Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, European Court of Human Rights, 7 July 2011

Aurel Sari

Relevance of the case

The judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Al-Jedda case in 2011 touches on a broad range of questions concerning the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to multinational military operations and the Convention’s relationship with other rules of public international law. Many of these questions, such as the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law, have been the subject of detailed attention in the literature.1 The focus of the present chapter is on the judgment’s contribution to the law of international responsibility, in particular the rules governing the attribution of wrongful conduct in the context of military operations conducted jointly by states and international organizations. The relevance of the Al-Jedda case in this context is twofold. First, it highlights the continued confusion surrounding the relationship between jurisdiction as a threshold requirement for the applicability of the ECHR and attribution as an element of international responsibility for a breach of the Convention, as well as the difficulties entailed by allocating responsibility between states and international organizations involved in the conduct of peace-support operations more generally. Second, the decision marks an evolution in the European Court’s approach to the attribution of wrongful conduct compared to its earlier decision in the joined cases of Behrami and Saramati2 In particular, the European Court now appears to accept that the relevant test governing the attribution of wrongful conduct is that of ‘effective control’.

I. Facts of the case

The Al-Jedda case arose out of the detention of the applicant, Mr Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda, by British armed forces operating as part of the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF). [1] [2]

On 20 March 2003, a coalition led by the United States of America and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq with the aim of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Following the end of major combat operations, the United Kingdom became an occupying power and jointly exercised the powers of government in Iraq with other members of the coalition under the law of belligerent occupation.[3] The legal framework governing the presence and activities of British forces in Iraq changed with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1511 on 16 October 2003.[4] The resolution authorized the establishment of ‘a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’.[5] It further urged all member states of the UN to contribute assistance, including military forces, to the multinational force ‘under this United Nations mandate’.[6] On 8 June 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 to extend the mandate of the MNF after the end of the occupation at the request of the Iraqi authorities.

The claimant held dual Iraqi-British citizenship and had lived in the United Kingdom since 1972. In September 2004, he travelled to Iraq where he was detained by coalition forces and later held in a British-run detention facility in Basrah. His detention was justified and upheld at periodic reviews on the basis that it was necessary for imperative reasons of security in Iraq. He was eventually released in December 2007, having been deprived of his British citizenship.

II. The legal question

On 8 June 2005, Al-Jedda brought judicial review proceedings before the English courts against the Secretary of State to challenge his detention. The Secretary of State accepted that Al-Jedda fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of art. 1 of the ECHR and thus benefitted from the right to liberty and security of person guaranteed in art. 5 of the Convention. Whilst the Secretary of State conceded that Al-Jedda’s detention could not be justified with reference to any of the exceptions enumerated in art. 5 and as such prima facie breached his right to liberty, he argued that Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546, applied in conjunction with art. 103 of the UN Charter,[7] rendered his detention lawful. These submissions were upheld by the lower courts.[8]

On the claimant’s appeal to the House of Lords, the Secretary of State introduced a new argument. Relying on the recently decided Behrami case, he submitted that the conduct of British forces participating in the MNF had to be attributed to the UN rather than to the United Kingdom. The majority of the House of Lords rejected this claim, but found that the Security Council resolutions authorizing the presence and activities of British forces in Iraq displaced art. 5 of the Convention to the extent that a conflict arose between them.[9] Consequently, the House of Lords affirmed that Al- Jedda’s detention did not entail a violation of art. 5 of the ECHR.

The parties revisited these points in their submissions before the ECtHR. The Government contended that the legal position of the British MNF contingent was essentially identical with that of national contingents forming part of Kosovo Force (KFOR), so that the Behrami case applied.[10] In detaining the applicant, British forces were not exercising the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom but the international authority conferred upon the MNF by the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Government submitted that as a result Al-Jedda did not fall within its jurisdiction and his detention could not be attributed to the United Kingdom. Endorsing the majority view of the House of Lords, the claimant replied by suggesting that the legal circumstances of the MNF differed from that of KFOR in material respects." His legal position was clearly distinguishable from that of the applicants in Behrami, with the effect that his detention had to be attributed to the United Kingdom and not to the UNd2

The question confronting the ECtHR therefore was this: did the applicant fall within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and was the conduct of British troops attributable to the United Kingdom or to the UN?

