Developing a framework for corporate governance
The first report which set out a framework for corporate governance was the Cadbury Report which was published in 1992 in the UK. Since then there have been a succession of codes on corporate governance each making amendments from the previous version. Currently all companies reporting on the London Stock Exchange are required to comply with the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, which came into effect in 2003. It was revised in 2006 and became the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2010. It might be thought therefore that a framework for corporate governance has already been developed but the code in the UK has been continually revised while problems associated with bad governance have not disappeared. So clearly a framework has not been established in the UK, and an international framework looks even more remote.
One of the problems with developing such a framework is the continual rules versus principles debate. The American approach tends to be rules based while the European approach is more based on the development of principles - a slower process. In general rules are considered to be simpler to follow than principles, demarcating a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Rules also reduce discretion on the part of individual managers or auditors. In practice however rules can be more complex than principles. They may be ill-equipped to deal with new types of transactions not covered by the code. Moreover, even if clear rules are followed, one can still find a way to circumvent their underlying purpose - this is harder to achieve if one is bound by a broader principle.
There are of course many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ according to the nature of the system of capitalism in which they are embedded. The liberal model that is common in Anglo-American countries tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders. The coordinated model, which is normally found in Continental Europe and in Japan, recognizes in addition the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. Both models have distinct competitive advantages, but in different ways. The liberal model of corporate governance encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the coordinated model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality competition. However there are important differences between the recent approach to governance issues taken in the USA and what has happened in the UK.
In the USA a corporation is governed by a board of directors, which has the power to choose an executive officer, usually known as the chief executive officer (CEO). The CEO has broad power to manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for certain major actions, such as hiring his / her immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another company, major capital expansions, or other expensive projects. Other duties of the board may include policy setting, decision making, monitoring management's performance, or corporate control.
The board of directors is nominally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the articles of many companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the makeup of the board. Normally individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose, but are merely asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board. Perverse incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in the developed world, with board members beholden to the chief executive whose actions they are intended to oversee. Frequently, members of the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations - in interlocking relationships, which many people see as posing a potential conflict of interest.
The UK on the other hand has developed a flexible model of regulation of corporate governance, known as the "comply or explain" code of governance. This is a principle based code that lists a number of recommended practices, such as:
o the separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board,
o the introduction of a time limit for CEOs' contracts,
o the introduction of a minimum number of non-executives Directors, and of independent directors,
o the designation of a senior non executive director,
o the formation and composition of remuneration, audit and nomination committees.
Publicly listed companies in the UK have to either apply those principles or, if they choose not to, to explain in a designated part of their annual reports why they decided not to do so. The monitoring of those explanations is left to shareholders themselves. The basic idea of the Code is that one size does not fit all in matters of corporate governance and that instead of a statutory regime like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., it is best to leave some flexibility to companies so that they can make choices most adapted to their circumstances. If they have good reasons to deviate from the sound rule, they should be able to convincingly explain those to their shareholders. A form of the code has been in existence since 1992 and has had drastic effects on the way firms are governed in the UK. A recent study shows that in 1993, about 10% of the FTSE 350 companies were fully compliant with all dimensions of the code while by 2003 more than 60% were fully compliant.
Now compliance is more or less 100%. Of course all firms reporting on the London Stock Exchange are required to comply with this code, and so these firms are doing no more than meeting their regulatory obligations. Many companies regard corporate governance as simply a part of investor relationships and do nothing more regarding such governance except to identify that it is important for investors / potential investors and to flag up that they have such governance policies. The more enlightened recognize that there is a clear link between governance and corporate social responsibility and make efforts to link the two. Often this is no more than making a claim that good governance is a part of their CSR policy as well as a part of their relationship with shareholders. Clearly the code is not yet fully complete - hence the continued revisions - and has not succeeded in eliminating all of the problems. Indeed governance issues have been considered to be one source of the recent crisis.
The same success was not achieved when looking at the explanation part for non compliant companies. Many deviations are simply not explained and a large majority of explanations fail to identify specific circumstances justifying those deviations. Still, the overall view is that the U.K.'s system works fairly well and in fact is often considered to be a benchmark, and therefore followed by a number of other countries. Nevertheless it still shows that there is more to be done to develop a global framework of corporate governance.
In East Asian countries, the family-owned company tends to dominate. In countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines for example, the top 15 families control over 50% of publicly owned corporations through a system of family cross-holdings, thus dominating the capital markets. Family-owned companies also dominate the Latin model of corporate governance, that is companies in Mexico, Italy, Spain, France (to a certain extent), Brazil, Argentina, and other countries in South America.
Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different countries and have been issued by stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the support of governments and international organizations. As a rule, compliance with these governance recommendations is not mandated by law, although the codes which are linked to stock exchange listing requirements9 will tend to have a coercive effect. Thus, for example, companies quoted on the London and Toronto Stock Exchanges formally need not follow the recommendations of their respective national codes, but they must disclose whether they follow the recommendations in those documents and, where not, they should provide explanations concerning divergent practices. Such disclosure requirements exert a significant pressure on listed companies for compliance.
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