More than a Gig? Ride-hailing in Los Angeles County

Tia Koonse, Lucero Herrera, Saba Waheed, Janna Shadduck-Hernändez, Ana Luz Gonzalez-Vasquez, and Kean Flowers

In 2019, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB5), extending labor protections and other workplace benefits such as healthcare and the right to collective bargaining to gig workers formerly classified as independent contractors.¹ The law codified Dynamex Operations West, Inc. u Superior Court case, and adopted the so-called ABC test that makes independent contractor classification illegal unless companies demonstrate that the worker is free of the company’s control, is doing work outside of the company’s usual course of business, and has a trade, occupation, or business in the field.²

Unsurprisingly, arguing that classifying drivers as employees would dramatically change their business model and negatively impact their bottom line, transportation network companies (TNCs), such as Uber and Lyft, pushed back against AB5, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a ballot proposition. With the recent passage of Proposition 22, drivers are now exempted from AB5 permanently classifying them as independent contractors under state law.

From the onset, the TNC business model has largely relied on misclassifying drivers as independent contractors. Misclassification has deprived drivers of legal protection from discrimination and sexual harassment; has excluded them from recent labor gains, such as a higher minimum wage, paid sick time, and fair scheduling practices; and, significantly, has prevented them from engaging in collective bargaining to address these issues, as independent contractors are not protected from retaliation for these activities and can be “deactivated” from their Uber and Lyft accounts.³

This chapter illustrates the working conditions and experiences of TNC drivers, preceding the passage of AB5. It portrays the reality of TNC drivers in the so-called gig economy, foregrounds the experience of drivers, and describes what this labor actually entails. It is based on 260 surveys and eight in-depth interviews with ridehailing drivers in Los Angeles County conducted in 2017, as well as an extensive policy and literature review. Many of the drivers we interviewed and surveyed relied on their TNC “gig” work as their primary or as a significant source of income, invested considerable resources in securing such work, and enjoyed flexible hours but wanted the control and benefits afforded to regular employees. We conclude by calling on policymakers to establish fair working conditions, ensure greater transparency and oversight of the sector, and allow for worker organizing.

Ride-Hailing in Los Angeles

Los Angeles is an ideal site for on-demand ride-hailing companies, also known as TNCs. In a city with over 8,000 people per square mile and decades-late investment in public transit, TNCs have flourished to accommodate the deficiencies of Los Angeles’s neglected public transit options.⁴ Given the simplicity, reliability, and convenience that Uber advertised to Los Angeles residents,⁵ it is no surprise that TNCs were widely welcomed into the city’s confines.

According to the National Center for Sustainable Transportation, about 32% of Angelenos have adopted ride-hailing, making Los Angeles one of the largest ride-hail markets in the US.⁶ Los Angeles has been particularly receptive to an expanded ride-hailing driver base and an increased consumer demand for multiple reasons, among them the city’s expansive geography, urban sprawl, and limited public transit coverage for many neighborhoods.⁷ Though public transportation infrastructure is expanding, recent estimates indicate that only 9% of commuters take public transportation to work, and 70% drive to work alone.⁸ Local government support of ride-hailing platforms to meet regional mobility needs has also contributed to the rise of TNCs in Los Angeles,⁹ and many concede that the rise of these platforms has generally made mobility smoother for consumers.

Precarity in Gig Work

Gig work is the latest iteration of casual, contingent, and precarious work—work that is nonstandard, is often temporary, and has lower wages, income instability, job insecurity, and higher rates of workplace injuries and health issues.¹⁰ The work’s “invisibilization of money exchanges between driver and rider, nonbranded fleet, and volunteeristic labor” obscures its labor as labor." These conditions render drivers vulnerable to exploitative work conditions, particularly for those who rely on it as a primary job and source of income. TNCs often engage in aggressive marketing strategies to lure prospective drivers “with the promise of bonuses of several hundred dollars and high five-figure annual income, but without revealing the costs and risks associated with ride-hailing.”¹² A 2015 Uber study asserted that drivers averaged more than $19 an hour before expenses.¹³ Other studies that incorporate the cost of driving find that gross earnings are between $8.55 and $11.77—the bottom fifth of wage earners and less than the lowest-paid service sector worker.¹⁴ As platform services and rates frequently shift, uncertainty becomes standardized, as do drivers’ income insecurity and absence of benefits.¹’ This uncertainty does not decline over time, as drivers are generally not better compensated due to seniority or tenure.¹⁶

