Teachers, Learning, and the Curriculum
A major role of schools is to socialize students and form them into “good citizens.” In other words, intentional or not, schools inculcate certain values. As mentioned in earlier chapters, courts have recognized that schools represent a “marketplace of ideas” (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 1969, p. 512). This concept implies that students should be encouraged to think for themselves through a wide exposure to various ideas and philosophies. On the other hand, the curriculum as such is not only what is taught in schools. As Arons and Lawrence note in their seminal article on this topic:
Even when a school bends over backwards (as it almost never does) to provide all points of view about ideas and issues in the classroom, it barely scratches the surface of its system of value inculcation. A school must still confront its hidden curriculum—the role models teachers provide, the structure of classrooms and of teacher-student relationships, the way in which the school is governed, the ways in which the child’s time is parceled out, learning subdivided and fragmented, attitudes and behaviors rewarded and punished. Even in those areas concerned with basic skills it is clear that teaching is never value-neutral, that texts, teachers, subject matter and atmosphere convey messages about approved and rewarded values and ideas.
(Arons & Lawrence, 1980, p. 310)
Accordingly, students learn lessons by observing how they and others are treated. The cases included in this chapter vividly illustrate this concept and the points that Arons and Lawrence make and, in turn, raise important ethical questions as to the inculcating of beliefs on young minds, which beliefs should be imparted, how this should be done, and who determines these beliefs. Thus, this chapter looks at the curriculum in the broadest sense of that word, including what Arons and Lawrence characterize as the “hidden curriculum” (Arons & Lawrence, 1980, p. 310).
In the second edition of Best Interests, the title of this chapter was changed from Teaching, Learning, and the Curriculum to Teachers, Learning, and the Curriculum, in an effort to acknowledge the vastly important role of teachers in shaping the curriculum, both apparent and “hidden,” and in supporting the best interests of students. Today, more than ever, teachers are not only expected to be masters of their subject matter, but many times to be moral exemplars. These high expectations, while well intentioned and vitally important, can also present challenges, both to the individual teachers as well as to those school leaders responsible for their evaluation and supervision.
As evidenced by the 2011-2012 crisis at Penn State University regarding alleged pedophilia and reporting laws, several reviewers had asked that this issue be addressed. At Penn State, a former football coach, Jerry Sandusky, was found guilty of having sexual relations with young boys at his home and on the university’s campus over many years. It was not until he coached at a school district and was reported by school that his history came to light. This crisis, on its surface, addresses issues of reporting requirements, loyalty to people and to institutions, and just how careful administrators must be regarding the protection of young children. At a deeper level, lie issues of compensation (Culhane, 2013), restorative justice as a possible pathway towards healing, (Doyle, 2014), and whistle-blower protection for student athletes (Hanna, 2017). Both before and following Sandusky, numerous schools and universities have faced scandals involving the corruption of minors by educators.
This chapter includes cases that emphasize and explore further the complexity of the roles and responsibilities of teachers and their supervisors, concerning child abuse, potential abuse, and the rights of those parties involved as well as other ways that teachers may influence students through their pedagogy and as role models and student advocates.
Yudof et al. (2002) use the Nabozny v. Podlesny (1996) case to illustrate how the curriculum may manifest itself in the way school personnel treat students. In this Wisconsin case, a student who was openly gay was both verbally and physically harassed for years by his fellow students. Despite the student’s attempt to get help from the school administration, and the intervention of both a guidance counselor and his parents, the harassment escalated until it resulted in a physical attack on the student. The high school’s assistant principal laughed and supposedly told this student that he “deserved such treatment because he is gay” {Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996, p. 452), and advised him to look for an alternative educational setting. After the boys in his class performed a mock rape witnessed by some 20 students, the abused student stated that the school’s female principal told him “boys will be boys” and that he should expect such treatment from his classmates if he is “going to be so openly gay” (Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996, p. 451).
In Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District (2001), parents challenged the policy of their third-grade daughter’s elementary school, which used race and other factors to determine classroom assignment. The parents further challenged the seating assignment of their daughter, which was race based, by claiming that both practices were discriminatory even though the teacher believed that such strategies would improve the student’s ability to learn.
Mead, a legal scholar on educational issues, uses Billings as an example of the degree to which courts can become entangled in instructional delivery. Raising issues like those in Billings, she questions what would happen legally if a school administrator wished to divide students by race to ensure diversity. Based on some lower court decisions, this practice could be unconstitutional, yet school authorities have postulated that there could well be compelling pedagogical reasons for such a practice, viewing diversity as critical in providing students with a balanced education in today’s society (Mead, 2002). Mead concludes by presenting educational leaders with this challenge:
Public elementary and secondary educational institutions exist for no reason other than to transmit to students what others have learned, inspire students to new learning, and inculcate the values held dear by our democracy. Student assignment or selection policies also teach. Schools can either turn a blind eye to the ramifications of racial isolation and enduring racial stereotypes, thereby becoming complicit in their perpetuation; or schools can accept the mantle that has defined them as public institutions since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.
(Mead, 2002, p. 148)
Selman v. Cobb County School District (2006) addresses scientific theories of evolution and what happens when school districts try to accommodate the religious beliefs of students and their parents when there is a conflict between religion and the curriculum. In this case, the district school board approved a disclaimer sticker to be placed on students’ science books. The district court decided that even though this disclaimer had a secular purpose, it nonetheless had the effect of endorsing religion. The appeals court sent the case back to the district court opining that the there was a need for much greater clarification of the facts before a final decision could be rendered.
As mentioned earlier, two cases in this chapter involve legal and ethical issues directly related to teachers. Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center (2010) demonstrates the potentially tenuous situation of a teacher working in a charter school with considerable experience but no job security. Caviness, a successful teacher and coach, lost his job because he was said to have used poor judgment in relating to a female student who had a crush on him. After his discharge, he was subject to seemingly unfounded and unsubstantiated rumors that he might have been a pedophile. Caviness was not afforded the opportunity to clear his name with the charter school and was subsequently denied a position at another school. The court ruled that this teacher had no further legal recourse in that the charter school, even though technically a public school, is managed by a private entity.
