Acknowledgment

I am grateful to the UCLA Center for the Study of Women for its ongoing support of this project. And I am profound!}' indebted to Claudia Ingram for her incisive reading of earlier drafts and thought-provoking comments.

Notes

• 1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
• 2 Id. at 480. The statutes at issue included the General Statutes of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196 (1958). Section 53-32 provided: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.” Section 54-196, the accessory statute, provided: “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”
• 3 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961).
• 4 See State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 865, 857-8 (Conn. 1940).
• 5 Poe, 367 U.S. at 519-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
• 6 See Leigh Ann Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 97-8.
• 7 Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty, 98.
• 8 Vance Packard, The Naked Society (New York: David McKay Co., 1964), 162-3; see also Deborah Nelson, Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 14-15, 79. Nelson examines the construction, dissolution, and reimagining of privacy in constitutional law and confessional poetry in the twentieth century, and her rich work has influenced my own. While Nelson is keenly alert to the discursive construction of privacy, she does not argue for a linguistic legal subject.
• 9 Griswold, 38Ї U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
• 10 See Kathryn Abrams, “Disenchanting the Public/Private Distinction,” in Imagining New Legalities, ed. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 26-8.

The trope also shielded domestic violence from state interference. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative,” Yale Law Journal 105 (June 1996), 2150-74. For this and other reasons, feminists have regarded privacy as a problematic vehicle for protecting reproductive rights. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law,” Yale Law Journal 100 (March 1991), 1311; Abrams, “Disenchanting the Public/Private Distinction,” 34-6.

Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); see Poe, 367 U.S. at 520 n.10 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 n.12 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Sandra F. VanBurkleo, “Belonging to the World”: Women’s Rights and American Constitutional Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 167-8. Connecticut’s anti-contraceptive statute was enacted in 1879 as an amendment to an obscene literature law; only later was the prohibition on contraceptive use enacted as an independent statute. See Carol Flora Brooks, “The Early History of the AntiContraceptive Laws in Massachusetts and Connecticut,” American Quarterly 18, No. 1 (Spring 1966), 9-12 and n. 23.

Margaret Sanger, Margaret Sanger: An Autobiography (New York: W.W. Norton, 1938), 113.

Margaret Sanger, The Pivot of Civilization (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1922), 140.

Margaret Sanger, Woman and the New Race (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1920), 94.

David M. Rabban, “The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History,” Stanford Law Review 45 (November 1992), 91-3.

Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 16, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). See also Melissa Murray, “Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold,” Yale Law Journal Forum 124 (March 2, 2015), 324-31, www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/overlooking-equality-on-the-road-to-griswold; Neil S. Siegel and Reva B. Siegel, “Contraception as a Sex Equality Right,” Yale Law Journal Forum 124 (March 2, 2015), 349-58, www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-right.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-5.

Id. at 486.

See id. at 481-2; Lochner p. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

See Nelson, Pursuing Privacy, 76-80, 93-5; see also Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 1-38.

Poe, 367 U.S. at 521-2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

See David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 30-8, 119-30; Nelson, Pursuing Privacy, 9-14; Packard, The Naked Society, 68-72, 148-68.

See Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty, 112-13, 154-5; Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 167.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-3 (2003). Ironically, the Griswold bedroom invasion was literalized in Lawrence. Id. The Court has also invoked the privacy right in cases invoking interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), possession of pornography in the home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and family life, Moore p. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech: Feminist Theory and the First Amendment (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 41-4.

Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution,” Notre Dame Law Review 58 (1983), 446, 452.

Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech, 149.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.

Alan Hyde’s work alerted me to the metaphorics of this passage. See Alan Hyde, Rodies of Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 83.

Jacques Lacan, “The mirror stage as formative of the function of the ‘I,’” in ¿trits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 1-7.

Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 4.

See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 127-9; Maty Ann Glendon, Rights Talk-. The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 18-46, 48-61.

Glendon, Rights Talk, 21-2, 31; John Locke, “On Property,” in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas I. Cook (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1947), 133-46.

Nedelsky, Law’s Relations, 128; see also Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 64-7. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.

See, e.g., Nedelsky, Law’s Relations, 130-3; Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech, 58-68.

See Michel Rosenfeld, “Law and the Postmodern Mind: The Identity of the Constitutional Subject,” Cardozo Law Review 16 (1995), 1058-9.

See, e.g., Michel Foucault, “Afterward: The Subject and Power,” in Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 208-26.

Michel Foucault, “Interview—Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1980), 119.

Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech, 149.

See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, “Lawrence v. Texas: The ‘Fundamental Right’ That Dare Not Speak Its Name,” Harvard Law Review 117 (April 2004), 1939-40; Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 200.

Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 221-55. For Rubenfeld, the legitimacy of privacy as an unwritten constitutional right flows from his model of democratic government as collective self-authorization; totalitarian practices deprive citizens of the foundational right to participate as co-authors in the democratic process.

Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time, 253.

Emile Benveniste, “Subjectivity in Language,” in Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 223-30.

See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 2.

Although the Griswold co-defendants challenged the accessory statute as a First Amendment violation, arguing that it prohibited even private and clinical discussions of contraception, they addressed the First Amendment rights of only the medical personnel. See Brief for Appellants at 90-2, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). The majority opinion did not address these arguments.

Meyer i>. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. Justice Harlan had earlier discussed Meyer and Pierce as exemplifying First Amendment values. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533-5.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, “The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,” Michigan Law Review 100 (August 2002), 2015-16 and n. 44.

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398 (quoting the state opinion, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (Neb. 1922)).

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402-3.

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

Roe, 410 U.S. 113.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.

Id. at 163 (emphasis added).

Id. at 166.

Nelson, Pursuing Privacy, 112-16, 128-30.

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, Vintage Books ed. (New York: Random House, 1990), 61-2.

City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (quoting Akron, Ohio Codified Ordinances ch. 1870, No. 160-1978, § 1870.06 (B) (1978); citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-62) (overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 882); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll, of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759-64 (1986) (overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 882). Casey, 505 U.S. 833.

Id. at 851.

Id. at 852.

Id. at 877.

Id.

Id. at 881-3.

See Stuart )>. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Ian Vande-walker, “Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics,” Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 19, No. 1 (2012), 5.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-8.

Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech, 148-56.

Williams, Truth, Autonomy and Speech, 149 (quoting Susan J. Brison, “The Uses of Narrative in the Aftermath of Violence,” in On Feminist Ethics and Politics, ed. Claudia Card (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 214).

See James E. Fleming, “Securing Deliberative Autonomy,” Stanford Law Review 48 (November 1995), 19-23, 64-71.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6709(b)(5) (2019); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.l-02(ll)(a) (2) (2019); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(l)(b) (2019). Missouri requires that women receive materials stating: “The life of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a separate, unique, living human being.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027(2) (2019).

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1( 1 )(c)-(d) (2019).

See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667-8 (8th Cir. 2011).

Id. at 667 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 737 (8th Cir. 2008)).

See S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23А-Ц4).

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734-6 (2019).

Robert Post, “Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech,” University of Illinois Law Review 2007, No. 3 (2007), 954-5.'

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(l)(c) (2019).

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(l)(g) (2019).

Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, No. 1 (1991), 1-21.

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 747 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see generally S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 (2019) and subsection 34-23A-10.1(l).

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(l) (2019).

Ala. Code § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2019); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2156(A)(1)(a) (2019); Fla. Stat. § 390.0111 (3)(a)( 1 )(b) (2019); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(5) (2019); Iowa Code § 146А.Ц1) (2019); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-34(1) (2019); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-76(B) (2019).

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.727(2) (2019); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(D) (2019); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)-(5) (2019); Wis. Stat. § 253.10 (3gm) (2019). Similar laws in North Carolina and Oklahoma have been enjoined. See Stuart, 77A F.3d 238 (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.85); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 2012 OK 103, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012) (Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (2010)). The Supreme Court recently declined to review a decision by the Sixth Circuit upholding Kentucky’s ultrasound requirement against a challenge that it violated doctors’ First Amendment speech rights. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019), cert, denied, 2015 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2019). In some states, a woman may refuse to hear the sonogram explanation if she certifies that she comes within a statutory exception, such as tor rape victims.

Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Seres. p. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting challenge to Texas statute).

Carol Sanger, “Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice,” UCLA Law Review 56 (December 2008), 367-72. My argument has been significantly informed by Sanger’s powerful examination of mandatory ultrasounds. While Sanger focuses on ultrasounds’ visual power, I examine the narrativization that ultrasounds enable, even compel. See also Jessica Silbey, “Picturing Moral Arguments in a Fraught Legal Arena: Fetuses, Photographic Phantoms and Ultrasounds,” Georgetown Journal of Gender and Law 593 (Summer 2015), 593-631; Vicki Toscano and Elizabeth Reiter, “Upholding a 40-Year-Old Promise: Why the Texas Sonogram Act Is Unlawful According to Planned Parenthood v. Casey,” Pace Law Review 34 (Winter 2014), 128-83.

See Reva Siegel, “Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,” Stanford Law Review 44 (January' 1992), 281-2.

Sanger, “Seeing and Believing,” 382.

MacKinnon, “Reflections on Sex Equality',” 1310.

Sanger, “Seeing and Believing,” 382-3.

• 99 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
• 100 Id. at 881-98.
• 101 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-8 (2000); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-10 (1975). See also Caroline Mala Corbin, “The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,” Boston University Law Review 89 (June 2009), 939-1016.
• 102 Robert D. Goldstein, “Reading Casey. Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process,” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 4 (Summer 1996), 848-9.