Governance and Limited Statehood

These considerations lead to the governance problems in areas of limited statehood. In this context, this book advances a major proposition, namely, that limited statehood does not equal the absence of governance, let alone political, social, or economic order. State weakness does not simply translate to the absence of political order, rule making, or the provision of basic services. Limited statehood does not mean anarchy in a Hobbesian sense. In fact, we even find failed states such as Somalia where limited statehood is all-pervasive but where governance takes place regularly and collective goods are provided (Menkhaus 2006/2007).

Before I proceed, however, the concept of governance used in this book must be clarified. In its most general version, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social action in human society. Williamson, for example, distinguished between governance by markets and governance by hierarchy (i.e., the state); later scholars added governance by networks to this list (e.g., Williamson 1975; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993). However, this understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering appears to be too broad.

As a result, this book employs a somewhat narrower concept that is linked to politics. By governance, we mean in this book the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods. This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within the social sciences (e.g., Mayntz 2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch 1998; Benz 2004a; Schuppert 2005; Schuppert and Zurn 2008). Governance consists of both structural (“institutionalized”) and process dimensions (“modes of social coordination”). Accordingly, governance covers steering by the state (“governance by government”), governance via cooperative networks of public and private actors (“governance with government”), as well as rule making by nonstate actors or self-regulation by civil society (“governance without government”;

cf. Benz 2004a; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Grande and Pauly 2005; Zurn 1998). Governance is supposed to provide collectively binding rules as well as collective goods.5

The modern (Western) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance structure. First, it provides a structure of rule and authority, a system of political and social institutions to generate and to implement authoritative political decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for authoritative rule making. Second, the Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal and external security of its citizens. The monopoly over the means of violence is supposed to do just that. Finally, the rendering of public services is part of the classical responsibilities of the state, from the creation of economic stability and the guarantee of minimal social security to public health, education, and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment. In short, the modern Western nation-state provides governance in the areas of rule making and enforcement, on the one hand, and collective goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment, on the other. While this nation-state is undergoing a profound transformation (Leibfried and Zurn 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 2007), its ability to ultimately make, implement, and enforce decisions is beyond doubt, even if the modern state privatizes or deregulates previously public services. In other words, the modern state’s “shadow of hierarchy” is never in doubt, even in the age of profound (neoliberal) privatization and deregulation (Borzel 2008).

This changes profoundly under conditions of limited statehood. Governance in areas of limited statehood requires providing these very governance services in the absence of a fully functioning state’s exerting at least a “shadow of hierarchy” with the ability to enforce and implement decisions. This implies that we will have to look for functional equivalents to modern statehood (see Draude 2007 on this point)—unless we want to give up the normative proposition that human beings have a right to a decent authority structure, security, and other collective goods (for a discussion of these normative problems, see Ladwig 2007; see also chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume).

This book explores the various forms of governance emerging in the context of limited statehood. We assume that forms of governance emerge under these conditions. The contemporary social science literature discusses these as “new” modes of governance or the privatization of authority (e.g., Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Grande and Pauly 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002). However, as the chapter by Conrad and Stange demonstrates, these “new” modes of governance are by no means specific to the contemporary international system. The colonial state, for example, constituted an area of limited statehood as we understand it in this volume, as a result of which governance took place through colonial rulers (“states”), transnational “public-private” companies (e.g., the Hudson Bay Company in North America or the East India Company in Asia), and local “private” actors such as settlers.

Governance as a process entails two dimensions: actors and modes of coordinating social action. Various combinations of state and nonstate actors “govern” in areas of limited statehood. These can be public-private partnerships (see Schaferhoff et al. 2009, also chapter by Liese and Beisheim in this volume) in which national governments, international (interstate) organizations, as well as (multinational) firms and (international) nongovernmental organizations co-govern. But governance can also be provided by the selfregulation of firms (chapter by Borzel et al. in this volume) and even by warlords and other violent actors (see chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume). The second part of this book explores the various contributions of nonstate actors to governance in areas of limited statehood.

The second process dimension of governance concerns modes of steering. The modern (Western) nation-state has the ability of hierarchical steering, that is, authoritatively enforcing the law, ultimately through policing and “top-down” command and control. It is precisely this ability to enforce decisions that is lacking in areas of limited statehood. To the extent that hierarchical steering and authoritative rule do take place in areas of limited statehood, we have to look for actors other than the national governments. As Choj- nacki and Branovic point out in their chapter, warlords and local “big men” sometimes exert hierarchical control in war-torn areas of limited statehood. In addition, international organizations as well as—mostly Western-states often interfere authoritatively, particularly in modern protectorates such as Kosovo or Afghanistan that have all but lost their “Westphalian sovereignty” (see chapters by Schneckener and Brozus in this volume).

Much more common, however, are nonhierarchical modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood (Borzel and Risse 2005; Gohler et al. 2009). Nonhierarchical steering involves creating and manipulating incentives and “benchmarking,” as well as initiating communicative learning processes. Positive incentives as well as sanctions are meant to affect the cost- benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behavior.

Governance also includes bargaining processes and horizontal negotiation as well as nonmanipulative communication, persuasion, and learning. The latter modes of governance aim at challenging fixed interests and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to internalize new rules and norms. Most chapters in the second part of this book explore the bargaining processes between state and nonstate actors involved in governance in areas of limited statehood.

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