Improving Access and Quality of Public Services in Latin America: To Govern and To Serve

The GDN Project on Varieties of Governance in Service DeliveryAccountability and Performance Within Different Institutional SettingsAccountability in Decentralized Systems: Closer Is Not Always BetterThe Key Importance of Providers’ Autonomy and IncentivesThe Importance of Local Taxation, Capabilities and Political CompetitionDirect Citizens’ Participation: Mimicry and Rubber Stamping or Effective Accountability?Accountability, Choice and Modes of Delivery: The Jury Is Still OutSumming Up: Three Major Conclusions for Building Accountability in Service DeliveryAdequate Information Flows Can Be More than a Necessary Condition for AccountabilityLack of Adequate Information Impairs AccountabilityInformation Often Promotes AccountabilitySelf-financing Promotes AccountabilityDirect Payment for Services Enhances Accountability and PerformancePayment for Services Through Local Taxes also Enhances Accountability and PerformancePolitical History and Culture Have Lasting Effects on Accountability, but They Can Eventually Be Overcome Through Persistent Institutional and Incentive ReformsIdeas for Future ResearchNotesReferencesMarkets and Hierarchies in Public Services: Incentives, Institutions, and PoliticsIntroductionTheoretical Issues: Markets, Hierarchies, and Quasi-MarketsComplementary Issues in Quasi-Market DesignInformationFlexibility and Managerial AutonomyEntry and ExitMitigating Negative ConsequencesIncentives and MotivationsEquityAuditing, Policing, and EnforcingPolitics and Quasi-MarketsConclusionsNotesBibliographyDecentralization, Fiscal Effort, and Social Progress in Colombia at the Municipal Level, 1994-2009: Why Does National Politics Matter?IntroductionDecentralization Impact on Education: Better Coverage, Deficient QualityDecentralization Impact: Mixed Results on the Provision of Water ServicesConceptual Framework: The Necessary Link between Political Competition, Local State Capacity, and Policy OutcomesMethodologyLink between Political Competition and Local State Capacity: How Often Do Mayors Update Their Municipality’s Local Cadastre?The Effect of Local State Capacity on the Efficiency of Service Provision Systems in Education and WaterThe Model for Enrollment Rates and Quality of EducationThe Model for Coverage and Quality of WaterResultsThe Link Between Political Competition and Local Tax CapacityThe Positive Impact of Local Tax Capacity on Service Provision in EducationThe Positive Effect of Local Tax Capacity on Provision of Water ServiceDiscussion and ConclusionsData sourcesNotesReferencesDoes Participatory Budgeting have an Effect on the Quality of Public Services? The Case of Peru’s Water and Sanitation SectorIntroductionChannels Through Which PB May Affect the Provision of Water and Sanitation ServicesInstitutional BackgroundThe Process of PBPB Within Municipal BudgetsThe Water and Sanitation SectorDescriptive StatisticsDeterminants of PBResults and DiscussionConclusions and Policy ImplicationsNotesReferencesUnderstanding the Effects of Educational Governance in Chile and UruguayDefining Educational GovernancePresentation of the National Case StudiesMixed-Methods ApproachQuantitative AnalysisQualitative AnalysisResearch DataResultsThe Dependent Variable: Performance and School Progression in Urugua^y and ChileGovernance Factors as Explanatory Variables: Some Clues for Understanding Their EffectsDecentralizationAccountabilityIncentivesConclusions and ImplicationsReferences
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