Such working conditions produce an alienated precarity characterized by irregular, insecure, and isolated work, which fails to provide drivers with lasting financial and social mobility.¹⁷ This precarious labor model has been a wider trend in neoliberal, late capitalist societies for decades.¹⁸ The growth of TNC platforms such as Uber and Lyft is predicated on indirect employment and precarious work arrangements that have relied on technological capabilities to optimize and manage labor through data collection.¹⁹ The simplicity of activating an app as a consumer or driver and being linked to a service makes such a platform appealing. However, lack of regulation and oversaturation of drivers has led to further problems that exacerbate the precarity of such work. Often, drivers must remain on call due to the accessibility of a smartphone and a saturated market that drives down working conditions, causing drivers to work more hours for less income.²⁰

Drivers also face conditions that are stressful and can compromise their health and safety. Drivers report that they feel pressure to accept rides and extend their working day to avoid deactivation, or job loss.²¹ (Because drivers were working excessive hours, Uber recently implemented limits to ensure rest.²²) In fact, some studies have shown increased risks related to kidney failure, back pain, and respiratory illnesses.²³ These illnesses have resulted in disabilities due to poor working conditions that push workers toward more hours, fewer breaks, and physical deterioration that makes driving unsustainable.²⁴

Methodology

The study uses a multimethod research approach that includes surveys, interviews, and academic and policy research. In August and September 2017, UCLA students conducted face-to-face surveys with 260 TNC drivers throughout Los Angeles County. The survey collected information on drivers’ work experience, attitudes toward driving and navigating platform work, earnings and expenses, working environment, and preferences and expectations for the future. To complement the survey data, students also conducted in-person interviews with eight TNC drivers in Los Angeles. Interviews covered topics such as working conditions, employment classification, organizing, and job satisfaction.

Findings

More Than a Gig

Many of today’s gig apps materialized during the Great Recession, which created the conditions necessary for those who were unemployed or underemployed to turn to the gig economy²’ and monetize their cars, driving skills, or homes. For

before survey

FIGURE 2.1 Days and hours of driving

some, driving is a necessary bridge between other jobs or ways to supplement their income. Since the recession, many workers who once held high-wage jobs, within a diminished field of opportunity, have taken low-wage work.²¹’ This may explain why gig work is continually expanding as unemployment is reaching record lows.²⁷ A number of studies have reiterated the part-time nature of this work: one found that workers spend about 12 hours of platform work per week,²“ and another found that half of drivers work 15 hours or fewer a week.²⁹ Yet our study establishes that many drivers stay in this work longer and work more hours per day. Thus, we question whether this work is actually short term, as many in our sample describe TNC work as their full-time, primary employment.

Our survey found that 47% of respondents drive for a TNC as their only job. Even for those with other jobs, driving for a TNC is a significant source of income. Among all drivers in our sample, 66% depend on driving as their main source of income. Almost half of those surveyed reported driving 35 hours or more a week, and three in five drive more than five days a week. On average, respondents reported driving seven hours a day, with half stating that they drove more than eight hours a day during the week before the survey (Figure 2.1).

Drivers use their earnings to sustain both themselves and family members. Over half support at least one other person in their family, and over one-third of drivers support their family with at least one child present. Our survey also found that nearly one in five drivers receive some form of public assistance, such as food assistance, housing subsidies, and other assistance programs for low-income families.

TABLE 2.1 Selected driver characteristics

Though multiple studies have noted high rates of turnover,³⁰ our survey found a lower rate of driver exit within the first six months: only about one-third of those surveyed had driven for their current TNC for less than six months, while almost two out of 10 had driven between six months and one year, and more than half had driven for over a year. On average, TNC drivers have been on the job for 13 months.

There are commonalities among those for whom driving is their main source of income, who drive full-time hours, and who have driven for more than a year: they tend to be older and are more likely to be immigrants, to hold driving as their primary job, and to stay in the profession for a longer time span. There are, however, distinct differences between part-time and full-time drivers and in driving tenure. Part-time drivers are usually younger than their full-time counterparts, are more likely to be US-born and have shorter driving tenures, and are less likely to support a child. Those that have driven for less than a year are more likely to be younger than their counterparts, work part-time hours, and not rely on driving as their primary job (Table 2.1).

