Foucault and the Historical Sociology of Globalization

Jean-Frangois Bayart

I will here limit myself, as an old user of Foucault’s work, to just setting it within the context of the historical and comparative sociology of globalization, the main topic in the study of international relations—indeed, it has fed into a sub-discipline of the latter, namely global studies, which can be better understood if we examine it in this light.1

However circumscribed the viewpoint taken by the historical and comparative sociology of the political, it should not be neglected in any reconsideration of the thought of Foucault. After all, Foucault quite obviously never stops talking about this issue. In his personal dealings with history, to begin with. In his exchanges of ideas with historians who focused on the political, starting with Peter Brown and Paul Veyne—historians who saw the political as the “inventory of differences.” In his constant concern to apprehend the historicity of the episteme, of subjection and the experiences of subjectivation. In his insistence on sticking to a study of practice. In his rejection of any essentialist and metaphysical definition of power. And in his reminders to us that power cannot just be reduced to the state and its structures.2

J.-F. Bayart (*)

Graduate Institute Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland e-mail: This email address is being protected from spam bots, you need Javascript enabled to view it

© The Author(s) 2017 175

P. Bonditti et al. (eds.), Foucault and the Modern International,

The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56153-4_10

We also need to take into account the formidable convergence between the thought of Michel Foucault and that of Max Weber (see Hibou in this volume), if we accept that the latter is the totem of the historical and comparative sociology of the political and is mainly concerned with the relationship between capitalism and universality, grasped through the prism of the West and its Sonderentwicklung. This is not, of course, the Weber of Talcott Parsons or Julien Freund, but the Weber we are now discovering thanks to his new translators into French, especially Jean-Paul Grossein. Although Foucault only rarely quotes or refers to Weber, hailing him as the sociologist of contingency but demurring from his alleged essentialism, the “elective affinities” between the two writers are clear.3 The “causal multiplication”4 of the one thinker echoes the untangling of “concrete genetic sets of relations” (or, in Kalberg’s translation “tangible, causal connections”5) in the other. The ideal type needs to be understood as part of a process, not a typol- ogy.6 Weber’s “conduct of life” (Lebenfuhrung) and “type of human being” (Menschentum) prefigure Foucault’s “subjectivation”; the “becoming like every day” (Veralltaglichung) looks forward to Foucault’s “dispositifs” or “apparatuses,” and “domination” (Herrschaft) anticipates “governmentality.” My more learned colleagues may draw up fuller lists, but these different concepts are, so to speak, interchangeable. Anyone who doubts this need only read The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism and the texts related to it with a modicum of attention to realize that this is the case. Weber writes:

We have intentionally decided here not to commence our discussion with a consideration of the objective social institutions of the old Protestant churches and their ethical influence. We have especially decided not to begin with a discussion of church discipline, even though it is very important. Instead, we will first examine the effects of each believer’s organization of life that are possible when individuals convert to a religious devoutness anchored in asceticism. We will proceed in this manner for two reasons: this side of our theme has until now received far less attention, and the effect of church discipline cannot be viewed as always leading in the same direction.

  • (...) In those regions where a Calvinist state church held sway, the authoritarian monitoring of the believer’s life was practised to a degree that rivalled an inquisition. This supervision could work even against that emancipation of individual energies originating out of the believer’s ascetic striving to methodically acquire a sense of certainty as belonging among the saved.
  • (...) The church’s regimentation of asceticism could have the same effect. Wherever the church developed too far in a harshly authoritarian direction, it coerced believers into adhering to specific forms of external behavior. In doing so, however, under certain circumstances the church then crippled the individual’s motivation to organize life in a methodical manner.7

And Weber insists on “the great difference between the effects of the despotic-authoritarianism of the state churches and the effects of the despotism of sects. The latter rests upon voluntary subjection.”8 As we see, Weber is here prefiguring the definition of governmentality as Foucault had come to define it in the 1980s, that is, as a place where the techniques of domination exercised over others and the techniques of the self meet.9 And he already sets within their historicity the “style of life” of ascetic Protestantism, that is, the Puritans’ daily method of subjectivation, and the “individualism” involved (an expression which “encompasses the most heterogeneous phenomena to be imagined”)10.

