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Conclusion

In this book chapter, a common protection approach against SCA-PA and FA attacks is introduced both for RSA and ECC primitive operations of modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication, respectively. Our approach adopts and extends the MPL algorithm by introducing message/base point blinding, extension of the randomization operation per ME/SM round through a random element exponentiation/scalar multiplication in every round and infective computation along with a fault detection mechanism that releases the correct result only after passing the MPL coherency check. The proposed algorithmic solution constitutes a protection framework against a wide variety of SSCA and ASCA attacks (focusing on PAs) as well as FA attacks that introduce one or two faults and process them statically or statistically.

Acknowledgements This work is supported by EU COST action IC1204 “Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices (TRUDEVICE)”.

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