• 1. In their study of the establishment of regulatory agencies in 48 countries, Jordana and his colleagues find that financial market regulation and competition policy currently are the responsibility of independent agencies in, respectively, 94 and 88 per cent of the countries (2011: p. 1346).
  • 2. Independent agencies with responsibilities in the area of competition policy are present in all 21 countries on which this study focuses, with some countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom) having two competition authorities. Independent financial market regulators are only present in 19 of the countries. In Ireland, financial market regulation is the responsibility of the central bank. In Denmark, the financial market regulator (Finanstilsynet) is part of the hierarchy of the Ministry of Business and Growth, and is therefore not regarded as an independent agency. Both Australia and Canada have two financial market regulators.


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