In his turn, and in his own way, Foucault takes up the crucial question of obedience. This is a question which obsesses those authors whom the historical sociology of the political inevitably treats as reference points: Weber, of course, but also La Boetie and his “voluntary servitude,” Marx and his concept of “appropriation,” Gramsci and his “hegemony,” and more contemporary scholars such as the “subalternists” who focus on Indian history, the historian Alf Ludtke and the anthropologist Maurice Godelier. At present, it is doubtless Beatrice Hibou11 who, in the field of the historical and comparative sociology of the political, most clearly illustrates the relative fungibility of such theoretical notions. Thus, in Foucault, political science is on familiar territory, and it is surprising that the members of the political science “establishment” have persisted for so long in viewing him with suspicion, even more than they do with Bourdieu, in whom several of them, recognize a kindred spirit (see Bigo in this volume).

In any case, as far as I am concerned, I found it quite natural to draw simultaneously on the concepts of Weber and Foucault to problematize contemporary globalization as a mode of governmentality, in the context of the historical and comparative sociology of the political, and especially of the state, thus going against most global studies which postulated a zero-sum game between the state and globalization.12


The convergence between the preoccupations of the historical and comparative sociology of the political and Foucault’s investigations seems to me to rest especially upon six points. As a philosopher-historian of practices and of raritas, Foucault supports a conception of comparativism that is also found in Paul Veyne and Giovanni Levi, and that consists in sharing questions rather than answers or solutions (see Bonditti in this volume)—the polar opposite of the smooth, ahistorical comparativism that characterized the “developmentalist” trend of political science in its study of “cultural areas” in the 1960s. His relational definition of power as an action on actions is limpid and, until proved otherwise, irreplaceable. The concept of governmentality that he draws from it allows us to grasp the state in its own dynamic historicity, both in a given “cultural area” and on a global scale, while avoiding the dead end of culturalism.13 The way he emphasizes the dispersal of power and the heterotopias constitutive of political community sheds light on the consubstantial incompletion of this same community. The—very Bergsonian—way in which he manipulates long periods of time (durees) casts doubt on the great established periodizations, such as Antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages, and combines lines of continuity and lines of discontinuity. Finally, his view that the Enlightenment represented an “emergence from minority” is the foundation stone of the historical and comparative sociology of the political insofar as it is a critical reflection on the political: such a move is made possible by the idea of writing as a “letting go” or “detachment” (deprise). This helps us, at last, to understand more fully the reticence of canonical political science, which is still so normative, edifying and prescriptive! A reading of “What is Enlightenment?” should indeed be made obligatory in all departments of political science in a sulphurous and salubrious counterpoint to the Gospel of Good Global Governance which they dispense.

The analysis of “cultural areas,” one that is too marginal within the discipline to be altogether honest, decent company, has not, for its part, hesitated to resort to Foucault in a pragmatic way, using him as its “toolbox.” In France, Foucault was initially of great help, in the early 1980s, when it came to envisaging the political “from below,” and as a process of utterance (un processus enonciatif), in a scholarly movement that drew on the work of certain historians—Michel de Certeau, the trend represented by Italian microstoria, the British journal Past and Present—and concomitant with the research being carried out by others, in the context of German Alltasgsgeschichte, the subaltern studies of specialists in India, and medieval Japanese history.14

As a result, the reference to Foucault was very much in evidence in the new wave of thinking aimed at “deciphering” domination in non-Western cultures. Curiously, the influence of Foucault was not actually at its most productive in connection with colonization, that major episode in globalization, in spite (or because?) of the success of Discipline and Punish. This was not because the colonial period was something of a blind spot for Foucault, as Ann Stoler regretted (1995). Rather, the use that has been made of his writings, especially in the United States, in work on colonial situations, has been too unequivocal to be fully convincing. The notions of discipline and confinement have been highlighted to the detriment of the notions of subjectivation and governmentality. Thus, the practices of appropriation of the colonial state carried out by the colonized have been under-estimated. The result has been an interpretation very similar to the determinist interpretation found in postcolonial studies, which are decidedly far from foucauldian in their tropical Calvinism, which sees the effect of predestination as stemming from an ahistorical, undifferentiated essence of “coloniality”15 (See Fernandez and Esteves in this volume).