The final case addresses Peter Melzer, a physics teacher at the prestigious Bronx High School of Science in New York City and an active member of the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA). This group openly supports sexual relationships between men and underage boys, and publicly advocates for changes in the laws. While Melzer had not had any such relationships with his students, once the news of his membership became known, his credibility in the school rapidly deteriorated and he lost his job. This case provides a vivid illustration of community expectations and the role of teacher as moral exemplar.
CASE STUDY 14.1: NABOZNY v. PODLESNY, 92 F.3d 446
(7th Cir. 1996)
Jamie Nabozny was a student in Ashland, Wisconsin from the time he was of school age. He attended elementary school in the district, largely without event. However, about the same time he became a seventh-grade middle school student in 1988, he realized that he was gay. Nabozny chose to be open about his sexuality and as a result faced the abuse of his classmates.
Other students verballv harassed Nabozny on a regular basis. Throughout seventh grade, the verbal assaults escalated to physical abuse, at which time Nabozny contacted the school guidance counselor, Mr Peterson. Mr Peterson took quick action to discipline the students involved. Soon afterwards, Mr Nowakowski replaced Mr Peterson. When Nabozny approached Mr Nowakowski about the abuse he received from his fellow students, the guidance counselor contacted Mary Podlesny, the school’s principal. Even though Nabozny continued to express his fear and concerns, neither adult acted.
The harassment continued to worsen, and two students habitually abused Nabozny. These students, Jason Welty and Roy Grande, physically assaulted Nabozny on numerous occasions. One such incident included performing a mock rape on him in a science classroom in front of 20 other students. When Nabozny told the principal about this incident, Principal
Podlesny dismissed the behavior of the two boys, telling Nabozny that his openness about being gay should lead him to expect such behavior. Nabozny left school early that day, and even though Welty and Grande did not receive punishment for their behavior, the next day Nabozny was forced to explain why he had left school without permission. The abuse continued throughout the rest of the school year and into the eighth grade.
In the eighth grade, Welty and Grande again attacked Nabozny, this time in the boys’ restroom. These boys were not disciplined even though Nabozny and his parents had met with Principal Podlesny to discuss the matter. Again, Nabozny was told that he should expect such behavior. There was no relief for Nabozny; the harassment reached such a level of intensity that he attempted suicide. Nabozny completed the remainder of eighth grade at a Catholic school.
After eighth grade, Nabozny returned to the Ashland School District, enrolling in Ashland High School. The abuse started as soon as the school year began. At one point a group of students attacked Nabozny, again in the restroom. One student, Stephen Huntley, struck Nabozny, and another, Roy Grande, urinated on him. No action was taken against the attackers, and Nabozny was referred to another school guidance counselor, Mr Reeder. Again, Nabozny attempted suicide. He then ran away. His parents tried to keep him out of the Ashland schools, but because they could not afford private school tuition, the Department of Social Services forced him to return to Ashland High School.
In tenth grade, there was no improvement in the treatment Nabozny received. Only one school official, Ms Hanson, a guidance counselor, attempted to advocate for Nabozny and get school officials to discipline the harassing students. One day, a group of eight boys, including Stephen Huntley, attacked Nabozny; Huntley kicked him repeatedly in the stomach over a period of several minutes. With the desire to press charges, Nabozny was ultimately directed to the assistant principal in charge of discipline, Thomas Blauert. Instead of helping Nabozny, Mr Blauert “laughed and told him he deserved such treatment because he is gay” {Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996, p. 452). Despite pleas from his parents and Ms Hanson, school district officials failed to grant Nabozny relief. Weeks later, Nabozny collapsed from internal bleeding due to the attack by Huntley and the other boys.
By the eleventh grade, Ms Hanson and Nabozny’s parents agreed that school officials would do nothing to help him, and he left school. Upon leaving, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome. Nabozny sued the school district and several school officials, claiming monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. A federal district court granted summary judgment for the school district.
Nabozny appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals. This court ruled that Nabozny’s Equal Protection rights had been violated based on gender discrimination or sexual orientation—the court combined the two claims—and that the law was clearly enough established to support Nabozny’s §1983 claims. In rendering its decision, Judge Eschbach, speaking for a unanimous three-judge panel, stated:
The defendants ask us to affirm the grant of qualified immunity because "there was no clear duty under the Equal Protection Clause for the individual defendants to enforce every student complaint of harassment by other students the same way.” The defendants are correct in that the Equal Protection Clause does not require the government to give everyone identical treatment. Nothing we say today suggests anything to the contrary. The Equal Protection Clause does, however, require the state to treat each person with equal regard, as having equal worth, regardless of his or her status. The defendants’ argument fails because they frame their inquiry too narrowly. The question is not whether they are required to treat eveiy harassment complaint the same way; as we have noted, they are not. The question is whether they are required to give male and female students equivalent levels of protection; they are, absent an important governmental objective, and the law clearly said so prior to Nabozny’s years in middle school.
(Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996, p. 456, n. 7)
At the same time, the court denied Nabozny relief on his due process claims. Making this determination, the court concluded:
However untenable it may be to suggest that under the Fourteenth Amendment a state can force a student to attend a school when school officials know that the student will be placed at risk of bodily harm, our court has concluded that local school administrations have no affirmative substantive due process duty to protect students.
(Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996, pp. 458-459)
Questions for Discussion
- 1. How might one view this case and the court’s decision from a justice perspective?
- 2. Was Jamie treated in a caring manner? Why or why not?
- 3. How might this case be viewed through the lens of critique?
- 4. What would the profession expect of Jamie’s guidance counselor? Mr Blauert? Principal Podlesny?
- 5. Through a best interests’ perspective, was Jamie afforded his rights or shown his responsibilities? In this respect, how might this situation have been handled differently? Better? Was Jamie afforded respect? Dignity? Why or why not?
