practices on the example of the lower chamber of parliament (Meclis-i Mebusari) in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. In her study comprising the two Ottoman constitutional periods (1876-1878 and 1908-1920) and the first three years of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (1920-1923) up to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, Morack identifies two diverging yet parallel trends which persisted throughout this time: a drive toward the strengthening of parliament vis-à-vis other constitutional institutions was offset by the prevailing of an authoritarian spirit in the guise of parliamentarism. Morack shows that an increase in parliamentary powers was usually followed by serious conflicts with the executive, which would then drastically curb the chamber’s de facto competences. While initially violations of the parliamentary rules of procedure were mostly committed by other institutions, such as the Sultan and the Sultanic government, the deputies’ faithfulness with the internal regulations decreased massively during the period of the postimperial transformation in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Hence, it was not only the executive which obstructed the parliament but sometimes the members of parliament themselves.
Whenever the competences of a parliament were curtailed, the accusation of sham parliamentarism lay near. After a period of an explicitly anti-parliamentary regime in the Soviet Union, which nevertheless included representative bodies, the Constitution of 1936 reintroduced a universally elected assembly vested with supreme authority, the Supreme Soviet. The elections were however never contested, and the Communist-led bloc always won them. All decisions were made in the Communist Party and then unanimously ratified by the Soviet “parliament.”18 The Supreme Soviet was not a unique institution and can be compared to the assemblies in the one-party regimes of Turkey and China.19 As a consensus forum, it was also quite similar to the assemblies in the one-party regimes of Italy and Germany. Furthermore, in many one-party regimes, the ruling parties had their own quasi-parliamentary assemblies, substituting thereby state institutions.20
But what then was the function of such assemblies? One would be tempted to see them as little more than theatrical façades, but Olga Velikanova’s analysis of the 1936 Soviet Constitution in Chapter 8 finds a much denser set of functions fulfilled by the Supreme Soviet than is usually assumed. Based on extensive archival research, she shows that the crafters of the 1936 Constitution did not see it as a mere sham but that they were genuinely attached to Vladimir Il'ich Lenin’s vision of a future socialist state and a subsequent full-fledged democracy, including his critique of bourgeois parliamentarism and his dreams about future forms of representative institutions. Placing the 1936 Constitution in a larger historical context, Velikanova demonstrates that the Soviet government introduced the new Constitution to achieve international, ideological, and political goals. What made the Supreme Soviet functionally a sham was the result of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin’s self-deception about the successful socialist transformation of the economy and society by the mid-1950s and of the clash of such a utopian thinking with the Soviet reality of recurrent crises.
The last contribution (Chapter 9) by Henrike Rudolph illuminates an institution which continues to exist until the present day: the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The first session of the body, convened in September 1949, shortly before the formal proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, became a central element in its foundation myth. Basing herself on previously neglected Chinese primary sources, Rudolph examines the meticulous staging of the conference preparation and demonstrates that the Communist Party used the conference to vie for public support from China’s minor political groups. It was a crucial means of uniting left-leaning intellectuals under Mao Zedong’s slogan of “New Democracy” while isolating potential opposition forces. At the same time, as the conference served as an element of continuity with the popular notions of the Republican past, it was - and is - subordinated to Marxist notions of the leadership of the proletariat, projecting an image of a government empowered by consensual decision-making and popular support.
Although the existence of a representative element at the center of the political structure is almost universally accepted, the cases, studied in this volume, show that there were alternative approaches to parliamentary modernity. The parliamentary institutions in one-party regimes, especially in the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic, emulated some elements of an imperial parliament, such as symbolic interest group representation (for instance, ethnic, professional, and gender), and integrated the diverse nationalities and social strata within one state, building thereby inclusionaiy national communities. Such institutions also performed as the linkage between the party authorities and the populace, fostered political and ideological education and socialization, and contributed to elite recruitment, all of which resembled the etatist agenda of the imperial policymakers.21 One-party regimes have survived and continue to evolve, at times featuring direct connections to the concepts, mythologies, and practices studied in this volume.22 The experience of imperial and postimperial Eurasia is also crucial for-understanding the now global phenomenon of authoritarian constitutionalism as not a mere deviant of its liberal counterpart, but as a phenomenon which developed in parallel to and in interaction with it, in which assemblies have a number of different functions beyond that of a façade, and which again postponed the end of history.23
- 1 Kelly L. Grotke and Markus J. Prutsch, eds., Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 2 Max Weber, “Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 23 (1906): 165-401.
- 3 See Egas Moniz Bandeira, “China and the Political Upheavals in Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia: Non-Western Influences on Constitutional Thinking in Late Imperial China, 1893-1911,” The Journal of Transcultural Studies 8, no. 2 (2017): 64-66.
- 4 Andrei Medushevsky, Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary Development (London: Routledge, 2006), 16-17.