III. Excerpts

  • 1. Article 1 of the Convention reads as follows: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.’ As provided by this Article, the engagement undertaken by a Contracting State is confined to ‘securing’ (‘reconnaitre’ in the French text) the listed rights and freedoms to persons within its own ‘jurisdiction’ (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 89, Series A no. 161; Bankovic, cited above, § 66). ‘Jurisdiction’ under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Ila$cu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 311, ECHR 2004-VII).
  • 2. The Court notes that, before the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal in the first set of domestic proceedings brought by the applicant, the Government accepted that he fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention during his detention in a British-run military prison in Basrah, South East Iraq. It was only before the House of Lords that the Government argued, for the first time, that the applicant did not fall within United Kingdom jurisdiction because his detention was attributable to the United Nations rather than to the United Kingdom. The majority of the House of Lords rejected the Government’s argument and held that the internment was attributable to British forces (see paragraphs 16-18 above).
  • 3. When examining whether the applicant’s detention was attributable to the United Kingdom or, as the Government submit, the United Nations, it is necessary to examine the particular facts of the case. These include the terms of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions which formed the framework for the security regime in Iraq during the period in question. In performing this exercise, the Court is mindful of the fact that it is not its role to seek to define authoritatively the meaning of provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international instruments. It must, nevertheless, examine whether there was a plausible basis in such instruments for the matters impugned before it (see Behrami and Saramati, cited above, § 122). The principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum and the Court must take into account relevant rules of international law (ibid.). It relies for guidance in this exercise on the statement of the International Court of Justice in § 114 of its advisory opinion ‘Legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia’ (see paragraph 49 above), indicating that a Security Council resolution should be interpreted in the light not only of the language used but also the context in which it was adopted.
  • 4. The Court takes as its starting point that, on 20 March 2003, the United Kingdom together with the United States of America and their coalition partners, through their armed forces, entered Iraq with the aim of displacing the Ba’ath regime then in power. At the time of the invasion, there was no United Nations Security Council resolution providing for the allocation of roles in Iraq in the event that the existing regime was displaced. [...]
  • 5. The first Security Council resolution after the invasion was Resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 20 03 (see paragraph 29 above). [.] Resolution 1483 did not assign any security role to the United Nations. The Government does not contend that, at this stage in the invasion and occupation, the acts of its armed forces were in any way attributable to the United Nations.
  • 6. In Resolution 1511, adopted on 16 October 2003, the United Nations Security Council, again acting under Chapter VII, underscored the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority of the authorities and responsibilities set out in Resolution 1483, which would cease as soon as an internationally recognised, representative Iraqi government could be sworn in. In paragraphs 13 and 14, the Security Council authorised ‘a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’ and urged Member States ‘to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13’ (see paragraph 31 above). The United States, on behalf of the multinational force, was requested periodically to report on the efforts and progress of the force. The Security Council also resolved that the United Nations, acting through the Secretary General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government.
  • 7. The Court does not consider that, as a result of the authorisation contained in Resolution 1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multi-National Force became attributable to the United Nations or—more importantly, for the purposes of this case—ceased to be attributable to the troop-contributing nations. The Multi-National Force had been present in Iraq since the invasion and had been recognised already in Resolution 1483, which welcomed the willingness of Member States to contribute personnel. The unified command structure over the force, established from the start of the invasion by the United States and United Kingdom, was not changed as a result of Resolution 1511. Moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom, through the Coalition Provisional Authority which they had established at the start of the occupation, continued to exercise the powers of government in Iraq. Although the United States was requested to report periodically to the Security Council about the activities of the MultiNational Force, the United Nations did not, thereby, assume any degree of control over either the force or any other of the executive functions of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
  • 8. The final resolution of relevance to the present issue was no. 1546 (see paragraph 35 above). It was adopted on 8 June 2004, twenty days before the transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Interim Government and some four months before the applicant was taken into detention. Annexed to the resolution was a letter from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq, seeking from the Security Council a new resolution on the Multi-National Force mandate. There was also annexed a letter from the United States Secretary of State to the President of the United Nations Security Council, confirming that ‘the Multi-National Force [under unified command] is prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq’ and informing the President of the Security Council of the goals of the Multi-National Force and the steps which its Commander intended to take to achieve those goals. It does not appear from the terms of this letter that the Secretary of State considered that the United Nations controlled the deployment or conduct of the Multi-National Force. In Resolution 1546 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, reaffirmed the authorisation for the Multi-National Force established under Resolution 1511. There is no indication in Resolution 1546 that the Security Council intended to assume any greater degree of control or command over the Multi-National Force than it had exercised previously.


