Crew Resource Management Training: A Competence-based Approach for Airline Pilots


Why a ‘Competence-based’ Approach to Crew Resource Management Training?IntroductionA Short History of CRMWhat Does Expertise Look Like?Developing ExpertiseDeveloping Training InterventionsInstructional Design vs Competency-based TrainingUnderstanding ‘Success’ConclusionReferencesThinking about FailureIntroductionWhat Is Safety?The Building Blocks of Safety ThinkingThe Pelee Island CrashLinear Models of Accident CausationNormal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability OrganisationsOrganisational ErrorWhy Historical Models Are ProblematicConclusionReferencesA Systems Model of AviationIntroductionSystems Thinking and SafetyThe Structure of the Aviation System – Aviation as Hierarchical Decision-MakingBehaviour within a SystemPelee Island as a SystemExploring Structural Elements of a Resilient SystemSystems and Scale EffectsSystems, Drift and the Distortion of BufferingConclusionReferencesOn Being Human – Frailties, Vulnerabilities and Their Effect on PerformanceIntroduction‘Personality’ – How Evolution Shapes BehaviourStress as a Biological ProcessStress, Fear and ‘Startle’Sleep and FatigueWhat Is Sleep?Acute Fatigue in PilotsAcclimatisation and Night FlyingChronic Fatigue in Airline PilotsRecuperationAnxiety and Psychological FatigueFatigue MitigationFatigue and Pilot HealthFatigue and Safety – Cause or Risk Factor?ConclusionReferencesDoing Normal Work – Processes at Level 1IntroductionWork as ThoughtGoals, Boundaries and Margins – The Structure of TasksBuffering and Efficacy – The Management of Goal StatesGoal States and ResilienceHuman Information ProcessingSituational Awareness, Distributed Cognition and Sense-MakingPerformance as ApproximationActing in an Under-specified WorldDecision-Making as Task ManagementDecision-Making and Goal State ModificationThe Special Case of Problem-SolvingSafety Drift at the Individual Level – Behavioural TemplatesConclusion – Working at Level 1ReferencesError as Performance FeedbackIntroductionThe Helios B-737 Crash Near Athens, 2005What Is an ‘Error’?Slips – Executing Trained Behaviour PatternsLapses – Forgetting as a part of workMistakes – The Failure of RulesBringing Knowledge into PlaySense-making, Rule-based and Knowledge-based ActionPerformance under Normal CircumstancesFactors That Shape PerformanceVariabilityKeeping Control‘Wrong Work’ and Violations as ImprovisationsPerformance Approaching the BoundaryConclusion: Errors as Signals of System BehaviourReferencesActing in the Public Domain – Collaboration to Achieve Operational GoalsIntroductionCollaboration in a Systems ContextCollaboration as Shared Decision-MakingCollaboration in Normal WorkEngagement as a Transitory StateControl in Work Groups – Monitoring as Collaborative Task ManagementWithin-Group Social DynamicsLeadership – A Special Case in Self-directed Teams?CultureConflict ResolutionBehaviour between GroupsConclusionReferencesCommunicationIntroductionThe Evolution of CommunicationSan Juan, Puerto RicoWhat Is ‘Communication’?Communication in an Aviation Context – What It Does?How Speech Works?A Functional Model of CommunicationExploring Communication Dynamics: Control and VerificationCommunication, Option Selection and Decision-MakingCreating Future Plans: Shared UnderstandingSocial ChatWhat ‘Normal’ Communication Looks Like?Communication in a Systems ModelDistributed CommunicationCommunication as Information Propagation across a NetworkCommunication as Hierarchical ControlCommunication, Safety Drift and Scale Law at a Systems LevelConclusionReferencesOrganisational Factors – Level 3IntroductionWhat Is an Airline?How Things Get Done in AviationFundamental Challenges at the Heart of OrganisationsManagement Control and Worker ResponsesControl, Management Legitimacy or Chaos and Abuse?Demand and Overwork – Employee Sickness/Absence as ResistanceDelegating Control: Challenges to Autonomy – Why Fuel Efficiency Measures Are ResistedStriving for Efficiency: Contradictions in Employee Involvement – Why Safety Reporting FailsDo Organisations Learn?How Level 3 WorksConclusionReferencesFacilitating Aviation – Decision-Making at Level 4IntroductionThe Nature of RegulationRegulation as Hierarchical ControlRegulatory FailureChange Management and Regulatory FailureFailure, Capture and Crisis – Regulators, Aircraft Manufacturers and the Construction of SafetyInvestigation as FeedbackThe Pel Air Westwind DitchingThe FalloutPostscript to Pel AirRegulation, Investigation, Control and FeedbackConclusionReferencesTraining for CompetenceIntroductionThe Training ProblemAssessment Frameworks and ‘Competence’A Systems View of CompetenceCompetence as ‘Normal Work’Competence as Management of Anomalies – Performance in Transitional StatesCompetence in a Crisis – Performance at the BoundaryAn Outline Competence ModelNon-Training InterventionsAre Stress and Fatigue a Special Case?Developing Training InterventionsMapping Competencies onto Training MethodsConclusionReferencesAssessment of PerformanceIntroductionWhy Assess?What to Assess?Assigning a Value to the PerformanceAssessors as Sources of BiasEstablishing Reliability and ValidityTraining AssessorsConducting the AssessmentConclusionReferences
 
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