Partnering enforcement with compliance

Comparing the compliance pattern of the Protocol and the CBD as substantive and procedural, it is not difficult to observe that the compliance stakeholders involved in the Protocol achieved both procedural and substantive objectives, whereas those in the CBD have rarely done so. Procedurally, there is a lack of information about the involved industries and the resources they have, and even the commercial benefits associated with biodiversity are not present. Poor procedural compliance partly explains the equally poor substantive compliance because of lack of motivation and concrete interests to fulfil the goal of the CBD. In addition, the degree of pairing or partnership between enforcement and compliance agents, namely government institutions and sectors, simply augments the contrast between procedural and substantive efforts.

The government-sector interaction pattern in the implementation of the Montreal Protocol is best summarised as strong leadership by the SEPB and a clear division of labour among various relevant ministries, in the format of 1:1 or 2:1 cooperation. The only exception is the production of methyl bromide, an ozone- depleting substance extensively used as a pesticide and effective soil sterilant. and this sector is monitored by five government institutions. In comparison, the very idea of “sector” used in the CBD is very lax, and unlike the detailed knowledge of sectoral information indicated in the Montreal Protocol, the “sectors” mentioned in the CBD national reports are self evident.

The relationship between enforcement and the sectors is more supportive than regulative. For instance, the biotechnology industry receives generous backing from the government: the State Economic Commission pinpointed biotechnology studies as a key area for support from 1996 to 2000; the State Science and Technology Commission outlined major technologies to be developed in conservation and biotechnology; the State Patent Administration giants biotechnology patent protection; the Chinese Academy of Science is at the forefront of biotechnology research, together with the China National Centre for Biotechnology Development under the Ministry of Science and Technology. What is missing in the national report is any mention of investment in the biotechnology industry. For five consecutive years, from 1999 to 2003, the Chinese government allocated RMB2.5 billion and attracted RJVIB24 billion in social capital for 287 projects with the purpose of industrialising biotechnology.46

Furthermore, while the fourth national report highlights the importance of the sectoral approach, the content does not indicate how enterprises and industries can be encouraged to comply but still adopts an enforcement-focused approach. One representative example is the marine sector, and concrete measures to integrate biodiversity into marine strategies are “strengthening the establishment and management of marine protected areas”, “energetically protecting the environment of islands and islets”, “conducting marine ecological surveys”, “actively carrying out marine ecological restoration” and “strengthening examination and approval of use of sea areas and assessment of the environmental impacts of marine projects”.47

The sole actor in the marine sector, unsurprisingly, is the State Oceanic Administration, once again an enforcement agent performing more like a compliance agent. Fisheries are not even included in the marine sector, not to mention the vast number of fishermen. To a large degree, the “sectors” used in the Montreal Protocol refer to companies and industries or non-state actors, whereas the sectors perceived in the CBD are not significantly different from the enforcement actors. Table 3.3 provides an overview of how enforcement agents are matched with interest groups which are expected to comply.

It is worth noting that China is not the only country to fail to meet CBD objectives. In fact, none of the Parties did so. Hence the 2010 Aiclii target was introduced, bearing in mind the biggest problem of the previous efforts: that biodiversity is

The Montreal Protocol

Convention on Biological Diversity

Ministry of Public Security

Hal on Sector

State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine and State Intellectual Pr operty Office

Traditional Chinese Medicine Industry

SEPB and State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Administration

CFCs Sector

State Forestry Administration (SFA)

Forestry Sector

SEPB and China Plastics Processing Industry Association

Foam Sector

State Tourism Administration. SEPB and SFA and Ministry of Commerce and Finance

Tourism Sector

SEPB and State Administr ation of Machinery Industry

Mobile Air' Conditioning Sector

State Economic Commission. State Science and Technology Commission. State Patent Administration and Chinese Academy of Science; Ministry of Agriculture

Biotechnology Industry

SEPB and State Tobacco Monopoly Administration

Tobacco Sector

Ministry of Agriculture

Agricultural Sector

SEPB

CTC Sector (production)

Ministry of Urban and Rural Housing and Development

Urban and Rural Development Sector

SEPB and China Household Electronical Appliances Association

Household Refrigeration Sector

Other mentioned but not specified sectors:

Marine Biodiversity. Water Resources. Education. Science and

SEPB

Industrial and Commercial Refrigeration

Technology. Poverty Alleviation and Development. Land and Resource Management, Commerce, Customs. Intellectual

SEPB and State Food and Drug Administration

Aerosol Spray Sector

Pr operty Management, Breeding of Wild Animals

SEPB. Ministry of Agriculture and State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, State Administration of Grain and General Administration of Quality Supervision. Inspection and Quarantine and General Administration of Customs and Ministry of Commerce

Methyl Bromide Sector

SEPB and Ministry of Information Industry

Solvent Sector

SEPB and China National Chemical Construction Corporation

TCA Production Sector

SEPB and Association of Automobile Manufacturers

Refrigeration Maintenance Sector

not mainstreamed in each country's economic-socio-political developments. The high expectation of the Convention derives largely from the high-profile commitments the Chinese government made back in 1992. The assumption is that authoritarian regimes could achieve better environmental governance because of then- capability to concentrate resources for ambitious projects and causes (jizhong liliang ban das hi However, a comparison of the implementation patterns of the Protocol and the CBD challenges the assumption and optimistic judgment. The following analysis demonstrates how domestic groups put the brakes on further commitments to international environmental treaties.

 
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