Introduction
Henri Wagner
The American philosopher Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) is a peculiar figure in rhe landscape of contemporary philosophy. In view of the scant amounts of published or unpublished works devoted to his thought,[1] one may be disposed to consider that the historical and philosophical significance of his contributions is of minor importance and anecdotal even though representative of an epoch. The growing interest during the last decades in pragmatism and in American philosophy in general would not significantly alter this verdict since it has essentially left the “last great pragmatist” aside. Notwithstanding that some of Lewis’s classical essays (amongst which “A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori" and “The Pragmatic Element of Knowledge”) are included in recent overviews or anthologies on pragmatism and that some pathbreaking studies were devoted to his philosophy, Flowers and Murphey’s assessment still appears to be valid: “The name of C. I. Lewis (1883-1964) lacks the currency of most of the American pragmatists” (Murphey and Flowers 1977, 891). The kernel of truth in this diagnosis lies in the apparent disproportion between the embryonic state of the secondary literature on Lewis and the wide range of impact of his central philosophical insights on twentieth-century philosophers. These major insights, some of them being classical pragmatist insights revisited by Lewis, were explored, criticized, and made alive by a whole generation of major philosophers in America, including N. Goodman, W. V. Quine, W. Sellars, R. Chisholm, D. Davidson, A. Pap, S. Cavell, T. Clarke, and K. Donnellan, who, in different and sometimes conflicting ways, all acknowledge and appreciate “the genuineness of philosophical inspiration in the teaching of C. I. Lewis” (Cavell 1979, xii). Not only does Lewis hold a decisive role in the formation of the post-World War II American philosophy, but he was also in a fruitful dialogue with, or crucially holds sway over, such towering figures as Russell, Carnap (1936-1937; [1934] 1937; 1956), Schlick (1936), Ayer (1936), Stebbing (1933), or Austin. It is then a real question as to why one is so prone to judge that Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism almost disappeared from the contemporary philosophical scene.
It is undisputable that Lewis does not stand within the history of pragmatism as Peirce, James, or Dewey do, nor does he stand within the
history of analytic philosophy as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, or Carnap do. His contributions to the history and the philosophy of logic were nevertheless thought of as so pioneering and seminal that he has been considered “the first major figure in history and philosophy of logic” (Corcoran 2006, I).[2] In this area, Lewis is mostly known to be the founder of modern propositional modal logic
The philosophers who formulated the most perceptive, harsh, and radical criticisms of Lewis’s thought were nevertheless amongst the ones by whom his major insights came to fruition. Whether critical or not, their responses to C. I. Lewis’s works exemplify Cavell’s claim that “a measure of the quality of a new text is the quality of the texts it arouses” (1979,5). However relevant and beneficial the examination of these responses would be for an understanding of the ins and outs of contemporary philosophy, one of the aims of this book is first and foremost to recover the original sense of Lewis’s philosophical contributions. Even though the works of his heirs constitute an invaluable guide to Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism, their purpose not being primarily exegetical, our attention to Lewis’s posterity will be mainly subordinated to our endeavor to elucidate the main tenets of Lewis’s conceptual (or “conceptualistic”) pragmatism as exposed in his 1929 masterpiece MWO.
of relativity. All these new developments call for a reconsideration of the nature of the a priori and the categories as they apparently challenge what was until then thought of as a priori and categorial truths and principles presupposed by our epistemic achievements. Indeed, a central conviction lying at the heart of M WO is that “every fundamental change in that manner in which [the subject of these scientific fields] is conceived, is sure to find its sequel, sooner or later, in epistemology” (1929, vii). That “there is hardly a category or principle of explanation which survives from Aristotle or the science of the Middle ages” (Lewis 1926, 253; 1929, 27, 228, 235, 268) convinced Lewis that every radical scientific change is likely to have repercussions on the then-standard categorial framework8 that are so radical that it results in a new one. What is true in the historical and diachronic case of the radical scientific changes is true in the synchronic case of the varieties of radically different logical and categorial frameworks. As Lewis suggests it, the historical phenomenon of radical scientific changes that ends in the demise of the then-standard categorial framework is echoed by the anthropological phenomenon of the synchronic varieties of categorial frameworks.9 From the modern “disintegration of the a priori" (Reichenbach 1935, 31-32; 1951, 125), Lewis concludes to the coextensionality of the class of analytic truths and of the class of a priori truths: the first of the three main theses of MWO states that an “[a] priori truth is definitive in nature and rises exclusively from the analysis of concepts” (1929, x, 37, 231, 433; see also the opening paragraphs of Quine 1990). This amounts to the rejection of any notion of a synthetic or material a priori: “the question whether there are any synthetic a priori truths ... is a dead, or nearly dead, issue” (Lewis 1946, 158). It should not be inferred from the coextensionality of the analytic and the a priori that the extension of the concept of the a priori is only restricted, as if Lewis’s pragmatic reconception of the a priori retained the traditional understanding of the two hallmarks of the a priori - its necessity and its independence from experience. The new developments in logic, mathematics, and physics may not determine univocal lessons on how to conceive the a priori and the categories, but