Why developing countries like Sri Lanka accepted TRIPS
Although many developing countries initially objected to linking the protection of intellectual property' rights to world trade and thus into the WTO Agreements, eventually they accepted the TRIPS Agreement.32 Several factors contributed to this acceptance. Of these, the main factors were the lack of awareness and negotiation strength of developing countries, the role played by the United States (particularly through the Generalized System of Preferences, the coercion exercised under Section 301 of the United States Trade Act 1974 (as amended), and bilateral initiatives), the glossy picture portrayed by developed countries with regard to the significance of affording protection for intellectual property rights in developing countries for their rapid economic development and the trade benefits (sweeteners) that were shown to be available to developing countries in the event they became members to the WTO.
LACK OF AWARENESS AND NEGOTIATION STRENGTH
During the eight years of the Uruguay Round negotiations, ‘[f]or almost 3 years, from 1986 until May 1989, developing countries refused to negotiate an agreement on intellectual property.’ However, this position changed from the second half of 1989 as it no longer became possible ‘politically, to avoid the discussion’. In particular, the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round in April 1989 produced a text that gave ‘the go-ahead to a full-blown agreement on TRIPS’. This was followed by two draft agreements on TRIPS tabled by the European Community and the United States in 1990. In addition, Switzerland and Japan also submitted draft negotiating proposals. Around this time, ‘[a] core group of fourteen developing countries conceded [that] they would have no choice but to participate more ftilly in the TRIPS discussions’.
Although developing countries participated in the TRIPS negotiations, they ‘faced increasing difficulty in countering the pro-TRIPS agenda’ advocated by the developed countries.[1] One of the reasons for this was the lack of knowledge and negotiating strength on the part of developing country delegates vis-à-vis the delegates from the developed countries to deal with extremely complex matters that were involved in the negotiation process. In particular, as Matthews observed, there was ‘a lack of real understanding among developing country delegations about how far-reaching the economic and social implications of the TRIPS Agreement were likely to be.’
Developing countries sent a senior official of the Trade Ministry [as a delegate]. There was no technical support. Several small developing countries were represented by the Trade Counsellors in Geneva being driven from one committee to another.
In contrast, delegations sent from developed countries to the TRIPS negotiation process had with them ‘teams comprised of hundreds of experts and specialists who were very knowledgeable in the issue under discussion’. Matthews noted that these delegations ‘had access to the highest level of business advice, this proving to be the most effective method for delegates to acquire the negotiating expertise they required.’ In view of this asymmetrical way in which the delegates of developed and developing countries carried out the TRIPS negotiation process, Balasubramaniam observed that ‘[t]here was hardly any “negotiations” in the real sense of the word’ and, ‘the so-called “negotiating process” did not involve any give and take’.
- [1] Ibid., 43-44. 2 Matthews, above n 27,44 (citations omitted). 3 К Balasubramaniam, ‘Globalisation and Liberalisation of Healthcare Services: WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in Services’ (Issue Paper, People’s Health Assembly, 2000) 8. 4 Ibid. 5 Matthews, above n 27,44. 6 Balasubramaniam, above n 90, 8. 7 Matthews, above n 27, 33.
