Explaining the rise and success of the DF

The years from 2001 to 2011 were particularly important for the success and consolidation of the DF. The party acted for three consecutive legislative terms as external supporter of minority governments including both Liberals and Conservatives. Unencumbered by the direct responsibilities of holding office, the DF could play two apparently conflicting roles, that of‘government maker’ and ‘government shaker’. This strategy paid off until the last 2019 elections. In particular, this position gave the DF the opportunity to exert significant influence on immigration, asylum, integration and citizenship policies during political negotiations with the ruling parties.The DF resorted to what can be termed as a ‘reward’ strategy: it would vote in favour of government reforms and budget but expected to receive a policy ‘reward’ in return. While gaining increasing political legitimacy thanks to its collaboration with mainstream centre-right parties (Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2009), the party managed to grow electorally at both national and municipal levels (Meret 2010).

Yet it was not only its advantageous position in coalition building that helped the party, as there were other, more long-term, factors that favoured its rise, too. Since the 1970s, the traditional mass parties (particularly the SD) had started to lose their electoral strength, while the rise of new political players had started to challenge their power and position. By the late 1990s, new values and cultural issues had gained political importance, influencing voting patterns and party identification.This was linked to the reconfiguration of class politics (Bornschier 2010). At the end of the 1990s, it was clear that political competition in Denmark was based less on traditional cleavages than in the past. This was due to a general shift from class voting towards what can be defined as ‘issue-voting’ (Borre and Goul Andersen 1997).The implications of a vote increasingly based on issue preferences, rather than class identity, became evident in Danish politics particularly from the 2000s (Borre 2003; Stubager 2010; Hjorth 2017).These socio-political transformations helped prepare the ground for the rise of new parties which would politicize new issues, such as immigration, integration, and multiculturalism. Thus, the DF could succeed by developing a right-wing populist ‘winning-formula’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; de Lange 2007) adapted to the Danish context.

In particular, immigration had started to attract increasing attention and concern. This phenomenon can be partly explained by the increasing number of immigrants, which went from less than 3 per cent of the whole population in 1980 to 12.3 per cent in 2016 (Figure 9.4).

Results from Danish election surveys conducted from 2001 to 2015 clearly show an increase in voters’ hostility towards immigration and multiculturalism. Since 2001 there has been a rising opposition towards multiculturalism and against increased ethnic diversity in the country. On the question of whether immigration represents a serious threat to Danish culture, the per cent difference index (PDI) between those agreeing and those disagreeing was negative in 2011 (-14 per cent), but turned positive in 2015 (+6 per cent), showing a relatively higher percentage

FIGURE 9.4 Immigrants and their descendants in Denmark: share of the total population (1980—2016)

TABLE 9.1 Immigration perceived as a threat to national culture. PDI (percentage difference index: strongly agree/agree - disagree/strongly disagree)

Source: The Danish National Election Study 2001—2015 (weighted data).Wordings: Immigration represents a serious threat to our national culture (vores nationale egenart).

TABLE 9.2 Refugees’ and immigrants’ right to access same welfare benefits as native Danes. PDI (strongly/agree- strongly/disagree)

Source: The Danish National Election Study 2001—2015. Wordings: Refugees and immigrants should have same right to social benefits as Danes, even if they do not have Danish citizenship (agree-disagree).

of people who feel culturally threatened by immigration (Table 9.1). Interestingly supporters of all parties seem to have moved in this direction, although there is a clear difference between supporters of non-populist left-wing (EL, SD, SF, RV) and right-wing parties (V and K).The latter are now much closer to DF voters.

Voters have also expressed increasing opposition to immigrants’ rights to access the same benefits as native Danes. Table 9.2 shows the trend since 2001. In this case a negative number means more opposition to extensive social rights for the immigrant population. It is noticeable that in 2015 only two parties, the EL and RV, still had a positive score, although much lower than in the past. All other parties, including the left-wing SF and SD, had negative scores. These results also suggest the joint role played by cultural and economic dimensions in explaining the Danish voters’ hostility towards immigrants and refugees.

In this context, the DF, with its strong anti-immigration, xenophobic, welfare- nationalist and Eurosceptic profile, could thrive. From the beginning, the party expressed grievances about the effects of what it called the ‘massive inflow of immigrants’, which would give rise to a ‘multi-ethnic society’ endangering the very core and future of Danish national identity, culture, and welfare state. Indeed, according to the party immigration would disrupt the country’s social cohesion

TABLE 9.3 Party voters’ attitudes towards immigration as a threat and same social benefits to refugees, 2019. PDI (strongly agree/agree - strongly disagree/disagree)

Source: YouGov data 2019. *Positive values = more anti-immigration. **Negative values = more anti-immigration.

and its internal ethnic and cultural homogeneity, undermining the very pillars of the Danish national identity and social model (Dansk Folkeparti 1997, 5-6). Additionally, the DF expressed its criticism of further European political integration, which would lead to the loss of national sovereignty and autonomy.

It is important to observe that immigration fears and anxieties can be triggered by rather different factors, spanning from concerns about national security issues (terrorism and fundamentalism) to cultural and national identity issues, from feelings of social and political marginalization (Gidron and Hall 2019) to lack of social cohesion and labour market transformations. Nonetheless, it is remarkable how attitudes towards immigration, and Islam (Meret and Beyer Gregersen 2019), continue to be negative, despite some positive results achieved in the past decade in terms of increasing labour market participation, integration levels, educational attainment and lower criminality among immigrants. The DF electoral defeat in the 2019 general election cannot be explained by a general drop in immigration grievances and concerns, since they remain quite strong in the Danish electorate (Table 9.3). In fact, it might be that mainstream parties have changed and, by coopting issues that were once mainly owned by the DF, have ultimately been able to win voters back.