  • 9. In the light of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the majority of the House of Lords that the United Nations’ role as regards security in Iraq in 2004 was quite different from its role as regards security in Kosovo in 1999. The comparison is relevant, since in the decision in Behrami and Saramati (cited above) the Court concluded, inter alia, that Mr Saramati’s detention was attributable to the United Nations and not to any of the respondent States. It is to be recalled that the international security presence in Kosovo was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) in which, ‘determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, the Security Council ‘decide[d] on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences’. The Security Council therefore authorised ‘Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo’ and directed that there should be ‘substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation’ in the force, which ‘must be deployed under unified command and control’. In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 authorised the Secretary General of the United Nations to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo. The United Nations, through a Special Representative appointed by the Secretary General in consultation with the Security Council, was to control the implementation of the international civil presence and coordinate closely with the international security presence (see Behrami and Saramati, cited above, §§ 3, 4 and 41). On 12 June 1999, two days after the Resolution was adopted, the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo.
  • 10. It would appear from the opinion of Lord Bingham in the first set of proceedings brought by the applicant that it was common ground between the parties before the House of Lords that the test to be applied in order to establish attribution was that set out by the International Law Commission, in Article 5 of its draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations and in its commentary thereon, namely that the conduct of an organ of a State placed at the disposal of an international organisation should be attributable under international law to that organisation if the organisation exercises effective control over that conduct (see paragraphs 18 and 56 above). For the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the United Nations Security Council had neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, therefore, attributable to the United Nations.
  • 11. The internment took place within a detention facility in Basrah City, controlled exclusively by British forces, and the applicant was therefore within the authority and control of the United Kingdom throughout (see paragraph 10 above; see also Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 136 and Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 61498/08, § 88, ECHR 2010 ...; see also the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Munaf v. Geren, paragraph 54 above). The decision to hold the applicant in internment was made by the British officer in command of the detention facility. Although the decision to continue holding the applicant in internment was, at various points, reviewed by committees including Iraqi officials and non-United Kingdom representatives from the Multi-National Force, the Court does not consider that the existence of these reviews operated to prevent the detention from being attributable to the United Kingdom.
  • 12. In conclusion, the Court agrees with the majority of the House of Lords that the internment of the applicant was attributable to the United Kingdom and that during his internment the applicant fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.

IV. Commentary

The ECtHR dealt with the parties’ submissions in two steps. Citing its earlier decision in Ila$cu, the Court made it clear at the outset that the exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of art. 1 of the ECHR is a necessary pre-condition for a potential finding of international responsibility.13 This is so because jurisdiction operates as a threshold criterion for the applicability of the ECHR: a state party owes no obligations under the Convention to anyone outside its jurisdiction and in such circumstances the question whether its international responsibility is engaged for a possible breach of the Convention does not arise at all. However, the Government denied that Al-Jedda fell within its jurisdiction because the troops detaining him acted in an international rather than a national capacity. In a second step, the Court therefore investigated whether Al-J edda’s detention should be attributed to the United Kingdom or to the UN. However, at this point of the Court’s reasoning a finding on attribution turns into a precondition for a finding on jurisdiction. Whether or not the United Kingdom exercised jurisdiction over Al-Jedda within the meaning of art. 1 of the ECHR now suddenly depends on the question whether the control exercised by British forces over him was to be attributed to the United Kingdom or not. This reversal of preliminary considerations emerges clearly from the concluding observations of the Court, which suggest that the Court considered the applicant to fall within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction precisely because his detention was to be attributed to the United Kingdom/4

As a result of this reversal, the clear conceptual distinction between jurisdiction as a primary matter of substantive law and attribution as a secondary matter of responsibility—the Court’s initial starting point—collapses almost completely. The Court could have avoided this outcome with relative ease. In an extra-territorial setting, the requirement of jurisdiction pursuant to art. 1 of the Convention is satisfied whenever a state party exercises effective physical control over an individual/5 The legal basis for the exercise of such control^ or indeed the absence of any valid legal basis/7 has no bearing on this requirement. Consequently, whether or not Al-Jedda was detained on the basis of national or international competences is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing that his detention crossed the jurisdictional threshold under art. 1/8 Moreover, whatever international functions British forces assumed as part of the MNF, they did not thereby lose their legal character and identity as British soldiers and thus their character as agents and organs [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

of the United Kingdom.19 It follows, therefore, that Al-Jedda did fall within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of art. 1 of the ECHR and that the United Kingdom was bound to guarantee to him the rights and freedoms recognized by the Convention.20 Whether or not the United Kingdom failed to comply with this obligation is a separate question which depends, amongst other matters, on whether the conduct of British forces should be attributed to the United Kingdom or not.