- 5 John Gorgone, “Soviet Jurists in the Legislative Arena: The Reform of Criminal Procedure, 1956-1958,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 3, no. 1 (1976): 1; Daniel Nelson, “Communist Legislatures and Communist Politics,” in Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, eds. Daniel Nelson and Stephen White (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), 2.
- 6 Geoffrey A. Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), vii; Cui Xuesen
“Qingting zhixian yu Mingzhi Riben” їпЙФУЙЙВД'ЖНФ (The Qing Court’s Constitution-Making and Meiji Japan) (Ph.D. diss., Peking University, 2015), 1; Zhao Hui, “Rethinking Constitutionalism in Late 19th and Early 20th Century China” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2012), 7.
Cui, “Qingting zhixian yu Mingzhi Riben,” I.
Pasi lhalainen, Cornelia Hie, and Kari Palonen, eds., Parliaments and Parliamentarism: A Comparative History of a European Concept (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); Remieg Aerts et al., eds., The Idea! of Parliament in Europe since 1800 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, eds. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Philip Norton, Lord Norton of Louth, and Nizam Ahmed, Parliaments in Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Zheng Yongnian, Lye Liang Fook, and Wilhelm Hofmeister, Parliaments in Asia: Institution Building and Political Development (London: Routledge, 2017).
Hasan Kayali, “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (1995): 265-286; Alexander Semyonov, ‘“The Real and Live Ethnographic Map of Russia’: The Russian Empire in the Mirror of the State Duma,” in Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, eds. Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 191-228; David Brophy, “Five Races, One Parliament? Xinliai in Xinjiang and the Problem of Minority Representation in the Chinese Republic,” Inner Asia 14, no. 2 (2012): 343-364; Egas Moniz Bandeira, “Late Qing Parliamentarism and the Borderlands of the Qing Empire - Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (1906-1911),” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 15-29; Alexander M. Semyonov, “Imperial Parliament for a Hybrid Empire: Representative Experiments in the Early 20th-Century Russian Empire,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 30-39.
Charles Kurzman, Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Egas Moniz Bandeira, “China and the Political Upheavals in Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia: NonWestern Influences on Constitutional Thinking in Late Imperial China, 1893-1911,” The Journal of Transcultural Studies 8, no. 2 (2017): 40-78; Adrian Brisku, Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires: A Comparative Approach (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).
Jurgen Rtiland, Clemens Jtirgenmeyer, Michael H. Nelson, and Patrick Ziegenliein, Parliaments and Political Change in Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 27.
Arjun Appadurai, “How Histories Make Geographies,” The Journal of Transcultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 4-13.
The authors of this volume understand empires not as vestiges of the past, but as composite social and political spaces produced by multilayered difference and polities governed through it. See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Ilya Gerasimov et al., “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire,” in Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, eds. Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 3-32. Larry Wolff', Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Englightenment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
David Brophy, “Five Races, One Parliament? Xinhai in Xinjiang and the Problem of Minority Representation in the Chinese Republic,” Inner Asia 14, no. 2 (2012): 343-364; Egas Moniz Bandeira, “Late Qing Parliamentarism and the Borderlands of the Qing Empire - Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (1906-1911),” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 15-29.
- 18 Peter Henry Ju viler, “Functions of a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938-1959” (Ph.D. diss. Political Science, Columbia University, I960), 3.
- 19 Both in Turkey and the Republic of China, however, there were many more opportunities for expressing dissenting views. See, for instance, Ahmet Demirel, “Representation of the Eastern and Southeastern Provinces in the Turkish Parliament during the National Struggle and Single-Party Era (1920-1946),” New Perspectives on TUrkey 44 (2011): 73-102; Louise Edwards, “Feminist Campaigns for Quotas for Women in Politics, 1936-1947,” Twentieth-Century China 24, no. 2 (1999): 69-105.
- 20 Enzo Fimiani, “Elections, Plebiscitary Elections, and Plebiscites in Fascist Italy and Nazi-Germany: Comparative Perspectives,” in Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th Century Dictatorships, eds. Ralph Jessen and Hedwig Richter (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011), 237; Antonio Costa Pinto, “Corporatism and ‘Organic Representation’ in European Dictatorships,” in Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe, ed. Antonio Costa Pinto (London: Routledge, 2019), 11-12; Markus Urban, “The Self-Staging of a Plebiscitary Dictatorship: The NS-Regime between ‘Uniformed Reichstag,’ Referendum and Reichsparteitag,” in Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th Century Dictatorships, eds. Ralph Jessen and Hedwig Richter (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011), 44-45.
- 21 Nelson, “Communist Legislatures and Communist Politics,” 11; Peter Vanneman, The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), 62.
- 22 Ngoc Son Bui, Constitutional Change in the Contemporary Socialist World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 117-118, 243.
- 23 Helena Alviar García and Gunter Frankenberg, Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Comparative Analysis and Critique (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), x; Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3-18.
Aerts, Remieg, Carla van Baalen, Henk te Velde, Margit van der Steen, and Marie-Luise Recker, eds. The Ideal of Parliament in Europe since 1800. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Alviar García, Helena, and Gunter Frankenberg. Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Comparative Analysis and Critique. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019.
