Nuclear Modernization in the 21st Century


Modernization debatesDefining modernizationSetting the stagePlan of the bookNotesU.S. modernization efforts and the 2018 Nuclear Posture ReviewThe 2018 Nuclear Posture ReviewAir-delivered nuclear weaponsLand-based ballistic missilesBallistic missile submarinesNon-strategic nuclear weaponsNuclear weapons production complexNotesRussia’s nuclear modernizationLegacy systemsIntercontinental ballistic missilesSubmarine-launched ballistic missilesHeavy bombersLegacy summaryNew developmentsIntercontinental ballistic missilesSubmarines sea-launched ballistic missilesHeavy bombersINF killerOther developmentsConclusion: why these developments matterNotesU.S.-Russian bilateral disarmamentStrategic nuclear forcesStrategic rocket forcesStrategic fleetStrategic aviationNon-strategic nuclear weapons, doctrineArms control and quantitative changes to the arsenalsFuture prospectsNotesChinese nuclear strategyThe academic debateMinimum deterrenceLimited deterrenceOther perspectivesEvidence of transitionObjectivesConditions of useTargetingForce structureConclusionNotesU.S. nuclear weapons modernization and the impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regimeIntroductionThe NPT and the NPT regimeU.S. leadership and impact on the NPT regimeU.S. nuclear modernizationThe Trump administrationThe demise of the INF TreatyThe non-renewal of New STARTConclusionNotesNATO nuclear modernizationThe purpose of NATO’s nuclear weaponsThe changing security environment in EuropeAn era of promiseWest-Russia relations fall to post-Cold War lowNuclear arms control in troubleDoctrinal questionsNATO nuclear postureNATO’s nuclear policy’NATO strategic nuclear forces and modernization piansNATO non-strategic nuclear forces and modernization plansOther U.S. weapons?A need for dialogueNotesThrough a crystal ball, dimly: nuclear modernization’s anticipated effects on International Relations theoryNukes, crystal balls, and futures of theoriesCold War theories: existential deterrence against nuclear war fighting and damage limitationMicro-drivers of macro-theories: realism vindicated?Rethinking Cold War nuclear deterrence in light of new evidence: MAD, nuclear primacy, and the role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal todayPost-Cold War nuclear deterrence: Chinese and American attitudes towards the bomb and its deterrent effectU.S. views on deterrence: a show of force equals willingness to fight?China’s views on deterrence: uncertainty and strategic ambiguityNuclear proliferation: revisiting extended theoretical debates?Conclusions and the theory’s way forwardNotesModernization a determent to international securityIntroductionUnnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe excessUnnecessary excessA larger arsenal than required for deterrenceThe flawed case for new low-yield weaponsRedundancy within the Obama-era recapitalization programExcess NNSA infrastructureUnsustainable excessThe third wave of nuclear modernization: unique challengesDisarmament by defaultUnsafe excessA new technological arms raceA cold shoulder to arms controlThe danger of a new low-yield weaponsNuclear cruise missiles, ICBMs, and the risks of accidental nuclear warThe risks of new warheadsDamaging opportunity costsConclusionNotesModernization as a promoter of international security: the special role of U.S. nuclear weaponsThe U.S.-led, rules-based international orderU.S. nuclear weapons and great power peaceU.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferationThe imperative of U.S. nuclear modernizationThe threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear modernizationRussiaChinaNorth KoreaThe role of other nations’ nuclear forcesConclusionNotesAfterwordStrategic stabilityGreat power conflictArms control and nonproliferationClosing thoughtsNotes
 
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