Options of Criticality Control Principles
Prevention of Criticality by Poison or Dry Process
The boration of coolant water was practiced in TMI-2 and is most preferable. Borated water bounds the criticality characteristics of all debris into a small region, indicated as “Boration” in Fig. 21.3, and keeps the region far from critical condition no matter how much temperature or geometry changes. By securing the lowest boron concentration in water, the subcritical condition can be guaranteed as well. The water issue, however, must be fixed to implement this option. Moreover, a structure made of carbon steel or aluminum will act as the water boundary when a
Fig. 21.2 Criticality map of fuel debris
CV is filled with water. Then, corrosion of such material by boron must be studied to prevent recurrence of the water issue.
The dry process without using coolant water will be also a certain criticality
control method (Fig. 21.3). There will be, however, other engineering challenges. CVs must be sealed to avoid unexpected intrusion of water. It will be necessary as well to shield radiation and to suppress airborne migration of radioactive materials without water during fuel debris retrieval work.
Prevention of Criticality by Monitoring
Utilization of borated water may not be feasible if the water issue cannot be remedied. An alternative may be subcriticality monitoring. It is necessary to detect the signs of approach to the critical condition across the defense line set in the subcritical region in Fig. 21.4, and an intervention measure must be deployed quickly before the critical condition is reached. Detection may be possible by setting neutron counters near the fuel debris.
There are key natures of the intervention measure to be understood. The injec-
tion of neutron poison is the only way, and it will be realistic only if the actual condition of fuel debris is far from critical condition. It will be, however, difficult to make the defense line effective if the buffer zone is small. To retain the effect of intervention even after the event, the neutron poison concentration must be maintained in the coolant water.
Fig. 21.3 Prevention of criticality by boration or dry process
Fig. 21.4 Prevention of criticality and the severe consequences by monitoring
Thus, this option does not differ, essentially, from the first option, which is prevention of criticality by poison. Monitoring still makes sense if we integrate it with the first option and use it as an implementation of the “double contingency principle.”
Prevention of Severe Consequence
The last option is, in fact, being currently applied. The defense line consists of xenon gas monitoring and the injection of borated water. The monitoring sensitivity is not sufficient to measure subcriticality but can detect the event beyond the occurrence of critical condition before severe consequences result. The borated water on standby will be injected when the monitoring detects the criticality. A study is under way to improve the monitoring sensitivity to make the detection and intervention quicker and to reduce the risk of this option.
A much bolder idea is also being brought up, which is to consider such quick detection and intervention as a regular reactivity control. A small-scale, controlled chain reaction is permissible in the concept, and the resumption of fuel debris retrieval is allowed after suppressing the criticality. To realize this kind of criticality control, its risk must be fully understood.
The risk study is necessary regardless of which option is chosen because the subcritical condition is not secured at present. Even though the fuel debris will not be touched for a while, the temperature of the fuel debris may drop gradually in time, which slowly increases reactivity. The risk of “low probability and high consequence events” must be also evaluated. An aftershock of large magnitude may change the fuel debris geometry greatly. The extreme event would be the fall of fuel debris in the PV onto the other in CV.
The fuel debris retrieval must be assessed carefully, of course, if it is conducted under nonborated water. The first step of the risk analysis is to understand the actual conditions of fuel debris. Exhaustive observation of the fuel debris should be conducted as early as possible, which enables us to complete the maps described in the previous sections.
According to each option, engineering work should be performed in parallel to establish design requirements. For the prevention of criticality by borated water, its required lowest concentration must be established. For the prevention of criticality by monitoring, requirements of sensitivity and time response of the monitoring and time response of an intervention measure must be clarified. For the prevention of severe consequences, an allowable limit of fission number must first be set. Then, the time response of detection and intervention must be defined to regulate fission numbers of supposed criticality events within the limit.
In 1FNPS, fuel debris conditions in the three damaged reactors are still unknown and uncertain. The water issue also affects criticality control, as the coolant water is not borated. Although fortunately no sign of criticality has yet been seen, the subcritical condition is not secured. There are options of principles to pursue a certain critical control of the fuel debris: prevention of criticality by poison, by dry process, or by monitoring, and prevention of the severe consequences resulting from criticality. Engineering research and development is to be conducted regarding any of these options.