Trust in Epistemology

Section 1 The Value of Trust and Self-TrustLocke on TrustEpistemic and Practical Dependence and the Value of Skills or: Satnavs, Good or Bad?Our Extensive Epistemic Dependence on Testimony and a Question It Makes SalientThe Nature of Our Epistemic Dependence on TestimonyOne’s Choices Regarding Remaining Epistemically and Practically Dependent Versus Acquiring New SkillsSome Normative Principles Regarding SkillsPutting Aside Two Instrumental Reasons to Acquire SkillsSkills and AbilitiesA Pleasure-Based Case for Certain-RAS, None for Unrestricted-RASA Well-Being-Based Case for Somc-RAS and Corc-RASConclusionNotesReferencesSection 2 Trust in TestimonyThe Role of Trust in Testimonial KnowledgeSome Categories for the Epistemology of TestimonyA General Framework for Understanding the Generation-Transmission Distinction15Knowledge Transmission as Involving Joint Agency and TrustKnowledge as Success From AbilityBack to the Main ArgumentsNotesReferencesTrust, Preemption, and KnowledgeIntroductionPreliminariesThe TaskPrecaution and PreemptionThe Central Challenge to PreemptionForfeiting Doxastic JustificationConclusionsNotesReferencesGroups, Trust, and TestimonyGroup Knowledge and Group TestimonyThe Role of Trust in TestimonyTrusting GroupsConcluding (Metaphysical) RemarksNotesReferencesSection 3 Trust and Epistemic ResponsibilityReconciling Epistemic Trust and ResponsibilityEpistemic Trust: General Accounts of TrustEpistemic Trust: Two FormsInquiry and Testimony: Intersections of the Epistemic Trust FormsEpistemic Responsibility: Responsibility for BeliefsEpistemic Responsibility: Responsibility in Epistemic ConductThe Implications of Epistemic Responsibility in Inquiry: A Matter of Knowing and Living WellEpistemic Responsibility in a Social World of Trust RelationsImplications of Trust: Belief Formation and the Distribution of Epistemic ResponsibilitiesImplications of Trust: The Presumption of Trustworthiness Within Epistemic PracticesImplications of Trust: Responsibility as Critical Reflection on Our PracticesConclusionNotesReferencesProper Epistemic Trust as a Responsibilist VirtueEpistemic Trust in GeneralProper Epistemic Trust and the Structure of Responsibilist VirtuesProper Epistemic Trust and the Meta-Epistemology of VirtuesImplicationsProper Epistemic Trust and Epistemological IssuesConclusionNotesReferencesVirtuous and Vicious Intellectual Self-TrustIntellectual Self-TrustVirtuous and Vicious Types of Intellectual Self-ConfidenceSecure, Defensive, and Damaged Self-EsteemSelf-Esteem as Underpinning Self-ConfidenceWell-Placed and Ill-Founded Self-TrustNotesReferencesSection 4 The Vulnerabilities of TrustExploitative Epistemic TrustIntroductionExploitative TrustExploitation in Epistcmic-Trust RelationshipsThe Speaker Exploiting the HearerThe Hearer Exploiting the SpeakerConclusionNotesReferencesSelf-Trust and Discriminatory SpeechIntroductionSelf-Trust and Forms of Prejudicial SpeechUnconscious InfluencesThe Effects of Unconscious Influences on Intellectual Self-TrustWhat’s a Liberal (or Anyone) to Do?NotesReferencesContributors
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