Establishing a strong political commitment to gender equity: the politics of Rwanda’s law on the Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence (2008)

Jennie E. Burnet

Introduction

In the past decade, Rwanda has become one of the global leaders in terms of expanding women’s inclusion in politics and promoting and securing women’s rights. In 2008, only 14 years after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwandans elected a female majority to the national legislature. Women realized this achievement thanks, in large part, to a gender quota system that encompassed all levels and branches of government, although these quotas are themselves part of a wider process through which women’s rights have been institutional' ized in Rwanda. Four significant pieces of gender equity legislation were passed before the gender quotas started to have an impact: the 1996 law on genocide;¹ the 1999 amendment to the civil code on matrimonial regimes (i.e. ‘inheritance law’);² the 2001 children’s rights law;³ and the 2003 constitution, which created the gender quotas. Indeed, if anything, fewer pieces of gender equity legislation have been passed since the introduction of gender quotas than occurred beforehand. In addition to the 2008 law on domestic violence that we examine here, these include the 2004 Land Policy and accompanying 2005 Land Law, which clarified women’s property rights under the 1999 inheritance law, includ-ing their rights to own and inherit real estate. This policy helped alleviate gender-based class inequities in terms of land ownership (Carpano 2011, Simons and Schulze, 2011).

Scholars have attributed Rwanda’s success in enhancing and protecting women’s rights and increasing women’s representation to numerous factors, including the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) long-term commitment to gender mainstreaming; Rwanda’s vibrant women’s organizations; the use of behind-the-scenes lobbying of potential male allies to convince them to support policy initiatives and laws; and a transformation in the international development context, whereby aid agencies have mainstreamed women’s rights and gender equity approaches (Newbury and Baldwin 2001, Powley 2005, Longman 2006, Powley and Pearson 2007, Burnet 2008, Devlin and Elgie 2008, Burnet 2011, Coffe 2012).

In this chapter, I explore the quality of women’s inclusion and participation in formal political institutions and informal processes and the women’s movement’s ability to negotiate gender equity concerns in terms of legislative reform and policy formulation in the area of gender-based violence (GBV). 1 use the power domains framework to understand the ways in which Rwanda’s dominant-party settlement shapes the institutional arrangements and ideas that govern the pursuit, adoption, implementation, and outcomes of gender equity policies. In this investigation, 1 emphasize the ways in which key actors and both formal and informal institutions interact with each other, the ways in which power is wielded in a dominant-party settlement, and the ways these structural formations and power relations affect gender equity outcomes. From this analysis, I conclude that Rwanda’s success in terms of women’s rights rests not only on top-down political will and a vibrant women’s movement, but also on the role of highly qualified professional technocrats in the government administration, and the system of performance-based contracts and accountability, which shapes bureaucratic behaviour through to the frontline of service delivery.

In order to identify the key features of Rwanda’s political settlement, and the important ways in which it is gendered, 1 constructed a timeline that identifies the key junctures in Rwanda’s history. A desk review was conducted to analyse women’s roles during these critical moments and the shifts in balance of power between the various social groups and factions. I used process tracing to construct my policy case on GBV law. This included the construction of a policy timeline and the review of various secondary documents, including scholarly literature; Rwandan government reports, documents, and legislation; and international and nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports and documents to identify the key players, formal processes for negotiation between these actors, and policy ideas that were forwarded by different groups. Key informant interviews were conducted with a strategic sample of 26 of the key state and nonstate actors who were at the heart of this policy process. The interviewees included women and men representatives from the ministries, legislators and elected officials, the national police, civil society actors, international NGOs, and the United Nations (UN). For a full list of participants, please see Appendix 2. Key documents on the selected policy areas and the data from the semi-structured interviews were systematically analysed for content and discourse, based on a set of relevant themes developed in collaboration with the research teams from the other country cases.

In this chapter, I first trace the evolution of Rwanda’s current political settlement and women’s historical exclusion from—and then gradual inclusion in— the political settlement. Then, I present my findings from analysis of the adoption and implementation of the 2008 anti-GBV law policy case. Finally, 1 reflect on these findings and outline the important outcomes that emerge from adding a gender analysis to the political settlement framework.