- 6. What would you have done in this situation if you were Jamie’s guidance counselor? Mr Blauert? Principal Podlesny?
CASE STUDY 14.2: BILLINGS v. MADISON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 259 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2001)
B.B. was a female student at John Muir Elementary School in Madison, Wisconsin from kindergarten until the middle of third grade, in the 1999-2000 school year. In the spring of 1999, the second-grade teachers at the school met several times to discuss third-grade class placements for their students for the following year.
The school district did not have a policy on student placement in elementary' classes, so the teachers relied on a memo from the principal, John Burmaster, which stated, in part, “to the extent possible we should attempt to balance classes according to gender, ethnicity, academic abilities, and special needs while also considering the Parent Input sheet” {Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001, p. 810).
Teachers, Sue Perry', Annie Keith, and Sue Berthouex, prepared an index card for each student to make the assignment of students easier. Each of these cards contained the student’s academic data, such as reading and math levels, behavioral issues, special education requirements, as well as gender, neighborhood, and ethnicity’. In creating the individual classes for the third grade, the teachers tried to reflect the overall third-grade population at John Muir. They used the academic information to create balanced classrooms with respect to high and low achievers and students with special needs. They' considered ethnicity’ only' to ensure that there were not disproportionate numbers of minority students in any one classroom. The teachers did not want any of the students isolated from friends in their own neighborhood and so took this into consideration as well.
Ms Perry assigned B.B. to Ms Zabel’s class for the following year. (Ms Perry' shared teaching responsibilities with Ms Mueller, who did not attend any of the placement meetings.) She based this decision on input from the parents, who wanted B.B. placed with a teacher with high academic expectations. Ms Perry was also aware that B.B. had had some negative interactions with special education students who were assigned to the other two classes, to be taught by Mary Bostrom and Lesley Wilke-Nadler.
Near the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, Ms Zabel divided her class into five groups. Two of the groups had six students and three of the groups had four students. In these latter groups of four, she indicated that she would put two African-American students together. She did the same for Hispanic students. Wien asked why she had done this, she replied, “I think in my education training sometimes we were told that African American students need a buddy, and sometimes it works well if they have someone else working with them because they view things in a global manner” (Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001, p. 811).
Evidence presented at the hearing indicated that B.B. was the only student in her class from Wexford Ridge, a neighborhood where many African-American students lived. The Billings family came to believe that B.B., who performed well academically, was placed in the class to be a role model for the other African-American students, who were all at a low achievement level. They cited a comment made by Principal Burmaster to Mrs Billings, in which he said that he hoped B.B. could be a role model for other children.
The Billings parents claimed violations of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The federal court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court agreed with the district court that B.B. was not assigned to Ms Zabel’s class because of race, nor was she considered a role model for the other children. The appeals court contended that Ms Perry had made her decision based on two reasons, both of which were race neutral. First, B.B.’s parents wanted her to have a teacher with high expectations, and Ms Zabel fitted that criterion. Second, the other two classrooms contained students with whom B.B. had had problems. Moreover, B.B.’s class did not have a disproportionate number of African-American students as compared to the other classes.
There was also no evidence to support the contention that Ms Perry ever saw B.B. as a role model for other students. This claim was based on Principal Burmaster’s remark, that “he hoped B.B. could be a role model for these other children” (Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001, p. 813). This was an offhand comment made following a disciplinary incident in B.B.’s class, and it was Ms Perry, not the principal, who made the placement decision. As the court noted:
Principal Burmaster’s remark is ambiguous as to the children for whom he hoped that B.B. could be a role model; the Billings have provided no evidence justifying their assumption that the principal was referring only to African American students. Additionally, the principal’s offhand remark is irrelevant to our review of the assignment process because it is undisputed that Principal Burmaster did not participate in making the classroom assignments.
(Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001, p. 813)
The appeals court also agreed with the lower court that the Billings parents failed to provide evidence to support their claim that B.B. was denied educational opportunities equal to those of White students. Where these two courts depart is on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim relative to Mrs Zabel’s classroom seating arrangement. Ruling in favor of the Billings family on this claim, the Seventh Circuit Court observed that Ms Zabel freely admitted to arranging minority students in her classroom in pairs. Even if Ms Zabel had had good intentions, her decision, nonetheless, was based purely on race. Here, the court points out that such racial classifications by government officials are highly suspect and likely illegal unless they are employed as an attempt to remedy past discrimination.
This record provides no basis for justifying the racially based seating arrangement other than Ms. Zabel’s reliance on a stereotypical notion that African American students “view things in a global manner.” No evidence of record indicates that this arrangement was implemented to rectify past discriminatory’ conduct that had left its effect on these students. On this record, without any justification other than Ms. Zabel’s stereotypical notion as to how African American children learn, her action cannot be justified, and, consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate. It may be that, in further proceedings, Ms. Zabel will be able to explain in a more satisfactory manner the reasons for her adoption of the racially based buddy system seating plan. Perhaps her decision was based on her professional assessment that, because of past discriminatory’ practices, students in this particular school had difficulty in adjusting to a racially diverse educational environment. However, we cannot accept as adequate her conclusory explanation. We must decide the case on the record before us.
(Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001, p. 815)
Questions for Discussion
- 1. How might one view this case and the court’s decision from a justice perspective?
- 2. Was B.B. treated in a caring manner? Why or why’ not?
- 3. How might this case be viewed through the lens of critique?
- 4. What would the profession expect of Ms Zabel? Principal Burmaster?
- 5. Through a best interests’ perspective, was B.B. afforded her rights or shown her responsibilities? In this respect, how might this situation have been handled differently? Better? Was B.B. afforded respect? Dignity’? Why or why not?
- 6. What would you have done in this situation if you were Ms Zabel? Principal Burmaster?
