Concluding remarks

This chapter examined the variation across the IRAs with respect to accountability, focusing on two policy areas: banking and telecommunications. Inquiring after the causes of such variation at both de jure and de facto levels that prevail in spite of common institutional constraints imposed on the agencies, it pointed out the role played by veto players and their strength; transnational regulatory regimes and expert networks; and stakeholders' organizations and their collective action capacity. It shed light on increasing upward accountability in both sectors despite the limited presence of downward accountability. Contrary to what is claimed in the respective literature regarding the simultaneous existence of high levels of accountability and independence, the chapter demonstrated that lower levels of accountability coexisted with higher levels of independence, and that higher levels of (upward) accountability coexisted with lower levels of independence in the Turkish case. Nonetheless, it did not build a causal link between these two dynamics.

The chapter differentiated between certain dynamics behind upward and downward accountability. It explored the configuration and strength of the veto players, such as the ministries, arguing that strong institutional veto players may help enhance upward accountability,

Table 8.1 Changing accountability of the IRAs, banking and telecommunications

Banking

(1999-2004)

Banking

(2005-)

Telecommunications

(2000-2007)

Telecommunications

(2008-)

Upward

Accountability

Increasing

High

Increasing

High

Downward

Accountability

Increasing

High

(yet, partial towards

concentrated

interests)

Low

(yet, partial towards the monopoly)

Low

(yet, partial towards the monopoly)

Veto players

Weak

Weak

Strong

Strong

Regimes & expert networks

Strengthening

Strong

Weak

Strengthening

Stakeholders Collective action

No monopoly but big (public and private) players

Increasing

concentration

High capacity

No monopoly but big (public and private) players High concentration High capacity

Public monopoly vs weak & disperse interests

High concentration in some segments

Low capacity

(of players except the

monopoly)

Private monopoly vs disperse interests

High concentration in some segments

Gradually increasing capacity (of players except the monopoly)

while they may hinder downward accountability. It suggested the existence of a positive association between strong institutional veto players and upward accountability, and a negative association between such players and agency independence.

The chapter also asserted that well-established regulatory regimes helped enhance accountability of the agencies, while expert networks facilitated de facto implementation of rules and norms. It also examined the impact of well-organized stakeholder associations on improving accountability of the IRAs, and found that strong associations helped build downward accountability, though this might take an exclusionary form depending on the concentration versus diffusion of interests aggregated in associations in the respective sectors.

 
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