Women’s inclusion and influence in politics and policy-making in Rwanda

Critical junctures and history of women’s engagement in politics

To understand Rwanda’s current political settlement it is important to understand certain critical junctures since the end of colonialism. The decolonization process in Rwanda (1952-1961) polarized divisions that had emerged during the colonial period. Belgian colonial administration had concentrated power in the hands of Tutsi chiefs while excluding Hutu from administrative positions and the education system. As a result, two political conflicts emerged: (1) Hutu and Tutsi nationalist elites jointly pursued the end of Belgian colonial rule and its replacement with self-rule, and (2) Hutu nationalists pursued emancipation for the Hutu majority from Belgian rule and what they claimed was Tutsi colonialism (Golooba-Mutebi 2013, p. 4). By the end of the transition in 1963, Rwanda had a democratically elected Hutu president, Grégoire Kayibanda. During the decolonization process, women and women’s issues never emerged as national issues.

Under President Juvénal Habyarimana’s government (1973-1994), women began to emerge as leaders as they gained access to higher education (albeit in very small numbers) and as the international feminist movement changed the global political climate for women’s rights. By 1982, there were four women parliamentarians out of a total of 70 in Rwanda (Muberanziza 2003, Burnet 2008, p. 370). In 1983, the number of women in parliament more than doubled to nine and women’s representation in the legislature under President Habyarimana peaked in 1988 at nearly 16 percent (Muberanziza 2003, Burnet 2008, p. 370).

In 1989, several political parties that had been dormant under the single-party state and dictatorship of President Habyarimana reemerged and began demanding political liberalization. Along with a few civil society organizations (CSOs) that were also pushing for change, their pleas coincided with increasing pressure in the international community for authoritarian states to democratize. Although the political liberalization movement was dominated by men, women were not completely absent. Women played an active role through the women’s wings of the political parties. There were also several key female politicians. Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, wife of President Habyarimana, held a great deal of informal power in the Habyarimana regime because she hailed from a powerful family. Among the national leaders of the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) party was Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was named minister of education in 1992 and then prime minister of Rwanda in 1993.

On 1 October 1990, the country entered a civil war when the RPF invaded. The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords brought an official end to hostilities and outlined a transition plan to move the country to multiparty politics and democratic elections. The transition, which had been limping along, was brought to a violent halt in April 1994, when President Habyarimana was assassinated by unknown assailants. Immediately, Hutu extremists took control of the government and perpetrated a genocide against Tutsi and others defined as ‘enemies’ of the state, including many Hutu and Twa. At the same time, the RPF resumed the civil war

Establishing political commitment to gender equity 91 against the government army, which was also involved in the genocide. The genocide ended when the RPF took military control of the majority of the territory, driving the Hutu-extremist government, militias, and army into exile. On 19 July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the ‘Government of National Unity’, whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s commitment to power sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords. In 2003, a new constitution was approved in a national referendum, and for the first time since 1994, multiparty elections for parliament and president were held. In the parliamentary elections, the RPF and parties in its coalition won 96 percent of the seats in the lower house.

The current political settlement and women’s inclusion in politics

Rwanda’s current political settlement comprises the dominant party type. The critical juncture of the current political settlement was the 1994 genocide of Tutsi and its aftermath, whereby the RPF became the dominant party in a governance system characterized by regular elections with very limited competition between political parties. In its second dimension regarding the degree of institutionalization (see Chapter 2), Rwanda’s political settlement can still largely be characterized by personalized relations and institutions, in that the political agenda and decision-making are dominated by a particular dominant ruler, President Kagame, and the rule of law has yet to be fully established (Pritchett et al. 2018). However, there is also compelling evidence that a process is under way to establish more formal institutional arrangements that operate along impersonal logics, with observers drawing attention to the strong ideological campaign against patronage politics and very low levels of corruption within the country’s public sector (Golooba-Mutebi 2013, Chemouni 2017).