The Cost of Driving

While taxis have a set meter rate based on an array of factors, such as the cost of living, TNC fares vary widely. Generally, TNCs create fixed, nonnegotiated formulas that include a base fare plus per-minute and per-distance rates for the time and distance from pickup to drop-off, surge pricing, the company’s fee, and whether other fees are applicable.³¹ Recent studies have noted discrepancies between what the companies advertise as average hourly pay and what drivers actually earn.³² Drivers, meanwhile, endure costs such as wear and tear on their vehicles, gas, car insurance, repairs, car maintenance, taxes, and additional expenses such as AUX cables, candy, and water. Estimates on work-related expenses incurred by drivers are difficult to measure. While studies on earnings are widespread, less is known about the hidden costs of driving.

The gig economy emerged during a period of national economic recession, and monetizing one’s resources became a way to navigate that uncertainty. The majority of drivers in our sample use their own car, with about a quarter leasing their cars. Over a third of drivers, however, purchased or leased their car in order to drive for the company: 22% of the drivers purchased and 14% leased in order to drive for the TNC. This heavy financial investment necessarily locks drivers into their work, and those who purchased or leased their car to drive for the company are more likely to work longer hours. More than half of those who purchased, and almost two-thirds who leased to drive for the company, work 35 hours or more a week.

In addition to paying for general maintenance costs for their vehicles, drivers incur other major expenses, such as gas and insurance, and almost half of drivers report experiencing difficulties paying for these various work-related expenses. Many drivers incur additional expenses by purchasing accessories for their riders. Over three-quarters provide amenities such as water, candy, and AUX cables, and eight in 10 purchased cell-phone mounts and mats. These are provided at no extra charge to riders, and some have come to expect them and file unfavorable ratings to drivers who don’t provide them.³³ An Uber driver expressed his concerns over these expectations: “When passengers ask for water, I feel like I have to provide [it] as if it were conditions of a contract, even though it’s not. I don’t like how passengers think drivers should provide these for them.”³⁴

In order to pay for these additional expenses, drivers report having to work more hours, using their credit cards, asking parents/friends for a loan, or taking out loans with another third party, and employing other means including using savings, working more hours at a second job, or picking up additional gigs through other on-demand platforms such as Postmates.

Out-of-pocket expenses significantly diminish drivers’ earnings. A recent Economic Policy Institute study found that Uber drivers earn less than the minimum wage in many major urban areas, including Los Angeles.³’ When we asked drivers if they would prefer to earn a set hourly wage after expenses, more than half said that they would. Among those who would like to receive a set hourly wage, the majority want a guaranteed hourly rate of SI 5 or more. About one in three drivers would like to earn $21 an hour or more, and only 13% would like to earn less than $15 an hour. The median hourly wage that drivers would prefer to earn is $19.

The pressure of the job is a significant, if less quantifiable, cost of the work. Much of the work of app-based drivers is monitored and evaluated on the app through which they work. Poor rider reviews, low acceptance rates, and customer complaints can deactivate drivers from their work entirely. This essential fact underlines the precarity of this form of work and necessarily endangers the well-being of the driver. Both Uber and Lyft ask riders to rate their driver following the use of their service. Individual scores are then used to calculate an average score for each driver, and if a score falls below a certain point, then the company may issue a warning or deactivate—fire—the driver from the platform. Our survey found that over half of drivers feel pressured to elicit good reviews, though the majority have received negative reviews. Drivers can be also suspended or deactivated if a passenger files a complaint. Over one-third of drivers have had a customer complain to the company, and only half were able to address it. Among those who have had a passenger complaint sent to the TNC, 20% were deactivated. Almost one-third of respondents fear deactivation.

