Relation between interpreting and changing the world

A close connection exists between interpreting the world and changing it and between historical determinism and human capability to change the world. We may analyze this connection based on the 11th of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach written in 1845 spring. Marx said: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”²⁵ Some and perhaps many scholars in China and beyond thus interpret Mare's above words: the philosophy of all pre-Mareian philosophers had only “interpreted the world” while only Marxist philosophy claimed to “change the world.” Some even dichotomize philosophy into that of “interpreting the world” and that of “changing the world.” They believe that no philosophy other than Marxist philosophy represents the latter. This rather popular view, I argue, misinterprets and distorts Mare. The key here lies in understanding “philosophers” as meant by Mare. Does it refer to all or only specific philosophical schools before Mare? I argue for the latter, specifically the young Hegelians emerging during the disintegration of Hegelian philosophy. That is, these Hegelians only attempted to "interpret” the world with no effort of changing it. A discussion of this follows.

When criticizing French and British materialists and communists in Holy Family, Mare said:

The criticism of the French and the English is not an abstract, preternatural personality beyond mankind; it is the real human activities of individuals who are active members of society and who suffer, feel, think and act as human beings. That is why their criticism is at the same time practical, their communism a socialism which gives practical, concrete measures and in which they do not just think but act even more, it is the living real criticism of existing society, the discovery of the causes of "the decay.”²⁶

In other words, the criticism by the French and British materialists and communists did not merely address ideas and thoughts or interpretations of the world. It advocated changing of existing society thr ough revolutionary practices.

Engels concurred with Mare. In his manuscript Dialectics of Nature, Engels discussed the great thinkers, artists, scientists, philosophers, revolutionaries, and their activities to change the world since the Renaissance. Engels said,

It was the greatest progressive revolution that mankind has so far experienced, a time which called for giants and produced giants—giants in power of thought, passion, and character, in universality and learning. The men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations. On the contrary, the adventurous character of the time inspired them to a greater or less degree.

The heroes of that time had not yet come under the servitude of the division of labour, the restricting effects of which, with its production of one sidedness, we so often notice in their successors. But what is especially characteristic of them is that they almost all pursue their lives and activities in the midst of the contemporary movements, in the practical struggle; they take sides and join in the fight, one by speaking and writing, another with the sword, many with both. Hence the fullness and force of character that makes them complete men. Men of the study are the exception—either persons of second or third rank or cautious philistines who do not want to burn their fingers. At that time natural science also developed in the midst of the general revolution and was itself thoroughly revolutionary; it had to win in struggle its right of existence. Side by side with the great Italians from whom modern philosophy dates, it provided its martyrs for the stake and the prisons of the Inquisition.²⁷

Engels’ words indicate that the great figures since the Renaissance have engaged not only passively in the ideological critique of old systems, not only passively in the interpretation of the world, but also vigorously in the movement of their time. They used pens, swords, or both to criticize the actual revolutionary practices against the old society, and even dared their lives upon the guillotine and the gallows.

The French and British materialist philosophy not only interprets the world, but advocates changing it. Hegelian idealism, however, interprets, without attempting to change, the world. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels criticized Hegelian philosophy, arguing that it starts with an absolute idea, walks through a series of links and another series of negation of negations, and yet finally returns to nothing but the same absolute idea.

But at the end of the whole philosophy, a similar return to the beginning is possible only in one way. Namely, by conceiving of the end of history as follows: mankind arrives at the cognition of the self-same absolute idea, and declares that this cognition of the absolute idea is reached in Hegelian philosophy. And what applies to philosophical cognition applies also to historical practice. Mankind, which, in the person of Hegel, has reached the point of working out the absolute idea, must also in practice have gotten so far that it can carry out this absolute idea in reality. Hence the practical political demands of the absolute idea on contemporaries may not be stretched too far. And so we find at the conclusion of the Philosophy of Right that the absolute idea is to be realized in that monarchy based on social estates which Frederick William III so persistently but vainly promised to his subjects.²⁸

When criticizing Hegelian thought and its “identity with being,” Engels argued that Hegel’s identification of thought with being is nothing but an absolute selfcognition, a thought of thought. Engels added that thought and being, for Hegel, are but different manifestations of the same absoluteness; the thing to be known is pre-embedded in the thought of it.

But that in no way prevents Hegel from drawing the further conclusion from his proof of the identity of thing and being that his philosophy, because it is correct for his thinking, is therefore the only correct one, and that the identity of thinking and being must prove its validity by mankind immediately translating his philosophy from theory into practice and transforming the whole world according to Hegelian principles. This is an illusion which he shares with well-nigh all philosophers.²⁹

In other words, all philosophers, including pure idealists such as Hegel, dream of turning their philosophies into reality and changing the world according to their philosophies. The only differences lie in their methods of and the degree of success in changing the world.

