The link between the Nash bargaining solution and the non-cooperative bargaining approach was first analysed by Binmore et al (1986). Muthoo (1999) is a thorough and highly informative survey of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining theory. The objection/counterobjection approach to the Nash bargaining solution is due to Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992). The economic analysis of legal conflict began with Gould (1973). Winston et al. (2011) survey the economic research on the market for lawyers and legal services, and argue that the market should be deregulated the approach in this chapter is original, but the general flavour of the basic conclusions have been known by economists for some time. Tullock (1967) is a classic paper on the economics of theft and rent seeking, and the results in this chapter mirror may of those discussed in that paper. Landsburg (1999, pages 272-3) and Friedman (1990, Chapter 20) present simple models of the supply of robbery and the market for theft, the welfare costs of which are similar to those computed in our model of the market for lawyers. The model in section 11.7 is based in part on the approach of Quandt (1983). Schuck (1992) and Epstein (1995) contain excellent discussions of legal simplicity and complexity. Rosen (1992) and Pashigian (1977) analyse the labour market for lawyers.
The approach to legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game outlined in section 11.5 can be found in Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino (1999), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) and Robson and Skaperdas (2008). Cooter and Ulen (1989) is an early literature survey.
Rubin (1977) is the classic paper on the efficiency hypothesis of the common law. Rubin (2007) collects the most influential papers in this area. Hirshleifer (1980, 1982) is a wide-ranging, book-length discussion. The preliminary discussion in the text of evolutionarily stable strategies in two player symmetric games follows Osborne (2009). The discussion of evolutionarily stable strategies in non-symmetric, multiple population situations follows Harrington (2009). The evolutionary model presented in the text follows Terrebonne (1981) closely.