Much more interesting is the way Foucault has been called on in the study of contemporary forms of domination, in the context of globalization, for example, in China,16 in Tunisia17 and in Iran.18 Yet using his themes relevantly has sometimes led to difficulties, and authors who have made the attempt have found themselves in tricky situations. Indeed, militant pieties will find little of benefit here. Woe betides anyone who talks of the active consent of the dominated to the scorned regimes of the Chinese Communist Party, the Tunisian dictatorship of Ben Ali or the Islamic Republic of Iran! Foucault was met with furious criticism when the revolution broke out in Iran in 1979—a taste of things to come, and still emblematic.19 The critics who lambasted his views were mistaken in two regards: they were both anachronistic (the allegedly wrong-headed articles and interviews dated from autumn 1978, the revolutionary Terror from the beginning of 1979) and ethnocentric (why should anyone wax indignant at the term “political spirituality” as used of Shiite Islam, while in the same period admiring the Catholic faith of the workers of Solidarnosc?; on political spirituality, see Dillon in this volume). Not only that, they also revealed their failure to understand the concept of subjectivation, one that is after all crucial when trying to analyse domination from a new standpoint. It represents the real added value of Foucault vis-a-vis Weber, so long as we take the argument to its logical conclusion, as I shall be suggesting shortly. Indeed, this is the approach—as well as the very notion of “political spirituality”—which Ruth Marshall picks up and uses in her study of Pentecostalism in Nigeria, a global phenomenon from any point of view, thereby providing us with one of the most illuminating works on the relation between the religious sphere and contemporary state formation in sub-Saharan Africa.20

It has proved heuristically fruitful to use Foucault’s work in the area of the historical and comparative sociology of the political in a situation of globalization because his work represents two major advances. First, in The

Order of Things, it breaks away from every form of historicism, while making a grasp of historicity its main focus. This explains why Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), eager to “provincialize Europe,” found a reading of Foucault so interesting. The latter’s work, after all, helps us not just to “rescue history from the nation,” as another proponent of subaltern studies, Prasenjit Duara (1995), desires us to do, but also to save it from revolution and the “transition” (to the market economy and democracy). The outrageously normative and teleological scholarly literature that seized on the “Arab Springs” in 2011 demonstrated that this theoretical argument was not always won, in spite of the disillusionment felt by the sycophantic devotees of the said “transitions” in the former Soviet sphere, in China and in Indochina.21

Secondly, Foucault dissuades us from arguing in terms of “origin,” causality or intentionality. The very problematic of “state formation”—if we accept the distinction between the “formation” and the “construction” of the state as introduced by two historians of Kenya, Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale (1992) in a book that is much more foucauldian than you might expect, given the way these writers skirt Foucault’s work22—depends on it. This problematic focuses on the “descent” (Herkunft) and “emergence” (Entstehung) of the state as it depends not just on public policies, but on the muddled actions of the whole set of social actors. This distinction chimes in with the approaches of “the political from below” and the “utterance of the political,” and it has largely been accepted by the adepts of this trend; it has fostered the birth of a disparate and yet consistent body of work in the historical and comparative sociology of the political, with its epicentre in the CERI (Centre de recherches internationales) at Sciences Po in Paris from the 1980s onwards, and, more recently, the FASOPO (Fonds d’analyse des societes politiques) and its REASOPO (Reseau euro- peen d’analyse des societes politiques—European Network for the study of political societies).23 The focus here is less on political science in the strict meaning of the term and more on the social sciences of the political, which bring social science together with history, anthropology, political economy, sociology and various other disciplines. Students who wish to explore this path need to reread Foucault, and in particular his celebrated text, “Nietzsche, genealogy, history”24 which could well be taken as a manifesto for the historical and comparative sociology of the political.