CASE STUDY 14.3: SELMAN v. COBB COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006)
Since 1979, the Cobb County School District had maintained a policy, revised several times, which acknowledged a conflict between the scientific account of the origin of human species and the family teachings of a significant number of Cobb County residents. The policy directed the instructional program to respect these family teachings while preserving the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. In 1995, a more specific statement was issued. It prohibited school officials from compelling any student to study the origin of human species. It also forbade the teaching of this topic in elementary and middle schools. The statement provided for electives and material to investigate theories of the origins of human species that would include, but not be limited to, creation theory. Any course including this topic was to be noted in course selection materials provided to students and parents.
Although the policy and statement made no reference to evolution, both implied that enough parents had beliefs conflicting with evolution to merit the district’s actions. Even though the state curriculum mandated the teaching of evolution, it was common practice for textbook pages with material on evolution to be removed. In addition, teachers were asked not to discuss human evolution in courses required for graduation.
In the fall of 2001, the school district began the process of adopting new science textbooks. The textbook committee raised concerns that an adopted textbook would conflict with existing policy. Following a legal review of the issues, school administrators recommended revisions to the policy that would strengthen evolution instruction and bring the district into compliance with state curriculum requirements.
In accordance with school board regulations, parents could review and comment on the recommended textbooks. Only three parents reviewed the books, with only one criticizing the presentation of evolution without any mention of alternate theories involving a creator. Several other parents complained about the textbooks but did not submit official comment forms. One parent organized a petition containing 2,300 signatures of Cobb County residents. The petition requested the school board to “clearly identify presumptions and theories and distinguish them from fact” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1291). Legal counsel recommended the following language to be placed on a sticker to be placed in the textbooks: “This textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living thing[s]. This material should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1295).
On March 28, 2002, the school board unanimously adopted the recommended textbooks with the condition that a sticker with the abovementioned information be placed in certain science textbooks. There were no minutes from school board meetings about any discussions regarding the sticker, nor did the school board issue any statement about the purpose of the sticker at the time of its adoption. A majority of the school board members stated that they did not intend the sticker to promote or benefit religion and that they were aware that the district policy was being revised to strengthen the teaching of evolution. In September 2002, Mr Lindsay Tippins, chair of the school board, issued a statement that the sticker “was not intended to inteiject religion into science instruction but simply to make students aware that a scientific dispute exists” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1293).
School board members had several different reasons for deciding to adopt the sticker. Mr Tippins believed that a scientific dispute regarding the origin of life existed; he wanted students to be able to critically consider information regarding evolution. Another member was concerned that the textbooks did not address the controversy from an evidentiary standpoint and wanted to facilitate open discussion in classes about issues of a scientific nature. Another member wanted the board to find a constitutional way to guide discussion in the classroom, encourage students to think critically, and get teachers to adhere to the state curriculum guidelines on the origin of species, which included only evolution. Still others saw the sticker as a notice to parents that evolution would be taught. A veteran educator on the board wanted the science classroom to be safe enough for students to express their different views. Two board members testified by affidavit (but not at the trial) that they wanted to promote tolerance and acceptance of a diversity of opinions.
The school board did not seek expert opinion on scientific theories of origin, nor did they conduct research outside of the board meetings before voting on the sticker. However, at the trial, George Stickel, the district’s science curriculum supervisor, and Wes McCoy, a science teacher at the high school, joined by both a biology textbook co-author and a university assistant professor of genetics and molecular biology’, acknowledged: “Evolution is the dominant scientific theory regarding the origin of the diversity of life and is accepted by the majority of the scientific community” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1309).
Dr McCoy, who opposed placing stickers in the textbooks, nevertheless proposed an alternative version of the sticker that the administration favored. It read:
This textbook contains material on evolution, a scientific theory, or explanation, for the nature and diversity of living things. Evolution is accepted by the majority of scientists, but questioned by some. All scientific theories should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully and critically considered.
(Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1295)
Even though this suggestion was made before the stickers were printed, the school board gave only minimal consideration to the alternative language because it was presented after the vote on the sticker. After the school board adopted the sticker, numerous citizens, organizations, churches, and academics contacted the members to both praise and express their dismay at the inclusion of the sticker in the textbooks.
Following the placement of the stickers in the textbooks, the school board revised its policy on the teaching of the origin of species. The revised policy recognized the controversy surrounding this subject and emphasized that related teaching should be done in a manner to promote tolerance and acceptance of a diversity of opinions, and to ensure neutrality toward religion. A revised regulation specified that theories of origin “shall be taught as defined within the Quality Core Curriculum (QCC)” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1296). It also cautioned teachers to set limits on discussions of theories of origin “in order to respectfully focus discussion on scientific subject matter” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1296), while at the same time recognizing that such instruction could conflict with some students’ belief systems. “Under no circumstances should teachers use instruction to coerce students to adopt a particular religious belief or set of beliefs or to disavow a particular religious belief or set of beliefs” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1296).
In the two years after adopting the new science textbooks with the sticker, neither the district superintendent nor the school board members received any complaints about the teaching of religion or religious theories of origin in science classes. Additionally, students had not mentioned religion as it relates to evolution any more frequently than before the sticker. One science teacher testified that the board’s misuse of the word “theory” required him to spend more time trying to distinguish “fact” from “theory” for his students.
Nonetheless, the stickers alarmed some parents, who feared that they promoted a religious view of origin and questioned the science in the textbooks. One of the plaintiffs in this case, Jeffrey Selman, felt that because the stickers only singled out evolution, their intent was to disparage evolution and was, therefore, “obviously religious” (Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1297).
Jeffrey Selman, as well as several other parents, sued the school district and its board of education, claiming that the stickers violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as Georgia’s state constitution. The essence of their claim was that the stickers endorsed religion. A federal court for the northern district of Georgia found in favor of the parents and ordered that the stickers could not be disseminated in any form and that the stickers currently on textbooks must be removed.