they nonetheless lead us to pose in a fresh way basic problems relative to the necessity of the a priori and of the categories, and to the relation between the a priori and experience. Although traditional conceptions of the a priori have correctly pinpointed the two distinctive marks of the a priori, they mistook the necessity specific to the a priori and to the categories for that which we must accept willy-nilly and the independence from experience for the idea that the a priori is constitutive of the form of experience (Lewis 1929, 196, 232).10 The first mistake amounts to misunderstand the relation of the a priori to the mind: the necessity specific to the a priori is thought of as what imposes itself upon us and thus as what admits of no alternative. Lewis argues that two acceptations of the word “necessary” should be distinguished, whether the necessary is opposed to the contingent or to the voluntary (1923, 231; 1929, 196-197). The necessity specific to the a priori is to be opposed not to the voluntary as held by the traditional conceptions but to the contingent: the necessity specific to the a priori is not that of the non-voluntary but that of the non-contingent. This reconsideration of the necessity of the a priori and of the categories is aimed at supporting the idea that the a priori and the categories are not imposed upon us: The a priori represents the activity of the mind itself; it represents an attitude in some sense freely taken. . . . The necessity of the a priori is its character as legislative act. It represents a constraint imposed by the mind, not a constraint imposed upon the mind by something else. (1929,196-197) Lewis’s pragmatic reconception of the a priori and of the categories consists then first and foremost in a pragmatic reconception of the notion of the necessity specific to the a priori, tailored to fit and to elucidate the possibility actualized in the historical and anthropological phenomena in question - the existence and conceivability of alternative systems of a priori and categorial principles. 2. The Given and the Concept By considering that the a priori is that “which the mind must accept willy-nilly” (Lewis 1929, 196), the traditional conceptions of the a priori have unduly ascribed to the a priori features that are specific to the given.11 The main reason for this mistake is that they were not clear enough about the distinction between the given and the concept.12 So the articulation of Lewis’s pragmatic reconception of the notions of a priori, categories, and concepts requires to properly distinguish between the given and the concept. In virtue of the reflective and analytical method adopted in MWO,13 Lewis is in a position to distinguish between two logically independent moments in “the thick experience of every-day life” (Lewis 1929, 30) which “constitutes the datum for philosophical reflection” (Lewis 1929, 54): “the concept, which is the product of the activity of thought, and the sensuously given, which is independent of such activity” (1929, 37). Lewis’s understanding of the distinction between given and concept can be legitimately interpreted as a pragmatist reading of the Kantian idea that all experience requires the contribution from both sensations and concepts.14 In “the thick experience of every-day life,” sensations and concepts have distinct functions and are correlated, but we cannot experience either one apart from the other although in philosophical reflection we are able to distinguish them and recognize the necessity of both (54-55). Whereas qualia are the sensuous qualities of the given element in experience, that is, reidentifiable qualitative and non-conceptual aspects of our experience with respect to which we are relatively passive (60-62, 121-128), categories and concepts are identified by Lewis with our active contribution to our experience according to our interests, ends, and abilities (37, 48). Following Kant, Lewis endorses the rationalist idea that concepts and categories essentially contribute to knowledge as well as the empiricist idea that the senses essentially contribute to knowledge while avoiding the two symmetrical errors, that is, the idealist error consisting in reducing to nothing the contribution of what is not of our own making and the empiricist one consisting in claiming that the senses deliver us something of which we are aware independently of any concept.15 In line with Kant’s motto “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,”16 Lewis thus sees the distinction between the given and the concept as an essential ingredient in his treatment of the problem of the possibility of objectivity, that is the problem of the objective purport of our concepts: If there be no datum given to the mind, then knowledge must be contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must be true to. And if there be no interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous, the possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of becoming meaningless. (1929,39) Conceptualization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for empirical knowledge since, on its own, the activity of the mind is empty and arbitrary so long as it remains wholly unconstrained by what is not its own making. The given is that which is delivered up to the mind, which is unalterable by the mind, and which furnishes content to operate with so that it makes it possible to distinguish between “objectively valid” conceptual constructions and merely capricious ones (Lewis 1929, 39, 164). It has then been argued that “Lewis’s concept of sensibility is - at least in the first instance - not sensualistic but transcendental [for t]he supposed need to recognize the givenness of sense-qualities is generated by the project of accommodating the contentfulness of conceptual activity” (McDowell 2015, 648; see also Sachs 2014, Ch. 2). To discriminate Lewis’s concept of given at once from Roderick Firth’s foundationalist interpretation of it (Firth 1968; see Dayton 1995) and from Price’s Cartesian notion of given (Conant 2016, VIII) is thus an important conceptual and exegetical corollary of bringing Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism back to his Kantian roots. The Kantian idea that all experience as such