Driving the Conditions of Work

While drivers generally find flexible work schedules appealing, studies have found that many contingent workers would actually prefer to enter or rejoin the permanent workforce but are prevented from doing so for multiple reasons: the rules of temporary employment agencies, a lack of choices due to economic need, or gaps in knowledge about the conditions of independent contract work.³⁶

Our research finds that drivers want control over their work but also the benefits of employee status. For example, close to two-thirds of drivers surveyed said the company was not their boss, yet over half said they would like to become TNC employees. Even among those who would like to retain their status as independent contractors, most want the workplace benefits associated with traditional employment. Four in five drivers, for instance, want workers’ compensation, which provides workers with wage replacement and medical benefits if injured on the job, and health insurance. About 79% would like to receive overtime pay, while 74% would like paid sick leave and access to a retirement plan.

Drivers in our survey also want greater control over their contracts. Despite a business model that depends on drivers, Uber and Lyft often unilaterally change terms and conditions of their contracts at will.³⁷ More than half of the drivers we surveyed had experienced a modification in their contract at least once, and for nearly 40% of workers, it changed three or more times. Drivers cannot pick up passengers until they agree to the terms of contracts the TNC dictates.³⁸ In addition, each new contract includes language around arbitration from which drivers must opt out. If they have not opted out before, the previous arbitration agreement is retained.³⁹ While contracts are now exclusively developed by the TNCs, 81% of drivers in our study want to be able to negotiate the conditions of their contracts (Figure 2.2).

Drivers also report additional ways in which the companies exert control over their daily activities. Many experience stress from a TNC’s ceaseless communication, which is a form of “soft control” that encourages them to drive. Almost half receive a notification when the app is off and one-quarter feel stressed from the contact. In addition, 39% feel pressure to drive when they receive notifications of surge pricing. A 2016 study found that the Uber app’s use of algorithmic labor logistics shapes drivers’ approach to their work, performs electronic surveillance, and is instrumental in developing policies for performance targets.⁴" Half of the

Would like to become employees

Would like the ability to negotiate contract

Would like to belong to a worker/driver organization to demand better wages and working conditions

FIGURE 2.2 Drivers’ attitudes about working status

surveyed drivers are concerned about how the company apps track and surveil them.

Without the employment protections granted in AB5, drivers may be fired for organizing to improve their working conditions, as long as the TNC companies continue to treat them as independent contractors. Drivers we surveyed adamantly want the ability to come together with other drivers to advocate for themselves; eight in 10 drivers want to join a worker or driver organization. One driver reported,

|I| really would like to see the ridesharing crowd come up with their own independent union ... I think that specific representation would be essential and crucial to representing our interests like a specific labor sector. I would like to see that happen, and if that did I think it would be very positive in getting things done because I think it would be more representative of our beliefs.

Consistent with these survey responses, the past five years have brought about significant traction in the growth of various informal driver organizing groups such as Rideshare Drivers United and Gig Workers Rising.⁴¹

Conclusions and Recommendations

Working conditions in the gig economy have grown increasingly dire during the COVID-19 pandemic. Misclassified gig workers who lack paid sick leave, access to unemployment insurance, healthcare, workers’ compensation, company-provided personal protective equipment (PPE), and income predictability faced a heightened risk of COVID-19 infection, food insecurity, and homelessness.⁴² Meanwhile, gig companies invested hundreds of millions of dollars into Proposition 22—even though many of these same companies remain unprofitable— to continue to avoid reclassifying their workforce as employees or paying into unemployment insurance, workers compensation, or payroll taxes.

With the November 2020 passage of Proposition 22 in California, these companies are able to exempt their workforce from AB5. The proposition is unsettling for worker rights and organizing. It sets a dangerous precedent that companies can buy their way out of labor laws and upend the checks and balances between labor, government, and business. The proposition further maintains substandard working conditions for the gig sector; the limited benefits in Prop 22 fall well beneath what drivers would receive as employees. Finally, some studies suggest that many drivers won’t even receive the health subsidies and higher wages promised.⁴³

Our study showed this work is more than a gig. We found that many drivers stay in the work for longer durations and work more hours per day than do their traditional gig counterparts. We also found that drivers make significant financial investments into vehicles, accessories, and other amenities while covering expenses for car maintenance, gas, and insurance. Our findings show that while gig workers in Los Angeles value flexibility, they also desire a measure of predictability, safety, and income security, protections long available to other workers. With Prop 22 in effect, these drivers will be operating under gig-like employment terms while they provide part-time and full-time work.