In determining whether the applicant’s detention was to be attributed to the United Kingdom or to the UN, the ECtHR followed the logic of its earlier reasoning in Behrami. In that case, the Court famously attributed the acts of KFOR to the UN on the basis that the Security Council retained ultimate authority and control over the military operation in Kosovo.21 This reasoning has attracted widespread criticism in the literature, as the Court seemed to confuse the legality of the delegation of Security Council powers under the UN Charter with the attribution of internationally wrongful conduct.22 Although both questions entail a test of control, the law of international responsibility imposes a test of ‘effective control’” for the purposes of attributing wrongful conduct, while the delegation of Security Council powers is subject to the more relaxed standard of ‘overall authority and control’ under the institutional law of the UN.24

By confusing these two bodies of law, the ECtHR has manoeuvred itself into something of a tight spot. To comply with the internal law of the UN, the Security Council will at all times retain at least ‘ultimate authority and control’ over any mandates it issues under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consequently, if this test is used as a basis for attribution, it follows that wrongful acts carried out by national contingents participating in Security Council mandated operations, such as the MNF in Iraq, will always have to be attributed to the UN rather than to their respective sending states. Coupled with the reversal of preliminaries in Al-Jedda, whereby a finding of attribution has become a precondition for a finding of jurisdiction and therefore the applicability of the Convention, this means that, in principle, the ECHR will never apply to state parties contributing troops to Security Council mandated

!9 Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179, at 198 and 222. cf. F. Messineo, ‘“Gentlement at Home, Hoodlums Elsewhere?” The Extra-territorial Exercise of Power by British Forces in Iraq and the European Convention on Human Rights’, (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 15, 15-16.

  • 20 In favour of a broad approach to jurisdiction see M. Andenas and E. Bjorge, ‘Human Rights and Acts by Troops Abroad: Rights and Jurisdictional Restrictions’, (2012) 18 European Public Law 473, at 492.
  • 21 cf. Behrami (n. 2), paras 128-44.
  • 22 For example K.M. Larsen, ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The “Ultimate Authority and Control” Test’, (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 509; A. Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’, (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 151; H. Krieger, ‘A Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 159; M. Milanovic and T. Papic, ‘As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’, (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 267.
  • 23 cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), [2007] ICJ Rep 15, para. 406.
  • 24 On the delegation of Chapter VII powers, see D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999).

operations. This outcome is hardly correct as a matter of law or desirable as a matter of policy.25

The Al-Jedda case presented the ECtHR with an opportunity to address the unhappy implications of its decision in Behrami. The Court could have done so on a principled basis and formally overturn Behrami in response to its overwhelmingly negative reception. Instead, it decided to follow the House of Lords in distinguishing Al-Jedda from Behrami on the facts. Although there are obvious differences between KFOR and the MNF, the material facts are identical and point to the conclusion that the Security Council retained overall authority and control over both operations.26 By overemphasizing the differences and neglecting the similarities between KFOR and the MNF,” the Court managed to arrive at the right conclusion: it declared that the acts of British forces participating in the MNF could not be attributed to the UN and that Al-Jedda therefore fell within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction.” However, it arrived at this conclusion at the cost of preserving, if not deepening, the conceptual confusion in its case-law.” Although Behrami therefore remains a valid, albeit unconvincing precedent, it is interesting to note that the Court concluded its analysis in Al-Jedda by declaring that the Security Council had ‘neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control’ over the acts of British forces.30 The simultaneous reference to the misplaced ‘ultimate authority and control’ standard and to the correct ‘effective control’ test is puzzling.31 At best, it may be understood as an implicit acknowledgement that Behrami was wrongly decided.32 At worst, it may be a sign that the Court continues to view Behrami as a good authority.