involves a twofold contribution of the given and the concept is nevertheless modified in a radical way by Lewis. First, Lewis takes all concepts, and not simply those we usually call “categories,” to be criteria of reality or objecthood (Lewis 1929, 230—231) and attempts at making sense of that which is given to us in experience. In this respect, even though he holds that there is a dichotomy, thus a difference in nature, between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge, there is no difference in nature between concepts and categories but only a difference in degree of generality (1930a, 17), in contrast to Kant’s view in which there is a sharp contrast between categories and empirical concepts formed by abstraction. Second, the conceptual element in experience is not only theoretically but also practically and pragmatically oriented. Concepts and categories are “categorical ways of acting” with respect to what is given in experience and whose meaning and significance lie in their practical and empirical consequences. Third, “the pragmatic element in knowledge concerns the choice in application of conceptual modes of interpretation” (1929,272) of the given in the sense that such a choice is determined by criteria relative to the fulfillment of specifically human needs, interests, and ends. For Lewis, what both rationalism and empiricism as well as Kant have missed is ultimately the pragmatic element in knowledge, thus the pragmatic dimension of the a priori (1923, 239).17 3. C. I. Lewis and the Myth(s) of the Given It has been claimed that Lewis’s concept of the given would be intrinsically inappropriate for its role as it would prove to be the desperate attempt to satisfy two incompatible requirements, namely the requirement to be located within or close enough to the edge of the sphere of the conceptual - so as to enable it to accomplish its function of warranting the application of some of our concepts, while excluding that of others - and the requirement to exert its constraint on conceptual activity from outside the sphere of the conceptual - so as to retain its function of an “external” constraint. As a result, Lewis would be caught in a “transcendental bind” (McDowell 2015, 647) and the argument of MWO would threaten to “collapse into a distinctively Kantian variety of skeptical paradox - one which leaves us unable to make sense of ourselves as so much as in possession of a ‘world-view’.” (Conant 2012, 51; 2016, 91-93; Conant’s analyses are reformulations of McDowell’s owns in McDowell 2015). Whether or not Lewis succumbs to the version of the myth of the given just described, the fact remains that his Kantianism leads him to reject a different version of the myth of the given.18 The main tenet of this version is to argue for the existence and coherence of a sort of “intuitive knowledge” or “knowledge by acquaintance,” that is to say, a direct awareness of what is immediately given, unmediated by conceptual activity. Lewis’s way of distinguishing the given and the concept leaves no room for such a kind of knowledge.19 The given and the concept are logically independent moments of experience but not epistemologically and temporally independent ones (Lewis 1929, 54-55, 66), which means that, in cognitive experience, there is no such a thing as sense-data or qualia of which we are aware independently of any concepts and of which there could be knowledge. Against this myth, Lewis argues, first, that any empirical epistemic claim is intrinsically predictive of future possible experience in that it “runs beyond what is given and asserts a certain regularity or predictable interconnection between experiences” (319) and, consequently, it could not coincide with the sensuous given as it is immediate and momentaneous (37, 44, 118-119, 132-133); second, that “in immediacy, there is no separation of subject and object” (46),20 and thus no knowledge at all since knowledge entails a relation between a subject and an object; third, that to restrict oneself to the element of givenness in knowledge is anyway to render it impossible to account for the possibility of falsity and error and for the distinction between veridical perception and perceptual illusion (39, 42, 44-45, 132-133). 4. Lewis’s Pragmatic View on Concepts The three main reasons for rejecting the myth of an intuitive knowledge are all implied in Lewis’s interpretation of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce 1931-1958, vol. 5, 402)21 Lewis identifies a “turning-point in pragmatic theory” between two incompatible interpretations or applications of the maxim (Lewis 1970, 81; 1946, 200-202) whether the focus is on sensible effects only or on practical consequences. The first interpretation, that he rejects, seems to emphasize “the directly empirical,” that is to say, the given and results in “immediatism or the presentation-theory of knowledge” whose notion of a knowledge by acquaintance is but a version (1930b, 81).22 The predicament then to confront with is that to repudiate all transcendence is to confine reality to the given, to land in solipsism, and in a solipsism which annihilates both past and future, and removes the distinction between real and unreal, by removing all distinction of veridical and illusory. (1929, 183; see also 410) The alternative interpretation, endorsed by Lewis, emphasizes “the limitation of meaning to what makes a verifiable and objective difference” from the teleological and practical viewpoint of humans as active beings. Peirce’s canonical statement of the maxim was certainly not free from any equivocality in that he characterizes these “effects that might have practical bearings” as “effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses,” that is to say, “sensible effects of things” (1931-1958, vol. 5,401). Furthermore, his application of the maxim shows that he takes the pragmatic maxim to entail that there can be no difference in conceptions where there is no difference in the sensible effects that we suppose would obtain if one of those conceptions proved to be correct. Anticipating Lewis’s distinction between the two interpretations of the pragmatic maxim, Peirce was led to distance himself from this interpretation and with what he took as James’s own empiricist interpretation of