In deciding the legality of the stickers, the court applied the Lemon test, a standard first articulated in the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) Supreme Court decision. Applied to the facts at hand, the test would first determine whether the sticker had a secular (nonreligious) purpose. Here, the court identified two purposes for the sticker, both of which it deemed secular. One purpose was that the sticker supported critical thinking about evolution, encouraging students to assess its merits individually. Next, it attempted to reduce the offensiveness of teaching evolution to parents and students with religious beliefs who believed differently.
Where the constitutionality of the sticker fell short was on the second prong of the Lemon test. Here, the court examined whether the effect of the sticker was one of either support for or hostility toward religion. In making its determination, the court found that the purpose of the sticker went well beyond religious accommodation in that it showed preference toward the Christian fundamentalists and creationists who pushed for the disclaimer. Moreover, by stating that evolution was a mere theory rather than the dominant scientific theory' that it is, the court downplayed its importance and in effect endorsed alternative theories such as creationism. In this respect, the federal district court decided:
In sum, the Sticker in dispute violates the effects prong of the Lemon test and Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which the Court has incorporated into its Lemon analysis. Adopted by the school board, funded by the money of taxpayers, and inserted by school personnel, the Sticker conveys an impermissible message of endorsement and tells some citizens that they are political outsiders while telling others that they are political insiders. Regardless of whether teachers comply with the Cobb County School District’s regulation on theories of origin and regardless of the discussions that actually take place in the Cobb County science classrooms, the Sticker has already sent a message that the School Board agrees with the beliefs of Christian fundamentalists and creationists. The School Board has effectively improperly entangled itself with religion by appearing to take a position. Therefore, the Sticker must be removed from all of the textbooks in which it has been placed.
(Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1312)
A year later, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard this decision and listed some 18 very specific and in-depth questions that the judges believed were unanswered. Among other things, these centered on specifics relative to the school board meetings, a clarification of some of the witnesses’ testimony and questions directly related to the development and display of the stickers. The court then vacated this opinion and remanded it to the district court for fact findings consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling. The court ended its opinion with this caveat:
In vacating the district court’s judgment and remanding the case for additional proceedings, we want to make it clear that we do not intend to make any implicit rulings on any of the legal issues that arise from the facts once they are found on remand. We intend no holding on any of the legal premises that may have shaped the district court’s conclusions on the three Lemon prongs. Mindfid that in this area factual context is everything, we simply choose not to attempt to decide this case based on a less than a complete record on appeal or fewer than all the facts.
We are aware, as our earlier recounting of the proceedings indicates, that in addition to holding that the adoption of the sticker violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment the district court also ruled that it violated article I, section 2, paragraph 7 of the Georgia Constitution. There is no reason to believe that one-paragraph riding was not plagued by the same evidentiary uncertainties and factual problems that taint the court’s riding on the federal issues. We express no view on how the state constitutional issue should be decided, or if it should be, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), once the facts are properly found and the federal constitutional issue is decided.
(Selman v. Cobb County School District, 2005, p. 1338)
In remanding this case for additional inquiry, evidence, and new findings, the appeals court left it up to the district court whether to start with an entirely clean slate and a completely new trial or to supplement, clarify, and flesh out the evidence that it had heard in the four days of bench trial that had been conducted. The procedural details of the proceedings on remand were within the discretion of that court, but the appeals court warned that the trial court should take care to ensure that any and all evidence on which it bases any findings is part of the record before it. No further record of what happened on remand appears in the legal databases. Nonetheless, this case raises some very important ethical issues.
Questions for Discussion
- 1. How might one view this case and its lengthy proceedings from a justice perspective?
- 2. Were Mr Selman and the other concerned parents treated in a caring manner? Why or why not?
- 3. How might this case be viewed through the lens of critique?
- 4. What would the profession expect of the school board’s chairman, Mr Tippins? The administrators at the school? Mr McCoy? Mr Stickel, the district’s science curriculum supervisor?
- 5. Through a best interests’ perspective, were the students afforded their rights or shown their responsibilities? In this respect, how might this situation have been handled differently? Better?
- 6. What would you have done in this situation if you were Mr Tippins? Mr McCoy? Mr Stickel?
CASE STUDY 14.4: CAVINESS v. HORIZON COMMUNITY
LEARNING CENTER, 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010)
Michael Caviness was employed as a high school physical education teacher, health teacher, and track coach for six years at Horizon Community Learning Center, a charter school. In February 2006, a female student Bled a grievance against Caviness alleging that “the student-teacher boundary had been crossed” {Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 2010, p. 810). Horizon immediately put Caviness on paid administrative leave and initiated an investigation. In March 2006, the Horizon board held a hearing regarding the student’s allegations, at which Horizon, but not Caviness, questioned the student.
Evidence elicited at the hearing indicated that the female student and Caviness had been communicating via telephone, and that the student had a crush on him. When the student learned that Caviness had an adult girlfriend, she became upset and retaliated by Bling a grievance. The Horizon board determined that Caviness had exercised questionable judgment regarding the extent of his personal communications with the student, and therefore decided not to renew his teaching and coaching contract. The board decided to keep Caviness on paid administrative leave until the end of his employment term, which was in June 2006.
In April 2006, Lawrence Pieratt, executive director of Horizon, wrote a letter to Caviness and sent copies to the Horizon board and the Arizona Department of Education. Caviness alleged that the letter contained numerous false and defamatory statements and private information that Pieratt had intentionally misused to present Caviness in a bad light. In May 2006, Caviness asked Pieratt for permission to attend the Arizona state high school track championship to watch several Horizon students compete; Pieratt refused to consent.
In July 2006, after the end of his employment term with Horizon, Caviness applied for a position as a teacher and coach with Mesa School
District. Mesa decided not to hire him after it asked Pieratt to rate Caviness’ ability and knowledge as a teacher, and Pieratt “declined to rate him since the Horizon board had taken the action of non-renewing his contract” (Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 2010, p. 810). Caviness alleged that Pieratt’s statement to Mesa was “purposely false and incomplete and was intended to harm” Caviness, since Pieratt “knew that Caviness had an excellent 6-year record as a teacher and coach and it was reasonable and appropriate for [Pieratt] to respond accordingly rather than decline to provide information” (Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 2010, pp. 810-811).
