(C2) Ethnic Mobilization and the Introduction of New Formal Representative Institutions

Another institutional mechanism variant also suggests that, ceteris paribus, mobilized ethnic groups push for recognition and inclusion via formal prominently party-systems (Kitschelt 1988) and other institutional factors (Horowitz 1985). Echoing the literature on political parties, the main debates on ethnic movements centre on the conditions under which movements influence policy (Amenta et al. 2010). Some researchers stress that mobilization in itself is sufficient to induce policy change (McCarthy and Zald 1977), others point to particular forms of movement organization (e.g. Andrews 2004), movement strategies (e.g. Cress and Snow 2000), and the broader political context, particularly the support of powerful allies (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta 2006). Similar arguments have been made in the literature on civic associations (e.g. Skocpol 2003; Varshney 2003).

institutions. Yet, in contrast to the emphasis on feedback effects, the focus is on how new representative institutions transform the state apparatus. The implementation of these institutions usually entails novel bureaucratic procedures and structures, with varying effects on state capacity. Existing approaches are again divided about the expected benefits of these rearrangements.

On the positive end, recent studies of affirmative action in the United States and Brazil (Htu 2004; Sowell 2004) suggest that the construction of new state agencies facilitate the provision of services and infrastructure across wider segments of the society. Similarly, the decentralization of political authority via federalist or consociationalist arrangements might lead to new bureaucratic structures and competencies, with largely beneficial effects on the administrative competence and territorial reach of the state apparatus. On the other hand, the same representative institutions might also generate unexpected problems for state public goods provision. For example, affirmative action or federalist arrangements often introduce new veto points into the policymaking process, thereby impeding the effective provision of public services (Gerring et al. 2005; Huber and Stephens 2001).

< Prev   CONTENTS   Source   Next >