A Powerful Particulars View of Causation

The Aims of This BookThe Outline of the BookCausation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural WorldCausation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural DeterminationStandard Approaches to CausationPowers-Based ApproachesThe Challenge from Modern ScienceThe Empiricist BiasAbout the Method of My ProjectPowers-Based vs. neo-Humean ApproachesExplaining vs. Characterising CausationPowers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of CharacterisationHume’s Discussion of CausationThe Tools of the Dominant StrategiesDoes It Really Matter?Causal RealismPowers-Based AccountsSalmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal ProcessesThe Transmission Account of CausationNed Hall on the Generative Conception of CausationStuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal ProductionCausation as a Continuous Process of ProductionThe Standard ViewAction or Influence in the Standard ViewTwo Types of EmpiricismA Return to the Empiricist Reduction of CausesCausal ProductionThe Standard View: A ReminderA Fundamental Flaw in the Standard ViewColloquial Language vs. Science: ‘Action’, ‘Reaction’, and ‘Interaction’Reciprocity of InteractionsBunge’s Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of CausationInteraction Involves ProductionUnidirectionality Due to Agency BiasInteractions Are Causally FundamentalNecessary ConnectionsProduction Requires Endurance and an A View of TimeSimultaneous CausationCausation a Form of One-Sided Existential DependenceThe Asymmetry of CausationConclusionCausal NecessityCausal Necessity as Logical NecessityThe Problem of Action at a Temporal DistanceThe Problem of Interference and PreventionThe Standard View ResponseInterference and Prevention in Powers-Based CausationCausal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus ClauseConclusionConstitution and PersistenceThe Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and PersistenceCharacterisationsA Causal Account of Constitution and PersistenceProblems?Concluding RemarksSubstance and ProcessSubstance OntologyThe Paradigm of Substance OntologyAristotelian Substance OntologyProcess OntologyThe Problem of Process OntologyA World of Processes/SubstancesPowersPreliminary Remarks About My Treatment of PowersDifferent Views of PowersAre Qualities Observable?A Priori Reason for Qualities Being FundamentalHume’s Separation of Quality and Causal RoleThe Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific ImageLocke’s Powerful Qualities ViewProperties and ConditionalsThe Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting PowersActive and Passive PowersThe Problem of FitWhat Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars?Concluding RemarkA Critique of Counterfactual Theories of CausationThe Appeal of CTCsCounterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals?The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual DependencePossible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract?Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCsComparative Similarity and SupervenienceConclusionThe Contrast to Alternative ViewsThe Neo-Humean ContrastThe Causal Objectivist ContrastThe Contrast to the Standard ViewContrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational RealismContrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process RealismContrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural AccountsContrast to 20th-Century Friends of PowersConcluding RemarkBibliography
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