In August 2006, Caviness’ attorney sent a letter to Horizon informing administration that a Horizon employee had called Caviness a pedophile. The letter demanded that Horizon instruct all of its agents and employees to cease and desist from making any further false and defamatory' statements to anyone. In his reply to this letter, Pieratt did not address these demands. Caviness claimed that another Horizon teacher subsequently defamed him by also calling him a pedophile. On December 21, 2006, Caviness sent a request to Pieratt for a name-clearing hearing to which Horizon did not respond.
In March 2007, Caviness filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in district court against Horizon. Caviness alleged that Horizon, acting under state law, had deprived Caviness of his liberty interest in finding and obtaining work without due process by making false statements about him regarding his employment. These statements caused serious damage to Caviness’ standing and associations in the community, or imposed on Caviness a stigma that interfered with his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities, without providing notice or a name-clearing hearing. Caviness also alleged that Horizon violated his First Amendment right to freedom of association by forbidding him to associate freely at certain public events.
The district court raised the question of whether Horizon was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The state-action element in §1983 does not cover private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful; therefore, the record must show a close nexus between the state and the challenged action so that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as behavior by the state.
On December 17, 2007, the district court granted Horizon’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the district court rejected Caviness’ arguments that Horizon was a state actor because of its statutory' characterization as a public school, and because it performed a public function in providing public education. In addition, Caviness failed to present evidence that Horizon had acted in concert or conspired with state actors, was subject to government coercion or encouragement, or was otherwise entwined or controlled by an agency' of the state.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court noted that this case presents the special situation of a private nonprofit corporation running a charter school that is defined as a public school by state law. The court began with the recognition that Arizona had statutorily defined a charter school as a “public school” (Arizona Revised Statutes §§15-101(3)). The conduct of a private corporation also needs to be considered if there is a close nexus between the state and the challenged action, by identifying the specific conduct that Caviness states in his complaint.
With respect to Caviness’ claim that Horizon’s actions in its role as his employer constituted state action, Caviness alleged only that Horizon is a nonprofit corporation, an Arizona charter school, and an Arizona public school operating in Maricopa County, and that Pieratt was acting as president, CEO, or executive director of Horizon. The Ninth Circuit Court disagreed, noting that a private entity may be designated a state actor for some purposes but still function as a private actor in other respects.
Accordingly, Caviness’ reliance on Arizona’s statutory characterization of charter schools as public schools and his assertion that charter school boards are political subdivisions for purposes of Arizona’s Open Meetings Act does not support his claim. Even if this were the case, such a determination would not resolve the question of whether the state was sufficiently involved in causing the harm to Caviness such that the court should treat Horizon as acting under color of state law.
In addition, Caviness argued that since charter schools are public schools under Arizona law, they therefore engage in the provision of public educational services. Education in general can be provided by anyone, while public educational services are traditionally and exclusively the province of the state. The court noted, however, that merely because Horizon is a private entity' performing a function that serves the public does not make its acts state actions.
Caviness also claimed that Horizon is a state actor because Arizona regulates the personnel matters of charter schools. This argument also failed. A state may be responsible for a private entity’s actions if “it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State” (Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 2010, p. 816, citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 1982, p. 1004). The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the state. Even extensive government regulation of a private business is insufficient to make that business a state actor if the challenged conduct was not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation.
Caviness contended that charter schools are state actors because charter school teachers have the same legal rights in, and to, their teachingjobs as teachers in the public school districts. This argument is erroneous and appears to be based on a misreading of the Arizona Code (§15-187(A)), which provides those rights only to a school district teacher who was previously a charter school teacher returning to the school district.
Specifically, Arizona gives hiring priority to teachers who have moved from a public-school district to a charter school and who seek to return to the same public-school district. Therefore, Arizona law ensures that the teacher receives preference when reapplying to his or her prior publicschool district without a reduction in seniority, certification, or benefits provided to employees by the public-school district. This in no way suggests that the government controls or influences post-termination decisions made by Horizon. In fact, Horizon is expressly “exempt from all statutes and rules relating to schools, governing boards and school districts” (§15—183(E) (5)), including the right to a hearing after dismissal. The absence of any reference to charter schools in the statutory sections governing certified teachers’ employment rights further supports the court’s conclusion.
In sum, the court found that Caviness did not argue, nor did the complaint allege, that the state was involved in the contested employment actions, or that it showed any interest in the school’s personnel matters. None of the regulations cited by Caviness contain substantive standards or procedural guidelines that could have compelled or influenced Horizon’s actions. Ultimately, Horizon’s actions and personnel decisions were made by private parties, and were determined by judgments of private parties without standards established by the state. Thus, the allegations in Caviness’ complaint were insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Horizon was a state actor and thus acted under state law in taking action after Caviness was terminated.
Questions for Discussion
- 1. Was justice served in this case? Why or why not? Do you believe that Caviness was treated fairly? Why or why not?
- 2. If you were the executive director in this case and you chose to handle this problem from a care perspective, what might you do? Would you do anything differently than Director Pieratt? If so, what?
- 3. How might this case be analyzed using a critical theory lens?
- 4. Should charter school employees have fewer employment rights than their traditional public-school counterparts? Does the profession carry with it different expectations for charter school teachers?
- 5. This case is based on Arizona law. Is the law the same or different in your state?
CASE STUDY 14.5: MELZER v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 336
F.3d 185 (2nd Cir. 2003)
In this case, the court’s decision begins with the following quotation:
Among the liberties an American citizen enjoys is the right to associate with whomever he or she chooses for whatever purpose. That right, Alexis de Tocqueville observed in discussing it 168 years ago in his classic book is “almost as inalienable in its nature as [the right of] individual freedom.”