pragmatism, anchored as it is in Peirce’s formulations, by clarifying the notion of sensible or/and practical effects: The meaning of a concept . . . lies in the manner in which it could conceivably modify purposive action, and in this alone. James, on the contrary, whose natural turn of mind is away from generals, and who is besides so soaked in ultra-sensationalist psychology that like modern psychologists he had almost lost the power of regarding matters from the logical point of view, in defining pragmatism, speaks of it as referring ideas to experiences, meaning evidently the sensational side of experience, while I regard concepts as affairs of habit or disposition, and of how we should react. Excerpt from a letter from Peirce to Christine Ladd-Franklin (undated), quoted in (Ladd-Franklin 1916, 718) The relation between meaning, experience, and action pinpointed by Peirce is at the heart of Lewis’s view of concepts: the objectivity and meaningfulness of a concept is indexed to a whole array of relevant counterfactual conditionals whose antecedents involve “our own purposes and attitudes” and whose consequents contribute to “conceivably modifying] purposive action” (Lewis 1929, 133-134). The concept of “sweet apple” is made explicit and elucidated through counterfactual conditionals: “when I interpret a certain round ruddy presentation as ‘sweet apple,’ I implicitly predict that if I should bite, then I should get a certain state” (136). The counterfactual relation asserted by such a conditional involves both a relation between a possible or an actual experience and future possible experiences, and a relation between my own ends and attitudes and future possible experiences (51). The application of a concept to a presentation of a quale23 is thus implicitly predictive of future possible experiences that would result from certain actions of my own. Crucial to this view is the role of action in that the predictions which make explicit the concept of the object involve “something we conceive could be made true by our mode of acting” (142). Even though “what eventuations of experience are genuinely possible, that is something independent of any purpose or attitude of mine” (193), there is no sense to the idea of a future possible experience without reference to our own active nature as involved in the “if” clause of relevant counter-factual conditionals (182). The nature of the conditional making explicit the content of the concept of the sweet apple before me is such that I could bite the apple “but perhaps I am not hungry now, so I merely file away this possibility for future reference. The ‘if’ clause of my prediction is allowed to remain contrary to fact” (136). For that reason, the application of a concept to a presentation is not required to be actually verified but only to be verifiable: “not only what we do verify is real for us, but all that could be” (1946, 21). This “Peircean” interpretation of the pragmatic maxim is consonant with the anti-psychologistic aspect of Lewis’s view on concepts (1929, Ch. 2 Sc 3). The individual mind or consciousness is not the source and guarantee of all meaning or, in other words, the objectivity of the concepts does not depend on any individual mind or consciousness. The logical notion of concept - the logical intension or connotation associated with a term - is therefore irreducible to the psychological one - the psychological state of mind associated with the use of a term. Concepts are “common, shareable and expressible meaning[s]” to be distinguished from the “adventitious” psychological representations individualistically associated with them (Frege’s “Vorstellungen”), and consisting in patterns of logical relations between concepts (79-83) in which “the immediate is precisely that element which must be left out” (1930b, 81): On a day which is terribly long to me and abominably short to you, we meet, by agreement, at three o’clock, and thus demonstrate that we have a world in common. An “hour” is not a feeling of tedium or vivacity, but sixty minutes, one round of the clock, a pattern of relations which we have established between chronometers and distances and rates of movement, and so on. (1929, 80-81) Lewis’s structural and relational view of concepts is consonant not only with his interpretation of the pragmatic maxim but also with his criticism of any notion of an intuitive knowledge.24 Indeed, on this relational structuralism of concepts, what can be shared and what underlies the possibility of communication is neither the given element correlated with a concept nor the idiosyncratic psychological representations associated with it. From the viewpoint of the application of the concept and its objectivity, it does not make any difference which psychological representations or qualia each individual associates or correlates with it: no commonality in terms of psychological representations or in terms of empirical immediacy is required for the commonality of concepts that accounts for the conceivability of communication. Anyway, it is cognitively meaningless to ascribe numerical identity conditions to qnalia or to psychological representations from one individual to another (1929, 73, 96, 109-110, 124). If the “correlation of concept and sense is intrinsically individual” (80), why then does the fact that “[f]or each individual there must be a correlation of concept with specific sense-quality” (80) not jeopardize the very possibility of communication? Lewis’s answer to this skeptical worry is that our meeting of minds only requires coincidence of a pattern of interrelated connotations, projected by and necessary to cooperative, purposeful behavior. . . . The significance of common conception is for community of action. Congruity of behavior is the ultimate practical test of common undertaking. (1929, 89-90; see also 112, 124-125)25 Our attunement in meaning shows forth in our agreement in judgments as involved in the general congruence of our modes of actions.26 Concepts are thus to be understood as shared meanings expressed in a common language and contributing to our common world. 