For Feuerbach, it is not that he didn't address practice. He even criticized idealism on basis of practical ideas, to which he attached great value. He even incorporated practice into his epistemology. Beuerbach said: “The main shortcoming of idealism is that it only proposes and solves the problems of objectivity and subjectivity, the truth and non-authenticity of the world from a theoretical point of view.”³⁰ Idealism does not understand that “practice will solve the problems that the theory cannot solve.”³¹ In his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin highly valued Feuerbach’s practical viewpoint. Lenin said: “Feuerbach makes the sum-total of human practice the basis of the theory of knowledge.”³² However, Feuerbach regards practical activities as the dirty business of petty businesspeople for profit. To Feuerbach, theorization is the only real practical activity. He saw no significance in revolutionary practices. In German Ideology, Marx and Engels thus critiqued Feuerbach:

In reality and for the practical materialist, i.e. the communist, it is a question of revolution is in the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things. When occasionally we find such views with Feuerbach, they are never more than isolated surmises and have much too little influence on his general outlook to be considered here as anything else than embryos capable of development.³³

However, despite our arguments so far, we cannot claim that Feuerbach’s philosophy merely interprets the world and negates the need to change the world.

Marx’s words “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it,” seen in Article 11 of Theses on Feuerbach, may be said about specific philosophers in a specific context from a specific perspective. First of all. the “philosophers” here do not refer to all philosophers before the birth of Marxist philosophy, but specifically to young Hegelians; second, the specific context here refers to the dark and tragic realities in Germany faced by young Hegelian philosophers at that time; and third, the specific perspective here is that young Hegelians only carried out philosophical and religious critiques, using their words against others’, but dared not to confront Germany’s dark reality with bold discussion of revolutionary practices. This is why Marx argued that young Hegelians only interpreted the world with no attempt to change it through revolutionary practices. It misunderstands Marx to claim that no philosophy other than Marxist philosophy advocates changing the world, and that philosophy is dichotomized into those that merely interpret the world and those that also attempt to change the world.

After our analyses so far, the following summary is offered concerning the relation between historical determinism and the human capability to change the world:

First, historical materialism is historical determinism, not historical nondeterminism. This is the first theoretical premise for examining the relation between historical determinism and human capability of changing the world. It is untenable to regard historical materialism as historical nondeterminism, which contradicts the essence of historical materialism.

Second, the determinism of historical materialism is a materialist dialectical determinism. It is essentially different from mechanical determinism, historical fatalism, or historical pre-determinism. This is the second theoretical premise in need of clarification to accurately assess the relation between historical determinism and the human possibility to change the world. Deniers and critics of the historical determinism of historical materialism mostly confuse it with mechanical determinism, historical fatalism, or historical pre-determinism. Typical examples include Karl Popper's The Poverty of Historical Determinism.

Third, historical determinism and human’s possibility to change the world are two aspects of the same issue. These two are not only reconcilable but closely connected, internally united, and mutually premised. Any effort otherwise would be fundamentally wrong. Accepting the former while denying the latter leads to mechanical determinism or historical fatalism. Reversely, accepting the latter while denying the former leads to historical idealism or voluntarism.

Fourth, historical determinism believes that historical development has necessity, objective regularity, and causality. It is the prerequisite for humans to change the world and history through practical activities. If historical development has no necessity and objective regularity, if humans’ practical activities are guided by no historical necessity and objective regularity, if humans are ignorant of the basic trend of historical development, then humans will not be able to determine the purpose and direction of their activities nor formulate plans for their future. Consequently, human activities become arbitrary, analogous to a messy horde of flies. Human activities as such won’t effectively change the world or history. Catastrophes and misery may lie ahead to engender the demise of humankind itself.

Fifth, humans' subjective choice refers to their understanding of the necessity and objective regularity of historical development, which they use to guide their practical activities to change the world. It is the prerequisite for the operation of historical determinism. The necessity and objective regularity of historical development are neither a preconceived determination nor product of an unknown supra-human force. They give form to human activities and enable humans to change the world.

Notes

• 1 Han Zhen. (1992). Introduction to the Western Philosophy of History. Jinan, China: Shandong People’s Press, 3.
• 2 Walsh, W. H. (1991). Philosophy of History: An Introduction (He Zhaowu & Zhang Wenjie, Trans.). Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 525.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 544.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 544-545.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 545.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 575-576.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 42-43.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 602.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 2). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 591-592.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 5). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 10.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 5). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 9-10.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 301.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 303. Emphasis added.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 304.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 302.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 2). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 470-471.

Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (1958). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 149.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 9). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 300.

Collected Works of Lenin—On Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism. (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 179.

Selected Works of Mao Zedong. (Vol. 2). (1991). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 478.

Collected Works of Mao Zedong. (Vol. 8) (1999). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 306.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 9). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing

House, 120. Emphasis added.

Selected Works of Mao Zedong. (Vol. 2). (1986). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 833.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 502.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 355.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 9). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 409, 409-410,405.

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 171.'

An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 279.

• 30 Le Yanping. (1961). The Interpretation of Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Shijiazhuang, China: Hebei People’s Press, 256.
• 31 Selected Readings of Feuerbac’s Philosophical Works. (1959). Beijing, China: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 248.
• 32 Lenin's Monographs on Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 49.
• 33 An Anthology of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). (2009). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 527.