At this point in our discussion, one should keep in mind that the elective affinities between this form of sociology and a foucauldian problema- tization do not stem from mere strategic opportunism, pure intellectual snobbery or a fortuitous conjunction of scientific stars. They reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, a shared experience: that of foreign societies. Foucault has sometimes been criticized for his provincialism, his French- focused ethnocentrism. But this is to ignore his adventures in Sweden, Poland, North and South America, throughout his career. It means seeing his curiosity for the Iranian Revolution as of interest only through the specious indignation it aroused—and people forget that on this occasion he could count on an excellent specialist in Shiite critical philosophy, in the person of Christian Jambet, a pupil of Henry Corbin. Above all, it means discounting the fact that he wrote The Archaeology of Knowledge in Tunisia, in the middle of the student revolution, that radical and courageous protest against the almost unanimously respected single-party regime that, in Foucault’s own view, would make May 1968 seem insipid and petit bourgeois. Foucault’s concern for historicity seems to me inseparable from his ability to face up to other places and other ways of engaging in the political—the very focus of the historical and comparative sociology of the political, something which he encountered in real life, during his time as an expatriate or on his travels, and not just through his dialogue with the historians of Antiquity or the modern period.

Foucault, but Deleuze Too

In my view however, the appropriation of Foucault’s thought by the historical and comparative sociology of the political will yield its full harvest only if we take seriously the philosophical friendship that linked him to Gilles Deleuze. In relation to Deleuze, Foucault’s advantage is that he continues to think about the state, even if he does not make it his central focus—far from it. And the state is crucial in the contemporary process of globalization, since the universalization of the state is just one of the dimensions of globalization, rather than its antagonistic principle or its victim, whatever the currently fashionable but illusory view of the matter may be.25 From the political analysis point of view, this is where “deter- ritorialization” reaches its limit: in contemporary globalization, there is not just a “multitude,” and the “empire” still has a centre, or in any case, a framework, namely, the hierarchical system of nation-states, contrary to what Michael Hardt and Toni Negri26 may claim.

On the other hand, Deleuze’s problematic helps us to extend and refine the analysis of foucauldian subjectivation, taken in a quite Weberian sense as the “production of modes of existence or styles of life,”27 but also as a process of “nonsubjective individuations.”28 This process can be grasped only through the “molar or rigid lines of segmentarity” (the so-called break lines), the “lines of molecular or supple segmentation” (“crack lines”) and the “line of flight” or “rupture lines” that form it.29 In other words, we need to identify social actors no longer as subjects, but as “assemblages,” in the shape of a “multiplicity of dimensions, of lines and directions”30 that compose them, and that are all positions that the latter can occupy, successively or simultaneously, with regard to domination. Deleuze writes,

Here, there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. Nothing develops, but things arrive late or early, and form this or that assemblage depending on their compositions of speed. Nothing subjectifies, but haecceities form according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects.31

This means that the political scientist has a new object of study: the “planes of consistency or of composition,”32 the “planes of immanence”33 which are experienced in a given society. Viewed this way, through the prism of such fragments, this society follows a logic of imbrication, of recessing (encastrement). There is an imbrication of planes; there is an imbrication of differing lengths of life and historical periods, in accordance with each of those planes; there is also an imbrication of objects and images in the way the planes of immanence unfold. This leads to a less anthropocentric interpretation of the social, a clearer perception of the diversity of the space-times from which it is woven, a more precise definition of obedience, dissidence or mere “looking after your own interests” (Eigensinn) than in the dichotomies of a certain sociology of domination made entirely of power and resistance (or submission). This quickly brings us to the regime of truth that Foucault prized so much. But it also means we can point out its incompleteness and ambiguity.34