Arguably, the proliferation of gig work has produced a system of unstable and unregulated labor founded upon the exploitation of drivers and capitalist business models that prioritize profit over worker rights.⁴⁴ Policymakers may consider the following recommendations to create an environment where technology' benefits both consumers and workers.

First, policymakers must ensure safe and dignified working conditions in the sector. With the passage of Prop 22, the independent contractor classification shields TNC companies from responsibility for many of the basic standards afforded to employees. Policymakers must (1) continue to challenge the exploitation of workers in the sector, such as refusal to pay workers for time spent waiting and driving to pick up passengers; (2) curb the expansion of misclassification into other gig work; (3) consider ways to create joint liability and expand the definition of “employer” to hold accountable corporate entities with deep pockets for wages, safety, and other working conditions; and (4) provide oversight and documentation of the conditions of work. Regular evaluation and monitoring of current and future TNC practices will facilitate enforcement of regulations as well as a greater understanding of how this labor model impacts workers, consumers, other businesses, public transportation, and the environment.

Second, policymakers should encourage democratized gig work, featuring greater transparency, less concentrated ownership, and proactive approaches to preventing displacement by technology. Platforms that allow workers to network with one another can be developed. These technologies could facilitate transparency around issues such as appeals processes for deactivation and could create systems for worker input. Cooperatively-owned apps controlled and/or co-owned by workers might channel fees into programs and direct services for workers. Given the imminent possibility of driverless cars, policymakers may also consider proactive policies that will support transitions to other forms of work.

Finally, workers need to be able to organize independently and advocate for their working conditions. Policymakers and worker advocates must develop strategies that remove barriers to organizing, such as retaliatory deactivation, and support institutions that center and lift up worker voices. Without a strong worker presence, power will continually fall on the company side, removing the checks and balances needed to ensure that worker rights, not profits, are driving decisions and policy agendas.

Notes

• 1. Kate Conger and Noam Scheibe, “California Bill Makes App-Based Companies Treat Workers as Employees,” New York Times, September 11, 2019, www.nytimes. com/2019/09/11/technology/california-gig-economy-bill.html.
• 2. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, S222732 Cal. Sup. Ct. (2018).
• 3. Denise Cheng, Is Sharing Really Caring? A Nuanced Introduction to the Peer Economy (Washington, DC: Open Society Foundation, 2014), 12-13, https://static.opensoci-etyfoundations.org/misc/future-of-work/the-sharing-economy.pdf.; Natasha Singer, “In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty,” New York Times, August 16,2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html.
• 4. Michael Storper, “The Neo-Liberal City as Idea and Reality,” Territory, Politics, Governance 4, no. 2 (2016): 241-63, https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2016.1158662.; Laura J. Nelson, “L.A. Is Hemorrhaging Bus Riders—Worsening Traffic and Hurting Climate Goals,” Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2019, www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ la-me-ln-bus-ridership-falling-los-angeles-la-metro-20190627-story.html.
• 5. Travis Kalanick, “Uber LA Officially Launched,” Uber Blog, March 8, 2012, www. uber.com/blog/los-angeles/uber-la-otficially-launched/.
• 6. Giovanni Circella, Farzad Alemi, Kate Tiedeman, Susan Handy, and Patricia Mokhtarian, The Adoption of Shared Mobility in California and Its Relationship With Other Components of Travel Behavior (Davis: UC Davis National Center for Sustainable Transportation, 2018), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1 kq5dO7p.
• 7. Laura Bliss, “Cities Have to Get Creative When Uber and Lyft Won’t Release Trip Data,” The Atlantic, January 13, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/ uber-lyft-cities-data/550433/.
• 8. US Census Bureau, “Census Reporter Profile: Los Angeles, CA,” accessed January 23, 2019, https://censusreporter.org/profiles/16000US0644000-los-angeles-ca/.

