The regulatory approach
With the state too often taking a reactive rather than proactive approach to serious corporate crime as a result of tailed self-regulation, crimes such as bribery and corruption are inadequately regulated. Therefore, if the aim of the 2010 Act
UK corporate corruption 179 was to prevent such crimes, success will arguably be limited if proactive and independent steps are not installed. The concepts of‘proactive’ or ‘intelligence-led’ policing, for instance, are hardly new phenomena[1] but have proven successful in other aspects of criminal justice, including organised crime.[2]’ Additionally, using historical case data to identify previous weaknesses and adopting a proactive and imaginative outlook surrounding known vulnerabilities would reduce the current reliance on effective self-regulation alone. To complement the ‘failure to prevent’ landscape, as well as UK regulators beginning to use existing laws more forcefully,[3] further proactive measures could even extend to considerations of precursor offences surrounding system and control failures. Whilst funding and resources remain important constraints to these prospects, tools such as intrusive audit and inspection (on a random and unanticipated basis), as well as the increasing use of artificial intelligence and data analytics,’[4] could undoubtedly help spot-check compliance.
Only when self-regulation fails and the state intervenes have corporations been prompted to reactively amend, compensate, or realign their activities to a more publicly acceptable concept of moral behaviour.’[5] In other words, the fact that the 2010 Act requires private actors to effectively self-regulate (and state regulators become dependent on compliance) is alone insufficient to deter acts of bribery and corruption. Despite the House of Lords Bribery Act 2010 Committee concluding that the 2010 Act should be used as a gold standard for other legislators, its report fails to hilly comprehend or discuss the lack of enforcement to date.[6] Whilst the section 7 offence and the proposed corporate liability expansions (of a similar nature) are necessary to encourage ethical business, without the ‘absolutely critical’[7] clement of external enforcement against those playing an active or complicit role in corrupt activity, there remains over-relianceon corporations to self-regulate and self-report wrongdoing. Without the necessary external enforcement and individual prosecutions, the section 7 offence, and the self-regulation it permits, cannot become the ‘very effective tool’ it is hailed to be.[8]
- [1] Heaton, R., ‘The prospects for intelligence-led policing: Some historical and quantitative considerations’ (2000) 9(4) Policing and Society 337; Ratcliffe, J. H. and Guidetti, R., ‘State police investigative structure and the adoption of intelligence-led policing’ (2008) 31(1) Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 109.
- [2] Alvesalo, A. and others, ‘Re-imagining crime prevention: Controlling corporate crime?’ (2006) 45(1) Crime, Law & Social Change 14.
- [3] Wessing, T., ‘The FCA’s new approach to market abuse reminds business leaders of their obligations’ (
- [4] Serious Fraud Office, ‘Al powered “Robo-Lawyer” helps step up the SFO’s fight against economic crime’ (
- [5] Hauser, C. and Hogenacker, J. ‘Do firms proactively take measures to prevent corruption in their international operations?’ (2014) 11(3-4) European Management Review 223.
- [6] House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010, The Bribery Act 2010: PostLegislative Scrutiny (2017-19 HL 303) para 319.
- [7] Sir Brian Leveson, House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010: Corrected Oral Evidence (
- [8] von Dadelszen, H., House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010-Corrected Oral Evidence (