Coming at the problem via Deleuze is especially productive as he allows us both to get beyond an unequivocal view of globalization, our contemporary regime of historicity, made of “difference” because it is made of “repetition.”35 For two centuries, the universalization of the nation-state, of the capitalist mode of production, of its material culture and of the techniques of the body linked with it may have been coercive, for example, in the context of colonialization, but it is neither an identical reproduction nor a pure alienation. It merges into a process of appropriation, in the Marxist sense of the term, that is, a process of creation—something which culturalism refuses to accept, though the historical and comparative sociology of the political understands it perfectly well.36 Nonetheless, the relevant unit of analysis cannot be society postulated in its totality, but rather the dispersal of the planes of immanence that can be observed in it. This means that the relation between a given historical society and globalization can be seen as various complex points of connection between human beings and their material or immaterial works as produced by their personal or professional relations, the trading in which they engage with each other, the circulation of cultural models and images and even military occupation—multiple points of connection that do not necessarily form a system and may be contradictory between one domain and another, and also lie at the heart of processes of subjectivation, of “subjectless individuations.” This results in various disjunctions, or even forms of schizophrenia, something that is particularly clear in France, a country where McDonald’s restaurants are trashed yet France represents the biggest European market for this chain. The foucauldian concept of heterotopia—as used by Thomas Fouquet,37 for example, in a fine unpublished thesis, to refer to the “social elsewhere” of night, in the dimension of which the young “women adventurers of the city” of Dakar affirm their independence while mobilizing the resources of cultural and material extraversion, and “deterritorializing” themselves—can also display its full measure (see Shapiro in this volume).

In order to problematize the so-called governmentality of the belly south of the Sahara, from the perspective of the historical and comparative sociology of the political, I used the term “rhizome-state.”38 It now strikes me that the concept can be broadened in this direction. The colonial state ensures “subjection” in both the senses Foucault gives this word (assujet- tissement—also a process of “making something a subject”—Trans.). It is at once a place of political obedience and a place where a moral subject can be constituted. Political subjectivation, however, is not inevitably consistent. It forms a dispersal, a “multiplicity”39 that creates the discontinuous character or the false bottom of social life and the processes whereby moral subjects are constituted. The latter exist as compositions rather than as identities, as rhizomes rather than linearities, as “events” rather than as “essences,” through an interplay of the Plenum and the Void.40 In Africa, the rhizome-state cannot be reduced to a network of political relations at the interface of institutions, social relations of locality (terroir), economic exchanges, alliances of lineage and the interplay of factions. It also assumes a moral dimension, or one that is ethical or, if you prefer, imaginary: that of the “politics of the belly,” full of contradiction and conflict. In short, it takes on the dimension of subjectivation, which is definitely inseparable from extraversion on the level of globalization, as Thomas Fouquet41 points out in connection with Senegal.

Nonetheless, the concept cannot be restricted to a neo-orientalist, Africanist sense. It has a universal and comparative application, once we have made allowances for historicity. We all live in rhizome-states, in accordance with disparate and fleeting planes of immediacy. And, like Deleuze, Foucault recommends—in a very Weberian fashion—that we grasp its concrete dispositifs by drawing on wirkliche Histone, (effective history). We should guard against the various avatars of “universal history,” the “kind of Esperanto” that, just like the language of that name, initially expresses a “hope,” and we should keep in mind the variety of “histories” (Historien).42 We should formulate the differentiated speeds of social transformations so as to escape the linear and teleological ways in which the different avatars of historicism and the ideology of progress inevitably grasp them, and we should definitely leave behind the hackneyed problematics of causality and intentionality. The categories of the social sciences of the political are still finding it difficult to understand how societies are unfinished and the structures and practices that underlie them are incomplete, the coexistence within them of a plurality of spacetimes, the ambiguity of relations of domination and the synergy between coercion and hegemony. But a society draws its strength from its dispersal, its discontinuity, its heterogeneity and its blind spots rather than from its consistency. This is the subject matter of wirkliche Historie when it pays attention not to the “origin” (Ursprung) but to the “descent” (Herkunft) and “emergence” (Entstehung) of things, the polar opposite of any preoccupation with identity:

The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us. [...] If genealogy in its own turn gives right to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogeneous systems that, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity.43

Thus, the monadology of political science needs to be replaced by a “nomadology”44 of the political that no longer argues in the strategic terms of methodological individualism, or the holistic terms of cultural- ism, or the identitarian terms of the political problematics of native existence (autochtonie), or the binary terms of class struggle, but rather in those of “multiplicity” of “assemblages” and “dispositifs”45 that produce the historicity of rhizome-states.

If we are to do this, Foucault, 30 years after his death, can still provide us with valuable help, over and above any effect of reverence and any theoretical fetishism, and in spite of the irritation that his academic beatification in a certain tradition of the study of “cultural areas” may arouse, especially when this is postmodern in temper. Not that he is any greater than, or all that different from, the other leading lights of the historical and comparative sociology of the political. We should learn from him precisely because he is in many ways close to them, encourages us to read them anew (even when he himself rarely quotes them), and painstakingly questions and refines their findings.