• 9. Emily Alpert Reyes, “At L.A. City Hall, It’s the Visionary vs. the Lawmakers,” Los Angeles Times, August 18, 2015, www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-adv-sharing-economy-20150818-story.html.
• 10. Veena Dubai, “The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Franciscos Taxi & Uber Economics,” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor (2017): 73, 75, https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/view content.cgi?article=2588&context=faculty_scholarship; Arne Kalleberg and Steven Valias, “Studying Precarious Work,” Work in Progress, December 20, 2017, https:// workinprogress.oowsection.org/2017/12/20/studying-precarious-work/.
• 11. Julietta Hua and Kasturi Ray, “Beyond the Precariat: Race, Gender, and Labor in the Taxi and Uber Economy,” Social Identities 24, no. 2 (2018): 276, https://doi.org/10.] 080/13504630.2017.1321721.
• 12. Lawrence Meyers, “Towards a Cost Estimate of a NYC UberX Driver: A White Paper,’’June 10, 2015, https://nyctaxinews.com/uber_white_paper.pdf.
• 13. Jonathan V. Hall and Alan B. Krueger, “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States,” IRLReview 71, no. 3 (May 2018): 725, https:// doi.org/10.1177/0019793917717222.
• 14. Alison Griswold, “Uber Drivers Make About as Much Money as Minimum Wage Workers,” Quartz, May 16, 2018, https://qz.com/1278707/the-uber-economy-is-actually-just-the-low-wage-economy/; Lawrence Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market: Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages, and the Scale of Uber and the Cig Economy (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2018), 2, www.epi.org/files/pdf/145552.pdf.
• 15. Cheng, “Is Sharing Really Caring? A Nuanced Introduction to the Peer Economy”: Singer, “In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty.”
• 16. Orly Lobel, “The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law,” University of San Francisco Law Review (2016): 66-67, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2848456.
• 17. Robert MacDonald and Andreas Giazitzoglu, “Youth, Enterprise and Precarity: Or, What Is, and What Is Wrong with, the ‘Gig Economy’?” Journal of Sociology 55, no. 4 (2019): 724-40, https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783319837604.
• 18. Ibid.
• 19. K. Sabeel Rahman and Kathleen Thelen, “The Rise of the Platform Business Model and the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism,” Politics & Society 47, no. 2 (2019): 177-204, https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329219838932.
• 20. MacDonald and Giazitzoglu, “Youth, Enterprise and Precarity: Or, What Is, and What Is Wrong with, the ‘Gig Economy’?”
• 21. Samantha Allen, “The Mysterious Way Uber Bans Its Drivers,” The Daily Beast, January 15, 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/the-mysterious-way-uber-bans-drivers; Avery Hartsman, “10 Ways Uber Drivers Can Get Kicked Off the App,” Business Insider, July 23, 2017, www.businessinsider.com/uber-is-recommitting-itself-to-putting-its-drivers-first-2016-11; Biz Carson, “Uber Is Making Changes to Eliminate the Fear Factor for Drivers,” Business Insider, November 27, 2016, www.businessinsider.com/ uber-is-recommitting-itself-to-putting-its-drivers-first-2016-11.
• 22. Faiz Siddiqui, “Uber Mandates a Six-Hour Rest Period for Frequent Drivers,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/ wp/2018/02/12/uber-mandates-a-six-hour-rest-period-for-frequent-drivers/?utm_ term=.alle95f2d9b7.
• 23. Hua and Ray, “Beyond the Precariat: Race, Gender, and Labor in the Taxi and Uber Economy.”
• 24. Ibid.
• 25. Nicholas Kacher and Stephan Weiler, Inside the Rise of the Cig Economy (Fort Collins: Colorado State University Regional Economic Development Institute, 2017), 2, https://redi.colostate.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/50/2017/06/REDI-report-April-gig-economy.pdf.