5. The Problem of the A Priori The distinction between the given and the concept is a central ingredient in Lewis’s answer to the problem of how our thoughts can have an objective purport, that is, how they can be answerable to the world. If nothing were given, no concepts and categories could have an objective purport; if there were no concepts and no categories, there could not be any thought and knowledge at all. These reflections on the role of action in relation to the objectivity of concepts furthermore show that if there were no concepts and no categories, there could not even be any actions: “If I should be completely absorbed in the first given, as an infant might, then I should frame no concept, it would have no meaning, and no action, unless a merely instinctive one, would be evoked” (Lewis 1929, 119). Though Lewis’s distinction between the given and the concept is meant to provide central elements of response to the problem of the answerability of our thoughts to the world, the fact remains, however, that this very distinction apparently leads to another version of the problem. It is one of the main theses of MWO that “the pure concept and the content of the given are mutually independent [in that] neither limits the other” (1929,37):27 the given is “what remains unaltered, no matter what our interests, no matter how we think or conceive” (52) while categories, and more generally concepts, in no way “confine the content of experience” (x). In other words, that a priori principles are independent from experience does not imply that they are constitutive of the form of possible experience. The mutual independence of the given and the concept seems to result in what Lewis labeled “the problem of the a priori"-, “can conceptual order, which is of the mind, be imposed upon a content of experience which is independent and not yet given?” (196; see also 213 and 219). In other words, if the content of experience is not of our own making and cannot be anticipated, how could the application of categories and concepts to experience even be guaranteed? Conversely, how could the given be intelligible? One of Lewis’s main purposes in MWO is to argue that the problem of a priori is by no means a skeptical predicament. The essential ingredient of his response to this problem is contained in one of the three main theses of the book set out in the preface: “That experience in general is such as to be capable of conceptual interpretation, requires no peculiar and metaphysical assumption about the conformity of experience to the mind and its categories” (v, x). Indeed, “mind may limit reality (in the only sense which the validity of the categories requires) without thereby limiting experience” (215, 222). The application of categories and concepts to experience and, conversely, the intelligibility of experience do not require concepts and categories to limit the possible experience - according to the Kantian principle “[t]hat which can not validly be thought under the categories can not be given in intuition” (214) - but only that they be constitutive of what counts, in a context, as real or unreal with respect to a category or concept. No assumption about the conformity of experience to the categories and concepts is necessary for experience to be intelligible for “we can understand anything in one way or another” (219) in the sense that what is not interpreted as real under the heading of a concept or a category will be interpreted as real under the heading of another concept or category (215-219, 227-228, 263). The general applicability of the a priori and the categories to experience is in any case satisfied. A direct implication of Lewis’s argument that experience may be categorized in many ways without being limited is that no fixed, unique, and invariant categorial framework is required for the intelligibility of experience. While Lewis agrees with Kant that “if there is to be any knowledge at all, some knowledge must be a priori" (1929, 196), he rejects the “rationalist prejudice of an absolute human reason, universal to all men and to all time [that] has created an artificially exalted and impossible conception of the categories as fixed and unalterable modes of mind” (233). This dismissal of this aspect of the rationalist legacy paves the way for a pragmatic variety of pluralism whose two main characteristics are: the acknowledgment of the existence and conceivability of alternative a priori and categorial frameworks; the claim that “the selection of a categorial system or framework for [an application of any concept to experience] is pragmatically determined” (x). As Lewis W. Beck points out about MWO, “what was most distinctive in that book was the pragmatic origin of the variability of the categories” (1968, 274). 6. Pragmatism and Pluralism The opening lines of MWO trace conceptual pragmatism back to C. I. Lewis’s seminal works in logic: “The conceptions presented in this book have grown our of investigations which began in the field of exact logic and its application to mathematics” (1929, vii; 1930a, 4; see also Lewis 1968, 12-15; Murphey 2005, 45). Lewis’s investigations in logic constitute the matrix of his reflections on the conceivability and existence of alternative systems of a priori and categorial principles in the sense that as early as the 1910s he was led to observe and to point out that “there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms” (1929, 248). The standard two-valued systems of logic and the many-valued systems of logic rejecting the law of excluded-middle (1932, 400) are examples of such “alternative systems of logic.” Yet, Lewis was first and foremost thinking about Russell’s system of logic in the Prin-cipia Mathematica and his own systems of strict implication S1-S5 as they represent “equally self-consistent mathematical systems” (1914, 240-241): rhe notion of strict implication according to which p strictly implies q if and only if it is impossible that p and ~q was designed by Lewis as he was dissatisfied with the extensional truth-functional logic of Principia Mathematica and with its understanding of implication as material implication, according to which the truth of the conditional p => q is only a function of the truth or falsity of p and q. That all these systems of logic count as alternative systems of logic means that they “represent different determinations of the fundamental categories of deduction” (Lewis 1932, 