Menu
Home
Log in / Register
 
Home arrow Economics arrow Generalized Microeconomics
Next >

Generalized Microeconomics





FOREWORDTHE GENERALIZED PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITYALTERNATIVES TO THE HOMO ECONOMICUS PARADIGMMINIMIZATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC EXTINCTIONPARETO DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVALFIRST-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONSECOND-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONGENERAL PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONMODELLING RISK AND HEDGING AGAINST ITPROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR INCOME AS A RANDOM VARIABLEFOR MULATION OF THE LENINGRAD CASINO PROBLEMMODEL OF THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOXMORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVALPRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELADVERSE SELECTIONMORAL HAZARDAPPLICATION OF GENERALIZED MICROECONOMICS: MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVALTHREAT TO THE AGENT DUE TO EXTINCTION OF THE PRINCIPALADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVALMORAL HAZARD IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVALCOMPARISON OF THE STANDARD HOMO ECONOMICUS WITH A SURVIVAL-PROBABILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENTTHE DEMAND FUNCTION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET: COMPARISON OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL WITH THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN EU THEORY AND KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY PROSPECT THEORYINSURANCE IN THE MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF AN AGENT'S PARETO PROBABILITY OF (ECONOMIC) SURVIVALINSURANCE DEMAND IN THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INCOME (EU THEORY)INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY MODEL (PROSPECT THEORY, PT)COMPARISON OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS OF MODELS A, B, AND C (FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE SECTIONS)MODELLING NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: THE UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN THE NON-PROFIT SECTORAN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOURUNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTIONBEHAVIOUR OF A FIRM IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY- THE HOMO SE ASSECURANS MODELSET OF FEASIBLE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMYTHE INDEX PLANNING METHOD AND THE CRITERION OF A PRODUCER IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMYMAXIMIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE RESERVEMAXIMIZATION OF THE RELATIVE RESERVE (I.E. MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN A CPE)MODEL OF AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD CORPORATE INSOLVENCYTHE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY INSOLVENCYMODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD SECONDARY INSOLVENCYMODEL A: MINIMAX STRATEGYMODEL B: MINIMUM EXTINCTION RISK STRATEGYTHE PRODUCER'S OPTIMUM UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALEMODEL A: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PRICEMODEL B: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITYMODEL C: NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITYMODELS OF MARKET ALLOCATION OF EXTERNALITIES, GENERALIZED COASE THEOREMEMISSIONS PERMIT MARKETTHE COASETHEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIESTHE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF TWO PRODUCERSTHE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATIONTHE COASE THEOREM FOR THE CASE WHERE A PRODUCER HARMS A CONSUMERTHE COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIESTHE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AGENTS MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN SURVIVAL PROBABILITYSINGLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDER MODELMULTIPLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDERS MODELEFFICIENCY OF ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENTS THAT DEPEND ON EACH OTHER TO SURVIVEMODEL A: INFORMATION EFFECT = INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COSTMODEL B: INFORMATION EFFECT < INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COSTALTRUISM AND REDISTRIBUTION INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALSALTRUISM AND BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITYREDISTRIBUTIONTHE SUPPLY SIDE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE WILLINGNESS TO FOR GO PART OF ONE'S PERSONAL PROSPERITY) DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS' PREFERENCESTHE WILLINGNESS TO REDISTRIBUTE IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC GOODS (THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION)HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDISTRIBUTIONTHE "DEMAND SIDE" OF REDISTRIBUTION: THE INFORMATION PROBLEMEFFICIENCY OF REDISTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO THE DONOR'S PREFERENCESALTRUISTIC ALLOCATION MODELSMODEL OF ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITYMODEL OF MINIMIZATION OF THE RISK OF SIMULTANEOUS EXTINCTION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS: CRUEL ALTRUISMTHE STATE IN THE ROLE OF DONORSOME DEBATABLE PRINCIPLES/RULES OF THE DONOR ACTIVITIES OF THE STATERESULT OF NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF A SUBSIDY TO THE NEXT PERIOD-OPTIMAL SUBSIDYTIMING MODELPRESCRIBED SUBSIDY USE STRUCTURE
 
Found a mistake? Please highlight the word and press Shift + Enter  
Next >
 
Subjects
Accounting
Business & Finance
Communication
Computer Science
Economics
Education
Engineering
Environment
Geography
Health
History
Language & Literature
Law
Management
Marketing
Mathematics
Political science
Philosophy
Psychology
Religion
Sociology
Travel