The literature on the economics of property rights is vast. Alchian (1965) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973) are classic contributions. The classic article on the symmetry between the costs of the commons and the anticommons is Buchanan and Yoon (2000). Heller (2008) is a book-length treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons which contains many illustrative examples.
Grossman and Hart (1980) analyse the free-rider problem in corporate takeovers. Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) show that the Grossman and Hart result does not obtain if there is a finite number of identical shareholders. The analysis in the text draws on their treatment. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) is the classic article on discrete public good contribution games.
The analysis of the costs of insecure property rights follows Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996). Grossman (2001) contains a similar analysis with more than two parties. The analysis of the economics of patents in this chapter is inspired by Chapter 5 of Nordhaus (1969). Landes and Posner (2003) is a book-length treatment on the economics of intellectual property rights. Watt (2000) is a book-length treatment of the economics of copyright.