400) and that “if one such system be taken as the canon of deduction then principles belonging to other systems must be abandoned as inapplicable, inexpressible, or nonsignificant” (400). From the conceivability and the existence of alternative systems of logic, Lewis draws three conclusions. First, the traditional understanding of logical laws is unsupported since logical laws are not “fixed and archetypal [and such that] they admit of no conceivable alternatives” (400; 1929, 211). Second, there is a de jure unlimited variety of alternative logical systems. Third, “the ultimate criteria of the laws of logic are pragmatic” (1929, 247; 1923, 232; 1946, 124). While the first two conclusions run counter to logical universalism,28 the third one constitutes Lewis’s answer to the problem that needs to be addressed from agreeing on the first two conclusions. That there are alternative systems of logic means that they are equally “self-consistent in their own terms”: from within a given system of logic, its principles, axioms, or laws are being implied by their own negations.29 “[SJuch necessity or self-affirmation” is a necessary condition for the reliability of a logical system and, hence, for establishing the truth of its principles, but it does not constitute a sufficient condition for logical truths (1929, 210; 1923, 232; 1930a, 11). The “test of self-criticism or circularity” is a “test of formal or methodological consistency” or a mark of logical necessity but not at all a test of truth - and a fortiori of necessary truth - or a procedure for proving (necessary) truth (1921,373-375; 1929,206-210; 1930a, 12). Lewis’s strategy is thus to deflate the significance of the reaffirmation through negation of logical principles, axioms, or laws: This signifies nothing more profound than the fact that deductions in logic are inevitably circular. In deducing our theorems of logic, we must make use of the very principles which the deduction is supposed to demonstrate. (1929, 207) That “a good logic must be circular” and even that “all logic and pseudologic is similarly circular” (1929, 209; see also 1921, 374) may be considered as Lewis’s acknowledgment of the kernel of truth in Sheffer’s logocentric predicament: “In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic” (Sheffer 1926, 228).30 If “logic” means “a logical system,” then Lewis is not immediately committed to the idea that such logocentrism entails a predicament. The reaffirmation through negation phenomenon holds only “because so long as we remain within our system of logic, we shall use the very principle in question in drawing inferences from the negation of it, and thus beg the question of its truth” (1929, 208; 1930a, 12).31 Since more than one logical system exhibits reaffirmation through negation of its principles or axioms, the reaffirmation procedure can no more be regarded as a criterion of the necessary truth of a unique and determinate set of logical principles, axioms, or laws. Nevertheless, because each logical system is “capable of being interpreted in such a way that all of its laws are true” (1932, 401), one cannot assert them all, since this would produce “not a canon, but a chaos” (419). There is no sense to the idea of a derivation of all systems of logic from a single and privileged set of logical axioms or laws. Once granted that “the reasons for the choice of our logical categories are not themselves reasons of logic” (1932, 412; see also 1921, 374 and 1930a, 11-12), the problem of the criterion of logical truth remains to be solved. Logical laws are the paradigmatic example of a priori truths or principles (1923, 231; 1929, 246). Lewis takes a priori principles to be ways of acting or attitudes taken by the mind with respect to what is given in experience. Even though “the a priori has its origin in an act of mind [and] has in some sense the character of fiat” (1929, 213), our “ways of acting” are not “arbitrary in the sense of being capriciously determined” (237), that is to say, in the sense of being gratuitous: [W]hile the a priori is dictated neither by what is presented in experience nor by any transcendent and eternal factor of human nature, it still answers to criteria of the general type which may be termed pragmatic. (1929,239) As a priori principles, logical laws are answerable to pragmatic criteria, namely to criteria related in various ways to the fulfillment of specifically human needs, interests, and ends (1923, 232-233; 1929, 247-248; 1930a, 4-6, 11; 1932, 401-402, 416). The reliability of a system of logical laws and its accuracy to our intentions - the fact that our logical system only does what we want, if not all what we want - thus depend on two conditions: an internal requisite of consistency or soundness and an external or extra-systematic requisite encapsulated in the pragmatic criterion. With the general attack launched by Lewis on the traditional conceptions of the a priori and the development of conceptual pragmatism in the early 1920s, what was in the first place a paradigmatic example of the existence and conceivability of alternative systems of a priori principles has then become a particular case exemplifying the distinctive variety of pluralism specific to Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism. To phrase it in Kantian terms, what initially holds of pure general logic eventually holds of transcendental logic. Alternative categorial frameworks give “rise to alternative descriptions of experience, which are equally objective and equally valid” (1929,271). Given the pragmatic and practical dimensions of the categorial principles, a choice between such alternative frameworks could only be made “consciously or unconsciously, on pragmatic grounds.” It is indeed part of the second main thesis of MWO to hold that “the choice of conceptual systems for [the application to experience] is instrumental or pragmatic” (1929, x). The very notion of a “pragmatic criterion” should not yet be understood in the light of a narrowly biological, utilitarian, or individualistic understanding of the notion of specifically human needs, interests, and purposes at stake: Certain important ends, such as intellectual consistency and economy, completeness of comprehension, and simplicity of interpretation, occupy