Appadurai, Arjun. “How Histories Make Geographies.” Transcultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 4-13. doi: 10.11588/ts.2010.1.6129.
Brisku, Adrian. Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires: A Comparative Approach. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.
Brophy, David. “Five Races, One Parliament? Xinhai in Xinjiang and the Problem of Minority Representation in the Chinese Republic.” Inner Asia 14, no. 2 (2012): 343-364. doi: 10.1163/22105018-90000009.
Bui, Ngoc Son. Constitutional Change in the Contemporary Socialist World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Butler, William Elliott. Soviet Law. London: Butterworths, 1988.
Cui Xuesen Ж'-г-Й:, "Qingting zhixian yu Mingzhi Riben” [The
Qing Court's constitution-making and Meiji Japan]. Ph.D. diss., Peking University, 2015.
Demirel, Ahmet. “Representation of the Eastern and Southeastern Provinces in the Turkish Parliament during the National Struggle and Single-Party Era (1920-1946).” New Perspectives on Turkey 44 (2011): 73-102. doi: 10.4000/ejts.497.
Edwards, Louise. “Feminist Campaigns for Quotas for Women in Politics, 1936-1947.” Twentieth-Century China 24, no. 2 (1999): 69-105. doi: 10.1179/tcc.1918.104.22.168.
Fimiani, Enzo. “Elections, Plebiscitary Elections, and Plebiscites in Fascist Italy and Nazi-Germany: Comparative Perspectives.” In Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th Century Dictatorships, edited by Ralph Jessen and Hedwig Richter, 231-253. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011.
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3-18.
Gerasimov, Ilya, Sergey Glebov, Jan Kusber, Marina Mogilner, and Alexander Semyonov. “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire.” In Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, edited by Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov, 3-32. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Alberto Simpser, eds. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Gorgone, John. “Soviet Jurists in the Legislative Arena: The Reform of Criminal Procedure, 1956-1958.” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 3, no. 1 (1976): 1-35. doi: 10.1163/187633276X00016.
Grotke, Kelly L., and Markus J. Prutsch, eds. Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hosking, Geoffrey A. The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Ihalainen, Pasi, Cornelia Hie, and Kari Palonen, eds. Parliaments and Parliamentarism: A Comparative History of a European Concept. New York: Berghalm Books, 2016.
Juviler, Peter Henry. “Functions of a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938— 1959.” Ph.D. diss. Political Science, Columbia University, 1960.
Kayali, Hasan. “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876—1919.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (1995): 265-286. doi: 10.1017/ S0020743800062085.
Kurzman, Charles. Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Medushevsky, Andrei. Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary Development. London: Routledge, 2006.
Moniz Bandeira, Egas. “China and the Political Upheavals in Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia: Non-Western Influences on Constitutional Thinking in Late Imperial China, 1893-1911.” TransculturalStudies 8, no. 2 (2017): 40-78. doi: 10.17885/heiup.ts.2017 .2.23701.
------. “Late Qing Parliamentarism and the Borderlands of the Qing Empire - Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (1906-1911).” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 15-29. doi: 10.1177°/o2F1879366520901923.
Nelson, Daniel. “Communist Legislatures and Communist Politics.” In Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, edited by Daniel Nelson and Stephen White, 1-13. London: Macmillan Press, 1982.
Norton, Philip, Lord Norton of Louth, and Nizam Ahmed. Parliaments in Asia. London: Routledge, 2013.
Pinto, Antonio Costa. “Corporatism and ‘Organic Representation’ in European Dictatorships.” In Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe, edited by Antonio Costa Pinto, 3-41. London: Routledge, 2019.
Rüland, Jürgen, Clemens Jürgemneyer, Michael H. Nelson, and Patrick Ziegenhein. Parliaments and Political Change in Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
Semyonov, Alexander M. ‘“The Real and Live Ethnographic Map of Russia’: The Russian Empire in the Mirror of the State Duma.’’ In Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, edited by Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov, 191-228. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
-------. “Imperial Parliament for a Hybrid Empire: Representative Experiments in the Early 20th-Century Russian Empire.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 30-39. doi: lO.1177«/o2F187936652O9O2868.
Urban, Markus. “The Self-Staging of a Plebiscitary Dictatorship: The NS-Regime between ‘Uniformed Reichstag’ Referendum and Reichsparteitag.” In Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th Century Dictatorships, edited by Ralph Jessen and Hedwig Richter, 39-58. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011.
Vanneman, Peter. The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977.
Weber, Max. “Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus.” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 23 (1906): 165-401.
Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Englightenment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Zhao, Hui. “Rethinking Constitutionalism in Late 19th and Early 20th Century China.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2012.
Zheng, Yongnian, Lye Liang Fook, and Wilhelm Hofmeister. Parliaments in Asia: Institution Building and Political Development. London: Routledge, 2017.