Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society: Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume 1

PrefaceI Epistemology and the problem of objective knowledgeSection I: knowledge as justified true beliefSection II: the dogmatic epistemology of justified true beliefDogmatic epistemologySection III: the sceptic epistemology and objective knowledgeScepticism: historical originScepticism and fallibility of the premisesSection IV: justificationism and the problem of objective knowledgeBibliographyKarl Popper’s critical rationalism An epistemological critiqueSection I: Popper’s epistemology: problem situationHume’s problem of induction and the Kantian solutionThe problem of objective knowledge: a Popperian perspectivePopper’s critique of the justified true belief account of knowledgeSection II: Popper’s theory of knowledgeThe idea of conjectural knowledgePopper’s solution for the problems of inductionPopper’s epistemology and its shortcomingsSection III: Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalismCritical rationalism: a moral commitment or a rational defence?Critical rationalism and irrationalismEpistemology of critical rationalismNotesBibliographyWilliam Bartley’s pancritical rationalismSection I: Bartley’s non-justificationist epistemologyFrom justification to criticism: a non-justificational concept of criticismEpistemology and the separation of justification and criticismSection II: rationality as a moral attitude: Bartley’s critiquePopper’s critical rationalism and the limits of rationalityThe epistemological origin of popper’s irrational faith in reasonSection III: Bartley’s pancritical rationalismThe problem of rationalist identity and pancritical rationalismPancritical rationalism: critical evaluationsA logical critique of pancritical rationalismNotesBibliographyTowards a non-justificationist epistemologySection I: objective knowledge: the failure of justificationist solutionsThe justified true belief account of knowledge and infinite regress in proofsObjective knowledge: dogmatic and sceptic epistemologiesSection II: objective knowledge as‘unfalsified conjecture’Karl Popper’s reading of conjectural knowledgeObjective knowledge: from justification to criticismSection III: deductive logic: a non-justificational theoryThe idea of unfalsified conjecture and the non-justificational model of deductionDeduction inference: justificational versus non-justificationalThe theory of falsification: a non-justificational approachSection IV: towards a non-justificational theory of knowledgeThe concept of objective knowledge and non-justificationist theory of knowledgeNotesBibliographyUnfalsified conjecture and critical rationality Towards a new theory of rationalitySection I: from justification to criticism: the unfinished project of critical rationalismPopper’s critical rationalism and the separation between justification and criticismBartley’s pancritical rationalism and the separation between justification and criticismSection II: unfalsified conjecture and the unfinished project of critical rationalismThe problem of‘rational beliefan epistemological readingObjective knowledge: a solution for the problem of rational beliefSection III: towards a new theory of the growth of critical rationalityTowards a non-justificational model of the growth of rationalityThree major stages of the growth in critical rationalitySection IV: critical rationality and moral dialogue for common valuesNoteBibliographyJustificationism and the theory of societySection I: Emile Dürkheim: social epistemology and social orderDurkheim’s social epistemologyHuman action in Durkheim’s theory of societySocial epistemology, moral codes of behaviours and social orderJustificationism and Durkheim’s theory of societySection II: Max Weber: Kantian epistemology and social orderImmanuel Kant: epistemology and rational actionKantian origin of Weber’s models of rational actionWeber’s justificationism and his theory of societySection III Talcott Parsons: epistemology and social orderKantian epistemology and Parsons’s theory of voluntaristic actionThe Hobbesian Problem of Order and the Parsonian SolutionJustificationism and Parsons’s theory of societySection IV: Jürgen Habermas: epistemology and the theory of societyHabermas’s epistemology: consensus and justificationIdeal types of rational action: communicative versus instrumentalHabermas’s theory of society: communicative reason and social orderHabermas’s theory of social evolution: the logic of social developmentJustificationism and Habermas’s theory of societyNotesBibliographyCritical rationalism and the theory of human actionSection I: non-justificationism and the rationality of actionJustificationist theories of action: utilitarian and normativeNon-justificationism and the theory of actionSection II: the problem situation in action theoryThe Hobbesian approach to the problem of actionCritical rationalism and the problem of action theorySection III: critical rationalism, moral philosophy and human actionMoral philosophy: from ‘practical’ reason to ‘critical’ reasonSection IV: the theory of human action: a critical rationalist formulationThe non-justificationist action type of value rationalityA non-justificationist ideal type of instrumental rationalityCritical rationalism and the ‘emancipatory’ ideal type of human actionSection V: from human action to social order: the rationalization of societyFrom human action to social order: the question of a causal linkCritical reason and the rationalization of societyThree major agents of social dialogueCritical rationalism and moral dialogue for social order: a summaryNotesBibliographyThe theory of social order A critical rationalist understandingSection I: the problem of social order: a reformulationHobbes: the problem of social order and its solutionJohn Locke’s solution to the problem of social orderThe problem of social order: a critical rationalist formulationSection II: emancipatory actions and the five mechanisms of social orderingHuman action for social ordering: a metaphysical mechanismHuman action for social ordering: a moral mechanismHuman action for social ordering: a legal mechanismHuman action for social ordering: a political mechanismHuman action for social ordering: an economic mechanismHuman action for social ordering: a sociological analysisSection III: ordinary actions and stabilization of social orderNotesBibliographyTowards a critical rationalist theory of social changeSection I: emancipatory action and the problem of social changeSection II: critical rationalism and the cultural mechanism of social changeTalcott Parsons’s view of social change: an epistemological critiqueCritical rationality and cultural changeReforming metaphysical beliefs for social changeThe concept of the good life and social changeSection III: governance and social change: a critical rationalist approachOpening up the law of society to rational criticismPolitical legitimacy and openness to criticismSection IV: critical rationalism and the economic mechanism of social changeOpenness of the economic order to rational criticismSection V: critical rationalism and the evolution of societyCritical rationalism and social evolution as a learning processNotesBibliographySection I: non-justificationism: rationality and human actionThe non-justificationist concept of reason and human actionPopper’s and Bartley’s justificationism and the meaning of rational actionNon-justificationism and emancipatory actionSection II: critical rationalist sociology: an overviewCritical rationalist sociology and the problem of social orderCritical rationalist sociology and the problem of social changeSection III: towards a sociology of the open society