In any event, the Court’s reasoning raises a broader question whether the effective control test is the sole or even the most appropriate principle of attribution during international military operations. The effective control test focuses on factual subordination at the expense of legal and institutional relationships^ By adopting this perspective, the Court failed to seriously engage with the Government’s argument concerning the legal identity of its forces operating as part of the MNF. Should the fact that national contingents act in an international capacity have any bearing on the attribution of their conduct? There are some indicators in domestic jurisprudence34 and Convention case-law35 suggesting that it should. Nor is the effective control test free from difficulties. Different actors involved in a peace-support operation may exercise effective control over different aspects of a national contingent’s activities. Attributing wrongful conduct to only one actor may be artificial in the face of multiple levels of control.36 The Government called attention to this when it pointed out that Al-Jedda’s continued detention was decided and authorized jointly by the Government of Iraq and the Commander of the MNF” It is worth noting in this respect that it is unclear whether a relationship of factual dependency must be established with reference to physical factors alone or whether normative factors may also serve as evidence of factual subordination, although practice does not appear to be settled.3®

While it would be too much to expect the ECtHR to resolve these open questions of the law of international responsibility, one may expect it to demonstrate a more coherent attitude to a subject so pivotal to its judicial mandate. While Al-Jedda thus marks an evolution in Court’s jurisprudence, its contribution to greater clarity is modest. [17] [18] [19]

  • [1] See J. Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda Judgment: The Oversight ofInternational Humanitarian Law’, (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 837; H. Krieger, ‘AfterAl-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and an Enduring Dilemma’, (2011) 50 Military Law and the Law ofWar Review 419; M. Kashgar, ‘The ECtHR’s Judgment in Al-Jedda and its Implications for InternationalHumanitarian Law’, (2011) 24 Humanitares Volkerrecht 229. For more general comments, see F.Messineo, ‘Things Could Only Get Better: Al-Jedda beyond Behrami’, (2011) 50 Military Law and the Lawof War Review 321; M. Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’, (2012) 23 European Journal ofInternational Law 121; M. Zgonec-Rozej, ‘Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom—Application No. 27021/08’, (2012)106 American Journal of International Law 830.
  • [2] cf. Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany, and Norway, App. Nos 71412/01and 78166/01 (2007) 45 EHRR SE10.
  • [3] See Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to thePresident of the Security Council, 8 May 2003, S/2003/538.
  • [4] cf. C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq andBeyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008), pp. 363-81.
  • [5] cf. Operative para. 13. 6 cf. Operative para. 14.
  • [6] 7 Article 103 of the UN Charter reads as follows: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligationsof the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
  • [7] international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’
  • [8] See R. (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] EWHC 1809 (Administrative Court); R. (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 327 (Court of Appeal).
  • [9] R. (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 (House of Lords). For a commentary onthe House of Lords decision, see A. Orakhelashvili, ‘R (On the Application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. Secretaryof State for Defence’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 337; A. Sari, ‘The Al-Jedda Casebefore the House of Lords’, (2009) 13 Journal of International Peacekeeping 181; F. Messineo, ‘The Houseof Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution of Conduct to UN-Authorized Forcesand the Power of the Security Council to Displace Human Rights’, (2009) 56 Netherlands InternationalLaw Review 35.
  • [10] cf. Al-Jedda (n. 9), paras 64-8. n cf. Al-Jedda (n. 9), paras 69-72. 12 cf. Al-Jedda (n. 9), para. 73.
  • [11] Ilafcu v Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004 (2004) 40 EHRR 46.
  • [12] cf. Al-Jedda (n. 9), para. 86.
  • [13] cf. Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 (2011) 53 EHRR 18, paras 131-40.
  • [14] cf. M. & Co. v Germany, App. No. 13258/87, 9 February 1990 (1990) 64 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. &Rep. 138; Bosphorus v Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005 (2006) 42 EHRR 1, para. 153; Nada vSwitzerland, App. No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012 (2013) 56 EHRR 18, para. 168.
  • [15] cf. Loizidou v Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App No 15318/89, 23 March 1995 (1995) ECHR 10,para. 62.
  • [16] Thus in Bosphorus (n. 16), the European Court affirmed Ireland’s jurisdiction regardless of the factthat the wrongful act in question was adopted by the Irish authorities pursuant to European Communitylaw (paras 135-8).
  • [17] For example N. K. v Austria (1979) 77 ILR 470, 472; Kunduz Case, 26 K 5534/10, ILDC 1858 (DE2012), 9 February 2012, para. 78.
  • [18] For example Ilse Hess v United Kingdom (Admissibility), App. No. 6231/73, 28 May 1975, ECommHR(1975) 2 DR 125.
  • [19] cf. C. Leck, ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Commandand Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct’, (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of InternationalLaw 346. See also Papa (n. 27), at 255. 37 Al-Jedda (n. 9), para. 67. 38 cf. Nuhanovic v Netherlands, LJN:BR5388, 5 July 2011, ILDC 1742 (NL 2011), para. 5.18.
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