(Melzer v. Board of Education, 2003, p. 188, quoting de Tocqueville, 2000 (1835), p. 184)
Peter Melzer, a teacher at Bronx High School of Science (Bronx Science) claimed that his constitutional rights to freedom of association and speech were violated when the New York City School District’s Board of Education terminated his teaching position. He alleged that action was taken in retaliation for his membership in the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA).
Melzer was a high school science teacher for over 30 years, from 1962 until his suspension in 1993 and his ultimate termination in 2000. He obtained tenure in 1968 as a physics teacher at Bronx Science. One of three highly selective science-oriented high schools in New York City, the school actively vies with New York’s other two prestigious science high schools for the city’s top students.
During his years at Bronx Science, Melzer taught grades 9 through 12. He participated in several school-related activities, including a volunteer program to teach physics to area junior high school students. He also served as an advisor to the school’s Physical Science Journal and its Bicycle Club and organized the Regional Science Olympiad. He had received several commendations for his school activities and teaching.
Melzer is a self-described pedophile and admitted to being sexually attracted to young males up to the age of 16. Despite this proclivity, there was no evidence that he engaged in any illegal or inappropriate conduct at Bronx Science. His outlet as a pedophile was his participation in NAMBLA, which he joined around 1980 to discuss with others his long-standing attraction to young boys.
NAMBLAs stated primary goal is to bring about a change in the attitudes and laws governing sexual activity between men and boys. It advocates the abolition of laws that govern the age of consent for such activity and that limit freedom of expression, including legal sanctions on child pornography. It seeks to build a support network for men and boys, while educating the public on what it sees as the benevolent nature of its activities and cooperating with lesbian, gay, and other movements for sexual liberation.
Beginning early in his NAMBLA membership, Melzer had been very active in the organization. For over 10 years, he served intermittently as a member of NAMBLA’s Steering Committee, a group that sets the association’s policy. He also served as the organization’s treasurer, coordinated its fundraising drives, and was one of three NAMBLA representatives at the Sixth Annual International Pedophile and Youth Emancipation Conference in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, a meeting devoted to sharing information about the youth pedophile movement worldwide. Melzer cofounded NAMBLA’s publication, the Bulletin, and at various times contributed articles and served as editor.
The NAMBLA Bulletin is published 10 times a year; it features articles on topics of interest to members and is the self-described voice of NAMBLA. Issues of the Bulletin in which Melzer is listed as editor include articles like “Staying Safe and Happy as a Man/Boy Lover,” which offers advice developed by NAMBLA activists on how to deal with police, store contraband erotica to escape discovery', and keep the specifics of a relationship with an underage boy secret from authorities.
A published letter to the Bulletin editors, entitled “Good Touches,” graphically instructs readers on ways to touch specific body parts. In his capacity as editor, Melzer claimed to sanction such contributions to the “Letters” section, believing that they' had value. Melzer also wrote several articles, one of which recounted the activities of a detective from the Manhattan South Public Morals Division, who posed as a NAMBLA. ally and arrested at least one NAMBLA member. In a follow-up article, Melzer complained that the officer coerced vulnerable NAMBLA members into mailing copies of Melzer’s Bulletin articles to his employer.
Melzer’s membership in NAMBLA first came to the board’s attention via an anonymous letter received by the school principal. The board’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an interview with Melzer, who declined to confirm or deny whether he was a member of NAMBLA. No administrative action was taken at that time (March 1985). The investigation was reopened in May 1992 by the newly' created Office of the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District (Commissioner of Investigation), an investigative body created to succeed the Office of the Inspector General.
During the reopened investigation in March 1993, a local television station aired a three-part news story on public school teachers who were members of NAMBLA. The story, which was broadcast on WBC-TV Channel 4 in New York, featured a secretly recorded video of a NAMBLA meeting at which Melzer was seen advising a non-tenured board employee to keep his association membership secret until he acquired tenure. The story also included interviews with students, as well as an attempted interview with
Melzer himself. Other news media soon picked up the story and further disseminated the fact that Melzer, a teacher at Bronx Science, was a NAMBLA member.
In the wake of this media attention, Melzer became the center of heated discussion in the Bronx Science community. Principal Galasso convened school officials to discuss his concerns about Melzer and the attendant publicity. Since Melzer was on sabbatical for the school year, the discussion focused on whether he should be allowed to return the following year. Galasso spoke to nearly 100 teachers and school officials, many of whom shared his concerns about whether Melzer should be teaching children and the effect the news story would have on student recruitment.
Some 50-60 members of the Bronx High School of Science Parents’ Association met to discuss the issue, right after the first installment of the news story was broadcast. They drafted a letter to the board of education chancellor, the mayor, and other public officials, demanding that Melzer and any other known member of NAMBLA be removed from positions involving daily contact with students at Bronx Science or any other New York City’ public school. In a personal meeting with the chancellor, Parents’ Association representatives strongly urged that Melzer be prohibited from returning to the classroom; they threatened to boycott the school and to call the news media if their views were ignored.
The students held an assembly that attracted 300-400 participants. A majority of the 30-40 students who spoke at the gathering opposed Melzer’s continued employment. A few students, however, expressed the view that a person not convicted of anything illegal should be allowed to practice his profession. School publications ran articles supporting opinions on both sides of the controversy. One stated that no matter how strange an organization may appear, people have the right to express their views, while another said Metzer’s actions should be condemned as “utterly detestable.” Principal Galasso estimated that over 90% of the student body was unhappy with Melzer’s membership in NAMBLA.
Based on these reactions from the school community, Galasso decided that allowing Melzer to return to the classroom would be detrimental to the school. In September 1993, the commissioner of investigation issued a report recommending disciplinary action in Melzer’s case. The report stated that it had examined the issues and concluded that serious disruption, as well as permanent loss of parental confidence, would be inevitable if Melzer was returned to the classroom. The investigation report concluded that articles in the Bulletin could serve as an instruction manual for the sexual abuse of children and can reasonably be assumed to have led to such abuse.