A key aspect of Rwanda’s post-genocide political settlement has been a top-to-bottom effort to transform gender relations, increase representation of women in every branch and level of government, and increase protection of women’s rights. The nature of women’s involvement in politics changed dramatically as President Kagame and RPF created scope and space for women to participate in politics during the transition period. Among the fundamental principles articulated in the 2003 constitution (article 9) was ‘the equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty percent of posts in decision-making organs’. The constitution delineated reserved women’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament. Since the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution were held in 2003, women have made remarkable gains in their representation in the Rwandan parliament. This can be seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which show women in the Rwandan parliament in the years until 1994 (before the quotas) and following 2003 (following the quotas). In every election, women captured seats well beyond the 24 reserved women’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the 2013 elections, women candidates were well represented among the candidates on all party lists and comprised 48 percent of candidates on the RPF coalition of candidates.

92 Jennie E. Burnet

Table 5.1 Women in Rwanda’s national parliament (1961-1994)

Source: Burnet (2008), p. 370

Despite the constitution’s clear instructions for representation of women through' out the government, the goal of at least 30 percent women in all decision-making organs has not yet been reached in all government bodies. Table 5.3 summarizes women’s representation in various parts of the government, as of September 2013. Women’s representation in the highest levels of the executive branch and the judiciary exceeds the quota, whereas the provincial and district levels of the local governments has not yet reached 30 percent.

In terms of other aspects of inclusion, the key actors in Rwanda’s ruling coalition, including the RPF-ruling party and President Paul Kagame, have advocated for greater representation of women (Longman 2006). President Kagame has regularly spoken on gender, women’s rights, and the importance of equal opportunities for girls and women as cornerstones of the nation’s development. Women hold influential positions in the major political parties, including the RPF, its coalition parties, and opposition parties.

Beginning shortly after the genocide, women’s CSOs rose to prominence in Rwanda, lobbying on behalf of women’s rights and needs in the aftermath of the genocide. The women’s movement had several significant successes before gender quotas came into effect, including codifying rape and sexual violence as among the most serious genocide crimes in the 1995 genocide statute and the 1998 amendment to the civil code, giving women and girls greater financial autonomy in marriage, and the right to inherit property. Women’s ability to claim these and other entitlements—including that of political inclusion—flowed directly from

Table 5.2 Women in Rwanda’s national parliament after gender quota (2003-2013)

Chamber of Deputies Senate

Source: Burnet (2008), p. 370, and parliamentary website (http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/).

Establishing political commitment to gender equity 93

Table 5.3 Womens representation in state apparatus in Rwanda (September 2013 and 2015)

Source: Data collected in Rwanda.

both the horrific violence and suffering that many women experienced during the 1994 genocide, and also the active participation of many women within the RPF’s armed struggle.

After the creation of the gender quotas in all decision-making bodies of government in 2003, many women’s CSO leaders took positions in the government. The majority joined the RPF political party, attracted by its willingness to promote gender equity policies, a move that contrasted strongly with the approach of the other main parties, which had generally ignored women in the past. Thus, the establishment of Rwanda’s current political settlement was a highly gendered process, characterized by the recognition of women’s entitlements and rising levels of female political participation.

The gender machinery within the Rwandan state expanded gradually after the genocide and then rapidly during the first decade of the 21st century, and femo-crats (feminist bureaucrats, whether female or male) would play a significant role in influencing gender-equitable policies and outcomes. In late 1994, the transitional government created the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs (M1GEFASO), the first government ministry dedicated to gender issues. The ministry was reorganized in 1999 and renamed the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (M1GEPROF). Technocrats and gender specialists within the ministry were key in collaborating with the Forum of Women Parliamentarians (FWPs) to develop the 1999 inheritance law. By the early 2000s, femocrats— comprising not only women, but also men with explicit gender training or who had bought intothe gender agenda—had become a critical mass. Femocrats within MIGEPROF would play an important role during the drafting of the 2008 GBV law and also conducted a national grassroots consultation as the law was being revised. The state gender machinery continued to expand throughout the early 2000s, with the creation of the Gender Monitoring Office and mandates for all budgets within all state entities to include gender mainstreaming. The following section sets out in more detail how these key actors within the realm of Rwanda’s domain of women’s interests played a key role in the adoption of the GBV law.