Translated by Andrew Brown


  • 1. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Foucault au Congo,” in Penser avec Michel Foucault. Theorie critique etpratiquespolitiques, ed. Marie-Christine Granjon, (Paris: Karthala, 2005), pp. 183-222; Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization, transl. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
  • 2. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Comparer en France: petit essai d’autobiographie disciplinaire,” Politix, 21(83) (2008): 201-228.
  • 3. Paul Veyne writes that Foucault’s idea of Weber was “incorrect” and that Foucault had failed to see that Weber was “just as nominalist as he himself was.” Paul Veyne, Foucault: His Thought, his Character (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 35.
  • 4. Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in G. Burchel, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 (1981)), p. 76.
  • 5. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism (Chicago and London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), p. 77.
  • 6. See the commentary by Beatrice Hibou, “De l’interet de lire La Domination de Max Weber aujourd’hui,” Liens socio (2014). Available at http://lec- (verified October 6, 2015). Paul Veyne compares the “discourse” of Foucault to the “ideal type” of Weber. See Veyne,

Foucault: His Thought, his Character, pp. 34-35. And it is permissible to see in Weber’s notion an “individualization operator” in Paul Veyne’s sense. On all these points, see Weber, Max, The Protestant ethic and the spirit ofcapitalism.

  • 7. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 156.
  • 8. Ibid., p. 156 - Weber’s emphasis.
  • 9. Foucault Michel, “Technologies of the self,” in Martin H. Luther, Huck Gutman et Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault (Amherst: the University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 16-49. See Weber, Ibid., pp. 176-79, 223-26 and 269-71.
  • 10. Ibid., pp. 325-26 n. 29.
  • 11. Beatrice Hibou, The Force ofObedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); The Bureaucratization of the World in the Neoliberal Era: An International and Comparative Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, 2015); and Anatomie politique de la domination (Paris: La Decouverte, 2015).
  • 12. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, Global Subjects, pp. 126-30.
  • 13. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (London: Hurst, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); “Foucault au Congo,” in Marie-Christine Granjon (ed.), Penser avec Michel Foucault. Theorie critique et pratiques politiques, (Paris: Karthala, 2005b), pp. 183-222; Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization, 2007, and The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd ed. (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2009).
  • 14. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, Achille Mbembe, and Comi Toulabor, Le Politique par le bas en Afrique noire. Contributions a une problematique de la democratie (Paris: Karthala, 1992); “L’enonciation du politique,” Revue frangaise de science politique 35 no. 3 (1985): 343-373.
  • 15. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, Les Etudes postcoloniales, un carnaval academique (Paris: Karthala, 2010); Jean-Fran^ois Bayart and Romain Bertrand, “De quel ‘legs colonial’ parle-t-on?” Esprit, December (2006): 134-160. For an authentic foucauldian reading of a colonial situation, see Bertrand, Romain, Etat colonial, noblesse et nationalisme a Java. La Tradition par- faite (Paris: Karthala, 2005); Romain Betrand, “Penser le Java mystique de l’age moderne avec Foucault: peut-on ecrire une histoire ‘non intention- naliste’ du politique?”, Societes politiques comparees 2, February (2008a); and “Habermas au Bengale, ou comment ‘provincialiser l’Europe’ avec Dipesh Chakrabarty,” Universite de Lausanne: Political Science Working Paper Series, no. 24 (2008b).
  • 16. Yves Chewier, “L’empire distendu: esquisse du politique en Chine des Qing a Deng Xiaoping,” in La Greffe de l’Etat. Les Trajectoires du politique, ed. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart (Paris: Karthala, 1996), pp. 263-395; Jean-Louis Rocca, La Condition chinoise. La mise au travail capitaliste a l’Age des

reformes (1978-2004) (Paris: Karthala, 2006); Severine Arsene, Internet et politique en Chine (Paris: Karthala, 2011); Fran^oise Mengin, Fragments of an Unfinished War: Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and the Partition of China (London: C. Hurst and Co. and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

