Relations to Theory ofMind

Table 8.2 shows the studies to be considered in this section. The high proportion of longitudinal examinations is a point to note. Note also, though, that the

Table 8.2 Studies Relating Mind-Mindedness to Theory ofMind

(continued)

Table 8.2 Continued

Table 8.2 Continued

number of reports outstrips the number of samples, for in several instances different publications are based on the same sample at different ages.

As with the topic of mental state talk in Chapter 7, it is easy to state the general conclusion from this research: Mind-mindedness relates positively to theory of mind. Parents who are relatively high in mind-mindedness have children who are relatively advanced in theory of mind.

There are exceptions. Two were noted in Chapter 6. Both Dunphy-Lelii et al. (2014) and Licata et al. (2014) examined mind-mindedness as a possible contributor to infants’ understanding of intentionality, and neither study found any relation between the two measures. At present these are the only attempts to relate mind-mindedness to developments in infancy. The Meins group has often assessed mind-mindedness in parents of infants, but they have yet to examine any contemporaneous theory-of-mind outcomes (although they have examined attachment). Recall, however, that Roberts et al. (2013) reported a relation between speech directed to infants at 6 months and joint attention at 12 months.

Neither their method of eliciting speech nor their scoring system matched those used in mind-mindedness research; still, their results provide suggestive evidence for an early effect of mind-mindedness.

The other exception to the pattern of positive outcomes is a study by Ereky- Stevens (2008) in which mind-mindedness assessed when infants were 10 months old showed no relation to either false belief or emotion understanding at age 4. As Ereky-Stevens notes in her Discussion, however, both her procedure and her scoring system differed in some ways from the approach used by the Meins group; thus further research is necessary to resolve the discrepancy in results.

These exceptions aside, mind-mindedness consistently relates to theory of mind. Relations have been shown both concurrently, through measures taken during the preschool period, and prospectively, through links between measures taken in infancy and later theory of mind. Relations have been shown for both of the most common methods of measuring mind-mindedness: speech directed to the baby in infancy and descriptions of the child during the preschool period. Finally, relations have been shown for a variety of theory-of-mind outcomes: false belief, affective false belief, appearance-reality, origins of knowledge, perspective taking, and understanding of desire.

The data just summarized are correlational, and hence they cannot establish cause and effect. Most studies, however, include controls for third-factor alternatives—most obviously, child language—and effects remain even with the controls in place. In addition, the fact that mind-mindedness assessed as early as 6 months is predictive of later theory of mind greatly reduces the plausibility of any child-to-parent effect. Six-month-olds are not producing mental state language of their own to which the parent can respond. As suggested in Chapter 5, they may be doing other things that affect parental response and eventual theory- of-mind development, but no such early child-t o-parent effects have yet been demonstrated. The more likely causal direction is from parent to child.

The discussion to this point has addressed one of the issues with respect to parents’ beliefs: relations between beliefs and child outcomes. I turn now to the obvious next question: What are the parental behaviors that follow from a mind- mindedness orientation and that nurture the development of the child’s theory of mind?

The most obvious possibility is a behavior that is often part of the assessment of mind-mindedness: talk about mental states. We saw in Chapter 7 that mental state talk not only shows a clear relation to theory of mind but also almost certainly makes a causal contribution to theory of mind. In most instances, it is true, the focus of such research has been on talk that occurs beyond the infancy period that is the locus for most mind-mindedness assessments. But there is no expectation in the mind-mindedness work that the effects of talk are limited to the time period during which talk is typically assessed, namely infancy. Rather, an early propensity on the parent’s part to engage in such talk is presumably a marker for a continued propensity to do so. And as we saw in Chapter 7, individual differences in mental state talk are in fact fairly stable over time. So, as we have seen in this chapter, are different indices of mind-mindedness.

That mental state talk contributes to the effects of mind-mindedness seems clear. This conclusion still leaves two questions unanswered. One is how talk produces its effects. The other is whether mental state talk is the sole basis for the predictive power of mind-mindedness—whether, in short, mind-mindedness reduces to mental state talk.

The first question was a central issue considered in Chapter 7. It is also one that Meins and colleagues have addressed on numerous occasions (Meins, 1997, 2012; Meins, Fernyhough, et al., 2013; Meins et al., 2002; Meins et al., 2003). I think that it is fair to say that the issue remains an ongoing challenge for the research team; various models have been proposed, each with some empirical support, but no fully satisfactory solution has yet emerged. In general, the suggested answers encompass two of the three bases for the efficacy of talk that were discussed in Chapter 7. Meins and colleagues suggest that talk may sensitize children to the possibility of different perspectives, a proposal that finds some support in the fact that early perspective taking relates (with some qualifications) to both mind-mindedness and later theory of mind (Laranjo et al., 2010; Meins, Fernyhough, et al., 2013). They also suggest that talk may be necessary to bring to explicit awareness infants’ and toddlers’ emerging understanding of mental states. Initially, the child’s own mental state talk was proposed as a mediator between parental talk and eventual understanding, but this model was called into question by the failure to find a relation between mind-mindedness and children’s talk (Meins, Fernyhough, et al., 2013). One alternative proposal, which still requires further testing, has a basis in Vygotskian theory: Parental talk contributes to the development of speech for self, which in turn contributes to the development of theory of mind (Fernyhough & Meins, 2009; Meins, 2012).

However mental state talk exerts its effects, is such talk the sole basis for the relation between mind-mindedness and theory of mind? The answer, at least on my reading, is no. Mental state talk is both a marker for and an important expression of mind-mindedness, but it is not the only way in which mind-mindedness is expressed. As we have seen, only one of the methods of assessing the construct makes use of mental state talk directed to the child; furthermore, it does so at a time when the child is not yet capable of processing the semantic content of the input, suggesting that talk may be, at least initially, more a marker than a causal factor. In addition, the other “online” measure, appropriate scaffolding during problem solving, incorporates a number of behaviors other than mental state talk by which parents can respond appropriately to their child’s mental states.

The more general parenting literature is also relevant. Mind-mindedness has been shown to relate to a number of aspects of parenting that are known to affect children’s development, including the development of theory of mind. The most frequently studied correlate is sensitivity, and the typical finding is that parents who are high in mind-mindedness are also high in sensitivity (e.g., Demers, Bernier, Tarabulsy, & Provost, 2010b; Meins et al., 2002). Mind-mindedness also relates positively to emotional availability (Licata et al., 2014), to sensitivity while feeding the infant (Farrow & Blissett, 2014), to mirroring of the infant’s behaviors during the Still-Face Paradigm (Bigelow, Power, Pulmer, & Gerrior, 2015), and to lower levels of hostility in parent-child interactions (Lok & McMahon, 2006; McMahon & Meins, 2012). In short, mind-mindedness goes along with, and almost certainly contributes to, a number of development-enhancing parental practices. A recent summary by Meins and colleagues expresses some of the ways in which early mind-mindedness might find later expression beyond its initial appearance in infancy:

It seems reasonable to predict that mothers who tend to comment appropriately on their infants’ internal states during the 1st year of life will be better able later in development to assess their children’s basic ability on tasks, collaborate with them in achieving goals, and structure interactions in such a way [as] to enhance children’s sense of their own competence. (Meins, Fernyhough, et al., 2013, p. 1789)