a place so much higher, for the long-run satisfaction of our needs in general, that they rightfully take precedence over any purpose which is merely personal or transitory. (1929, 267; see also 239, 257)32 The aforementioned reflections are aimed at sketching the main tenets of C. I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and how it involves a pragmatic reconception of the notions of categories, a priori, and experience. Although the chapters collected in this book address various aspects of Lewis’s thought and occasionally diverge in their interpretation of it, they all attest to its historical significance and continued relevance. Accordingly, while this book as a whole does not pretend to do more than scratch the surface of Lewis’s legacy, it will have attained its primary aim if it has convinced the reader that this legacy is one that neither the historian of philosophy nor the contemporary philosopher can safely ignore. The contributions by Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh address Lewis’s criticisms of traditional conceptions of logic in light of his early pragmatism. The purpose of Juliet Floyd’s contribution, “Sheffer, Lewis, and the ‘Logocentric Predicament’” (Chapter 1) is to explore and characterize the significance and ramifications of the “logocentric predicament” in the philosophies of Henry Sheffer and C. I. Lewis, particularly in the context of their epistemologies in the 1910s and the early 1920s. By emphasizing their indebtedness to Huntington, Royce, and James, Floyd shows that logocentrism was central to Sheffer’s and Lewis’s inheritance of the pragmatist tradition, in which logic is taken to consist in the study of the most general types of order. Through a systematic comparison of Sheffer’s and Lewis’s dissertations (from 1908 and from 1910, respectively), Floyd is able to show that the logocentric predicament runs in various guises through Lewis’s entire early philosophy of logic. Both Lewis’s criticism of Royce’s “re-instatement through denial” criterion and the “heterodox” (that is to say, formalist) conception of mathematics that he devises in A Survey of Symbolic Logic (1918) are meant to acknowledge the importance of the phenomenon identified by Sheffer for an adequate understanding of logic, while avoiding any reduction of the predicament to an impossibility. Lewis’s “heterodox” conception of logistic is fruitfully contrasted with Sheffer’s own approach to logic as concerned with invariances of form under all permutations of a domain. By adverting to the context of the history of American logic and offering a fine-grained commentary of Lewis’s dissertation, Floyd sheds a new light on his pragmatic conception of logic. Sanford Shieh’s essay, “Strict Implication and the Pragmatic A Priori" (Chapter 2), directly echoes Floyd’s comments on Lewis’s relation to Royce’s absolute pragmatism. Shieh focuses on the intimate connection between two themes integral to Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism, his rehabilitation of modality through his devising of strict implication and his pragmatism. This connection is exemplified in Lewis’s discussions of Russell’s views on implication and logical consequence as well as in his criticism of Josiah Royce’s ‘“absolute pragmatism.” After surveying Russell’s views on material implication, Shieh sets out to dismantle a widespread interpretation of Lewis’s modal logic of strict implication, according to which it is meant to accord with our ordinary “intuitions” about logical consequence. Against the standard narrative, which holds that Lewis conceives the reliability of a logical system as a function of its ability to capture such intuitions, Shieh forcefully argues that the issue at stake in the dispute between Lewis and Russell over implication has to do with a practical and pragmatic dimension of logic. The issue is that of the extent to which the logical principles underlying implication are “useful” to our inferential practices. Insofar as logical principles play an indispensable role in our inferential practices, they enjoy an epistemic and practical priority that cannot be made intelligible except by reinstating modality at the heart of logic. Shieh argues that from this early position Lewis could not advance to a fully pragmatic conception of the a priori without articulating a response to Royce’s doctrine of absolute, non-pragmatic, logical principles as identifiable by the fact that they are “re-instated” through denial. It was only after the publication of A Survey of Symbolic Logic that Lewis was able to demonstrate that Royce’s “re-instatement through denial” criterion was satisfied, not by a unique and privileged logical system, but by all logical systems. The primary goal of Henri Wagner’s chapter (Chapter 3) is to expose and recover the main aims and claims of C. I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism in M WO. Two problems are at the center of Lewis’s masterpiece: the Kantian problem of the applicability of the a priori to experience -the problem to which the transcendental deduction is allegedly supposed to answer - and the Humean problem of the validity of empirical knowledge - the “old” problem of induction. Wagner maintains that these two problems are two variants of the problem of the “world order.” They both are shown by Lewis to be wrongheaded for they rely on the presupposition that an absolute lack of world order - whether it be a systematic disharmony at the level of the relation between categories and experience or a systematic disharmony at the level of the empirical uniformity of nature - would be intelligible. As Wagner argues, a close examination of Lewis’s treatment of these two problems and of their classical answers proves to be one of the most fruitful approaches to his distinctive sort of pragmatism. Two of his major philosophical contributions are indeed at work in his treatment of the problem of the world order: the pragmatic reconception of the a priori and of its two intrinsic features - necessity and independence from experience - and the distinctive variety of pluralism integral to his conceptual pragmatism. Arata Hamawaki’s chapter, “C. I. Lewis on the Intersubjective and the Constitution of Objectivity” (Chapter 4), maintains