• 26. Beth Gutelius and Nik Theodore, “The Future of Work: Urban Economies in Transition,” in Jobs and the Labor Force of Tomorrow: Migration, Training, Education, ed. Michael A. Pagano (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017), 3-22, www.jstor.org/ stable/10.5406/j.cttlv2xtk2.4.
• 27. Abha Bhattarai, “Now Hiring, for a One-Dayjob: The Gig Economy Hits Retail,” The Washington Post, May 4, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/now-hiring-for-a-one-day-job-the-gig-economy-hits-retail/2018/05/04/2bebdd3c-4257-lle8-ad8f-27a8c409298b_story.html.
• 28. Intuit Tax and Financial Center, “Dispatches from the New Economy: The On-Demand Workforce” (2016), 4, https://intuittaxandfinancialcenter.com/wp-content/ uploads/2017/06/Dispatches-from-the-New-Economy-Long-Form-Report.pdf.
• 29. Jonathan V. Hall and Alan B. Krueger, “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States,” National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber. org/papers/w22843.
• 30. RosariaM.BerlinerandGilTal,“WhatDrivesYourDrivers:AnIn-DepthLookatLyftand Uber Drivers” (poster presentation, STEPS Symposium, Davis, CA, December 2017), https://steps.ucdavis.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/12.-BERLINERWhat-Drives-Your-Drivers-An-In-Depth-Look-at-Lyft-and-Uber-Drivers.-Rosaria-Berliner-Gil-Tal.pdf; Annette Bernhardt and Sarah Thomason, What Do We Know About Gig Work in California? An Analysis of Independent Contracting (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Labor Center, 2017), 16, https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/what-do-we-know-about-gig-work-in-california/.
• 31. “Uber Help,” Uber, accessed May 15, 2018, https://help.uber.com/; “Lyft Help Center,” Lyft, accessed May 15, 2018, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/ 115013080008-How-and-when-driver-pay-is-calculated#calculations.
• 32. Griswold, “Uber Drivers Make About as Much Money as Minimum Wage Workers”; Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market: Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages, and the Scale of Uber and the Gig Economy, 12-13.
• 33. Kat Kane, “The Big Hidden Problem With Uber? Insincere 5-Star Ratings,” Wired, March 19, 2015, www.wired.com/2015/03/bogus-uber-reviews/.
• 34. Saba Waheed, Lucero Herrera, Ana Luz Gonzalez-Vasquez, Janna Shadduck Hernandez, Tia Koonse, and David Leynov, More Than a Cig: A Survey of Ride-Hailing Drivers in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: UCLA Labor Center, 2018), https://irle.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Final-Report.-UCLA-More-than-a-Gig.pdf.
• 35. Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market: Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages, and the Scale of Uber and the Cig Economy, 2, 15.
• 36. Alice De Wolff', Breaking the Myth of Flexible Work: Contingent Work in Toronto (Toronto: Toronto Organizing for Fair Employment, 2000), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED458428.pdf; Arne L. Kalleberg, “Flexible Firms and Labor Market Segmentation: Effects of Workplace Restructuring on Jobs and Workers,” Work and Occupations 30, no. 2 (2003): 170, https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888403251683.
• 37. Brishen Rogers, “The Social Costs of Uber,” University of Chicago Law Review Online 82, no. 1 (2015): 98, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1037&context=uclrev_online.
• 38. Ben Z. Steinberger, “Redefining Employee’ in the Gig Economy: Shielding Workers from the Uber Model,” Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 23, no. 2 (2018): 585, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edU/jcfl/vol23/iss2/5/.
• 39. Ibid.; “Lyft Terms of Service,” Lyft, accessed May 18, 2018, www.lyft.com/terms.
• 40. Alex Rosenblat and Luke Stark, “Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers,” International Journal of Communication 10 (2016): 3777, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4892/1739.
• 41. Sarah Holder, “Why L.A.’s Ride-Hail Drivers Went on Strike,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-26/inside-l-a-uber-and-lyft-drivers-25-hour-str ike#text=Why%20L. A.’s%20Ride%2DHail,higher%

• 20wages%20and%20fairer%20treatment; Johana Bhuiyan, “Uber Wants to Redefine Employment. More Than 50 Labor Groups Are Fighting Back,” Los Angeles Times, April 8, 2020, www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-04-08/ labor-groups-ask-congress-to-reject-uber-ceo-plea.
• 42. Lucero Herrera, Brian Justie, Tia Koonse, and Saba Waheed, Worker Ownership, COVID-19, and the Future of the Cig Economy (Los Angeles: UCLA LaborCenter, 2020), www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/UCLA_coop_report_Final-l. pdf.
• 43. Ken Jacobs and Michael Reich, The Uber/Lyft Ballot Initiative Guarantees Only $5.64 an Hour (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Labor Center, 2020), https://laborcenter.berkeley. edu/the-uber-lyft-ballot-initiative-guarantees-only-5-64-an-hour-2/.
• 44. MacDonald and Giazitzoglu, “Youth, Enterprise and Precarity: Or, What Is, and What Is Wrong with, the ‘Gig Economy’?”

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