  • 17. Hibou, The Force ofObedience.
  • 18. Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran (London: Hurst & Co, 1999).
  • 19. See the excellent account in Olivier Roy, ‘“L’enigme du soulevement.’ Foucault et l’Iran,” Vacarmes, 29 (2004).
  • 20. See also Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Around Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria, by Ruth Marshall,” Religion and Society, 2 (2011): 145-150 and, for a very foucauldian analysis, in terms of civic subjectivation, of a trend in the Murid confraternity in Senegal, Audrain, Xavier, Des ‘punks de Dieu’ aux ‘taalibe -citoyens’. Jeunesse, citoyennete et mobilisation religieuse au Senegal. Le mouvement mouride de Cheikh Modou Kara (1980-2007), Paris: Universite de Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, 2013.
  • 21. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Another look at the Arab Springs,” Societes poli- tiques comparees, 35 (2013): 1-34.
  • 22. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Hors de la ‘vallee heureuse’ de l’africanisme. Note bibliographique,” Revue frangaise de science politique 44 no. 1 (1994): 136-139.
  • 23. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, “Comparing from bellow,” english version of “Comparer en France: petit essai d’autobiographie disciplinaire,” Politix, 21, no. 83 (2008): 201-228 available at: default/files/papier1_eng_n1.pdf
  • 24. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, genealogy, history,” in Essential Works of Michel Foucault, ed. James Faubion, vol. 2 Aesthetics (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 369-391.
  • 25. This is why I feel it is preferable to talk in terms of national-liberalism, rather than neo-liberalism. See Sortir du national-liberalisme. Croquispoli- tiques des annees 2004-2012 (Paris: Karthala, 2012). See also Global Subjects: A Political Critique ofGlobalization.
  • 26. Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2000).
  • 27. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 98.
  • 28. Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 144.
  • 29. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophreni (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 212-228, especially 221; Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 124ff.
  • 30. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, pp. 212-28, especially 217; Deleuze and Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 100. Remember that Alltagsgeschichte

also insists, in a different vocabulary, on the “multidimensional experiences” (Mehrschichtigkeiten) of actors and on the “interaction”

  • (Vermittlung) and “overlapping” or “imbrication” (Gemengelagen) of the latter. See Alf Ludtke, Des ouvriers dans l’Allemagne du XXesiecle. Le quo- tidien des dictatures (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), pp. 68ff.
  • 31. Deleuze, and Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 293-4.
  • 32. Ibid., p. 558.
  • 33. Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A life” in Jean Khalfa, ed., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 170 ; Deleuze and Guattari, What is philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994), chapter 2.
  • 34. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, Le Plan cul. Ethnologie d’unepratique sexuelle (Paris: Fayard, 2014).
  • 35. Gilles Deleuze, “Difference and repetition (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
  • 36. Bayart, Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization.
  • 37. Thomas Fouquet, Filles de la nuit, aventurieres de la cite. Arts de la citadi- nite et desirs de l’Ailleurs d Dakar (Paris: Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 2011).
  • 38. Jean-Fran^ois Bayart, The state in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd ed. (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2009).
  • 39. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (New York: Zone, 1988).
  • 40. “The plane of consistence or of immanence, the body without organs, includes voids and deserts. But these are ‘fully’ part of desire, far from accentuating some kind oflack in it” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 90). And, “the voids which form part of the plane, as a silence forms part of a plane of sound [plan sonore], without it being possible to say ‘something is missing”’ (ibid., p. 94). See also Michel Foucault, Subjectivite et verite. Cours au College de France. 1980-1981 (Paris: Seuil, Gallimard, 2014), p. 247.
  • 41. Fouquet, Filles de la nuit, aventurieres de la cite.
  • 42. Walter Benjamin, Ecrits frangais (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), p. 447 and pp. 452-55. See also Walter Benjamin (ed.), Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1973: 253-64); and Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 14.
  • 43. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, genealogy, history,” in Essential Works of Michel Foucault, ed. James Faubion, vol. 2 Aesthetics (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 386-87.
  • 44. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 21.
  • 45. Gilles Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?” In Michel Foucault Philosopher, edited and translated by Timothy J. Armstrong, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 159-168.
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