As a result of this report, the board filed disciplinary charges against Melzer stating that he had advanced the goals and activities of NAMBLA, and assisted in the publication of the NAMBLA Bulletin, which promoted illegal sexual activity between male adults and male children under the age of consent. Further, the board charged that Melzer’s activities had been widely reported, had caused disruption in his school and the school community, and had undermined his ability to serve as a teacher. Melzer requested a hearing to contest the charges. After 30 days of hearings held over the course of three years, the hearing officer recommended that Melzer be terminated. Upon receipt of this recommendation, the board dismissed Melzer.
Melzer brought action under §1983, challenging his dismissal. The district court found significant disruption at the high school and concluded that Melzer was terminated solely because his employer reasonably believed that the public exposure of this teacher’s associational activities was likely to impair his effectiveness as a teacher and cause internal disruption if he were returned to the classroom. The district court believed that the threat of such disruption weighed more heavily than Melzer’s rights to speech and association. The federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld this holding.
This appeals court noted that the First Amendment protects the speech and association rights of an individual like Melzer, no matter how different, unpopular, or morally repugnant society may find his activities. Nonetheless, according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), the government may impose restraints on the First Amendment activities of its employees that are job-related, even when such restraints would be unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.
Under the Pickering balancing test, public employees have First Amendment rights, but those rights are somewhat diminished in public employment. The test requires a court to balance the interests of the employee as a citizen commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
The Pickering test involves a two-step inquiry: first, a court must determine whether the speech that has led to an employee’s discipline relates to a matter of public concern; andsecond, if so, the balance between free speech concerns is weighed against efficient public service. The court agreed that Melzer’s activity centers on a matter of public concern. NAMBLA’s stated goal is to effect change in attitudes and laws regarding age of consent. The bulk of Melzer’s activity, advocacy, and speech support this goal. Advocacy for a change in public perception and law, a fundamental component of democracy, is a matter of public concern, regardless of the underlying subject matter. Consequently, Melzer’s activity is protected.
To satisfy the efficient public service component of the Pickering test, the government has the burden to show that the employee’s activity is disruptive to the internal operations of the school. There was strong proof that Melzer’s return to his teaching post would compromise the learning environment, particularly because of his effect on two critical constituencies: the students and the parents. An expert in psychology testifying for the board stated that having a teacher with beliefs such as Melzer’s would provoke anxiety and be a disruptive experience for the average student. He believed students would likely be unable to concentrate in the plaintiffs class or be uncomfortable asking him for help after class or in any other one-on-one situation.
Melzer’s position as a schoolteacher, which requires him to act in loco parentis for a group of students that includes adolescent boys, is central to this review. Melzer advocates changes in the law that would accommodate his professed desire to have sexual relationships with such children. According to the court, it is perfectly reasonable to predict that parents may fear his influence and predilections. Parents so concerned may remove their children from the school, thereby interrupting the children’s education, impairing the school’s reputation, and impairing educationally desirable interdependency' and cooperation among parents, teachers, and administrators. The board contends as well that parental concern would compromise the competitive position of this high school vis-à-vis other elite high schools in New York City: While not a central concern, this also matters.
As the district court noted, disruption may' have arisen from Melzer’s possible inability’ to fulfill his duties as a teacher. Melzer candidly acknowledged that it would be difficult for him to decide whether to report an incident of child molestation at the school. Not only is reporting such incidents a part of any teacher’s duties, but lack of confidence in Melzer’s will to do so would further undermine the trust of students and parents alike.
The court acknowledged that community' reaction should not dictate whether an employee’s constitutional rights are protected; however, the judges also recognized that allowing the public, with the government’s help, to shout down unpopular ideas that stir anger is generally not permitted under our jurisprudence. On the other hand, Melzer’s position as a teacher leaves him somewhat beholden to the views of parents in the community'. Parents are not outsiders seeking to heckle Melzer into silence; rather, they are participants in public education, and without their cooperation public education as a practical matter cannot function.
Finally, the court found no proof of retaliatory motives, reasoning that the board had known of Melzer’s NAMBLA membership as early as the mid-1980s and did not terminate him until after his membership became public knowledge. In sum, Melzer’s freedom to associate with and advocate for NAMBLA is protected by the First Amendment; however, the board met its burden under Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) by demonstrating that Melzer’s association and his degree of active involvement in NAMBLA caused disruption to the school’s mission and operations justifying the termination.
Questions for Discussion
- 1. What ethical frame(s) did the school district follow in addressing this situation?
- 2. How would you have handled this case and what ethical frames(s) would you have used?
- 3. How might the ethic of critique apply to the facts of this case?
- 4. What decision (s) would be in the best interests of the students? What would the profession expect of school leaders dealing with this type of situation?
REFERENCES
Arizona Revised Statutes §§15-101 (3).
Arons, S., & Lawrence, C. (1980). The manipulation of consciousness: A first amendment critique of schooling. Harvard Civil Rights—Civil Liberties Law Review, 15, 309-361.
Billings v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 259 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2001).
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010).
Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. §1983.
Culhane, J. G. (2013). Sandusky’s victims: Compensation, vindication, and blame. Widener Laxe Journal, 22, 589-609.
de Tocqueville, A. (2000 (1835)). Democracy in America, ed. and trans. H. C. Mansfield & D. Winthrop. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Doyle, M. C. (2014). Circles of trust: Using restorative justice to repair organizations marred by sex abuse. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 14, 175-201.
Hanna, C. (2017). College athletics’ whistle-blower protection. Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, 27, 209-223.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Mead, J. F. (2002). Conscious use of race as a voluntary means to educational ends in elementary and secondary education: A legal argument derived from recent judicial decisions. Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 8, 63-149.
Melzer v. Board of Education, 336 F.3d 185 (2nd Cir. 2003).
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Selman v. Cobb County School District, 390 F.2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Selman v. Cobb County School District, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
United States Constitution, Amendment I. (1791).
Yudof, M., Kirp, D., Levin, B., & Moran, R. (2002). Educational policy and the law (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.
Chapter