Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation

Downward Causation, Emergence and LevelsThe Irreducibility of Downward CausationDownward Causation and the Metaphysics and Epistemology of CausationDownward Causation as Non-CausalDownward Causation, Mind and AgencyThe Science of Downward CausationThe Contributions in This BookI. Downward Causation and the Metaphysics of CausationII. Downward Causation and the SciencesIII. Downward Causation, Mind and AgencyReferencesI Downward Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation Three Grades of Downward CausationIntroductionThe ContextKim against Downward CausationTropes as Causal RelataGeneric Events as Causal RelataPossession of a Power vs. Exercise of the PowerConclusionNotesReferencesDownward CausationSpecies of Downward CausationDownward Causation and EmergenceLawsPropertiesWholes without PartsNotesReferencesHigher-Level, Downward and Specific CausationInterventionist Analysis of CausationSpecific CausationDifferences in Specificity Relative to the Level of Properties within a Mechanistic SystemReply to ObjectionsConclusionNotesReferencesPowers and Downward CausationIntroductionRealism about PowersKim and Downward CausationExcluding PowersHow to RespondConclusionReferencesEmergence and DemergenceWhy Emergence?Weak and Strong EmergenceEmergent Causal PowersMere CompositionNonlinear CompositionNew PropertiesCausal Composition and Supervenience FailureExample of Social PhenomenaAdvantages of This AccountCausal ClosureResponse to KimConclusionNoteReferencesPower Mereology: Structural Powers versus Substantial PowersPowers, and Only PowersPotentiality and ActualityManifesting PowersPower MereologyStructural versus Substantial PowersDownward EmergenceConclusionNotesReferencesII Downward Causation and the SciencesThe Use of Downward Causation in Condensed Matter PhysicsIntroductionMean Field TheoryThe Electron GasFirst Principles CalculationsDensity Functional TheoryExchange, Correlation and the Emergence of Quasiparticles in DFTConclusionsNotesReferencesProspects for Strong Emergence in ChemistryIntroductionSetting up the QuestionChemical SubstancesMolecular Structure and Quantum MechanicsObjections and RepliesObjection 1: The Chemical Bond Is “Just a Model”Objection 2: Chemistry Doesn’t Study PropertiesObjection 3: The Causal Closure of PhysicsNotesReferencesCausality and Levels of Explanation in BiologyThe Context-Relative Dimension of Biological Explanations: From Mechanisms to LevelsThe Agency Theory of Causality and the Context Dependence IssueMechanisms, Levels and ComponentsCancer ResearchConclusionsNotesReferencesThe Interlacing of Upward and Downward Causation in Complex Living Systems: On Interactions, Self-Organization, Emergence and WholenessThe Challenge of Biological Complexity: Self-Organization, Emergence of Novelties and the Integration of the Parts into a WholeThe Problem of the Levels and Kinds of Causation in Biological Sciences: Some RemarksOn the Role of Loops of Interactions and Emergent Properties in Biological SystemsHow Overall Chromatin Arrangements and Their Modifications Affect Gene Activity and Cell FunctioningNew Insights into the Relation between Structure and Function, or How Forms Generate Functionality in Living SystemsFrom Cells to Molecules: Cells May Change the Structure and Function of DNAMany Levels of Causation Are Needed for Thinking of Biological Complexity and FunctionalityConclusionNotesReferencesTop-Down Causation in Biology and NeuroscienceIntroductionMechanisms as Modules in NetworksNegative Feedback Control in Human-Made MachinesOrganisms Need Control Mechanisms to Maintain ThemselvesMaintaining Constancy of the Internal Environment via Control MechanismsUsing Oscillations from Negative Feedback to Control Timing of OperationsUsing Neurons to Realize Control HierarchiesConclusion: Hierarchical Control as Top-Down CausationNotesReferencesEarly Complexity in Human DevelopmentThe Idea of Early CompetenceFrom the Dissociation of Competence and Performance to the Earliness ArgumentEarly Skills without Learning?Early Skills: Starting Point of Development?Early Cognitive Abilities and EpigenesisConclusionNoteReferencesScientific Emergentism and Its Move beyond (Direct) Downward CausationCompositional Explanation: Some ExamplesSome Features of Compositional Explanation and Scientific CompositionInitial Problems: Downward Causation and the Features of S-EmergenceAnother Foundational Problem: The Impossibility of Direct Manipulability in Cases of S-EmergenceScientific Emergentism and Its Non-Causal Downward Relation: Understanding ‘Upward’ Composition alongside ‘Downward’ MachresisMachresis and Mediated Downward CausationConclusionNotesReferencesIII Downward Causation, Mind and Agency The Mental Causation Debate and Qua ProblemsThe Original Qua ProblemCoarse-Grained versus Fine-Grained AccountsProperty AspectsEvent AspectsNotesReferencesAgent-Causation—Neither Upward Nor DownwardThe Possibility of the Total Absence of CausationThe Justification of the Existence of Agent-CausationObjectionsThe Nature of Agent-CausationThe Nature of AgentsThe Existence of Non-physical AgentsSophistication in the Wish to Get Rid of Agent-Causation, and a Serious Consideration of Philosophical PlausibilityLevels of Physical RealityLevels of Physical Reality and CausationThe Work of CausationThe Brain-AgentNotesReferencesThe Compatibility of Downward Causation and EmergenceFirst Steps into the IssueThe Main Aspects of the IssueDesiderata for EmergenceWhat Are Levels?A Case of Emergence?Realization and EmergenceConclusionsNotesReferencesThree Views on Mental Downward CausationAnomalous MonismOntological EmergentismThe Intentional Causation ViewConclusionNotesReferences
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