that Lewis’s solution to the Kantian problem of objectivity, the problem of what makes it possible so much as to make a claim about the world at all, is marred by a fundamental inconsistency. While Lewis must be credited with a crucial insight into the resolution of this problem, his analysis of the concept of experience proves unfaithful to this insight. Lewis’s deep insight, according to Hamawaki, is that the capacity for judgment, insofar as it is intrinsically (because self-consciously) normative, is also essentially intersubjective. In judging, I am conscious of myself as judging that things are the way that they must be judged to be, and so conscious of myself as judging in the way that anybody must judge. Thus, I am necessarily conscious of myself as exercising a shared capacity. Lewis’s account of concepts reflects this insight. To possess the concept of Grizzly Bear is not to have the ability to summon a certain private representation before one’s mind. Rather, to possess such a concept is to master the public meaning of the expression “Grizzly Bear,” which in turn is a matter of having the ability to employ it in judgments like “Grizzly Bears hibernate in winter,” the selfsame ability that anybody must have if they are to possess this concept. In short, “what constitutes an individual mind as a unified thinker is what unites individual minds.” However, Hamawaki contends, Lewis’s analysis of experience as a mix of two ingredients isolable by thought - an immediately given delivered by the senses and a conceptual interpretation cast on it by the mind - runs afoul of his deep insight. Each of the two elements gives rise to an intractable difficulty. First, it is hard to see how the immediately given could so much as contribute to verifying our judgments, given that it is essentially unshareable. Second, and even more fundamental, the interpretation of the given by the mind, however shareable, is subjective in yet another sense: it is brought to the world by the mind. This flies in the face of the intrinsic normativity of judgment. In Hamawaki’s terms, “it is incoherent for me to treat my act of judgment as something that I merely ‘bring to my experience’.” It follows from this that “what verifies a judgment... cannot lie outside of the act of judgment itself.” The contributions by James O’Shea (Chapter 5), Thomas Land (Chapter 6), and Quentin Kammer (Chapter 7) highlight both the strengths and the limitations of Lewis’s conception of the given. In his chapter, “Relocating the Myth of the Given in Lewis and Sellars,” J. O’Shea argues that Lewis’s account of the given is to be seen as an instance of Sellars’s Myth of the Given on the condition that one be aware of the variety of forms that the Myth can take. If the Myth of the Given is limited to the idea that the given independently provides knowledge of a non-inferential sort, then Lewis’s account does not succumb to the Myth. Since for Lewis all knowledge is predictive, that is, entails a projection beyond what is given, or else a priori, that is, independent of what is given, the given element in knowledge does not constitute knowledge at all. Lewis insists, against Russell, that it is a mistake to confuse the qnalia given to us with conceptual properties of objects, insofar as our recognition of the former is not a matter of knowledge, whereas our grasp of the latter is. However, from the non-epistemic and non-foundational status of the given as conceived by Lewis, one must not conclude that his conception is immune to all of Sellars’s criticisms. Rather, the Myth must be located elsewhere. O’Shea extracts a more fundamental variety of the Myth, which he calls “Myth of the Categorial Given,” from Sellars’s later writings. It consists in the idea that some sensory items are presented as being of such and such a sort independently of any conceptualization. This is precisely what Lewis claims for the recognition of qualia. He holds the identification of their repetition to be independent of any conceptual activity. Not only does Lewis’s account of the given succumb to the Myth, but his conception of the repeatable character of qualia is paradigmatic of it. The chapter by Thomas Land, “Spontaneity, Sensation, and the Myth of the Given,” provides a clarification of the Sellarsian notion of the “Myth of the Given” in the form of a penetrating defense of McDowell’s account of this notion against some criticisms recently put forward by Eric Watkins. Insofar as the conception of the given that Watkins propounds on the basis of his alleged alternative account of the Myth closely resembles Lewis’s, the essay also reads as a vindication of McDowell’s diagnosis that a conception along the lines of Lewis’s fails to avoid the Myth, on a correct understanding of it. The philosophical pitfail that Sellars designates as the “Myth of the Given” is the temptation to suppose that it is possible to crossbreed two ideas: the idea of a mental state or episode that does not involve the conceptual apparatus required to place something within “the logical space of reasons,” and the idea of a non-inferential knowing that such-and-such is the case (see Sellars 1956, §7). On this supposition, a mental state or episode can be merely natural - in other words, it can fail to be intentional, that is, concept-involving - yet count as knowledge. According to McDowell, the core of the Myth lies in the idea that the logical space of reasons must extend more widely than the conceptual sphere if thought is to be constrained by reality (see McDowell 1994, Lecture I). Watkins reads Sellars differently. He takes Sellars’s “Myth of the Given” to consist in the idea that a non-conceptual mental state or episode can yield knowledge by itself. This means that sensations can play a role in the justification of beliefs without themselves belonging to the logical space of reasons as long as their contribution to such justification is only notionally separable from that of the intellect. The gist of Land’s criticism of Watkins is that his Lewisian proposal is unable to do justice to the sense in which the capacity to think is “spontaneous,” that is to say, “self-determining.” For the capacity to think to be self-determining is for it to be responsive to reasons as such. In turn, to respond to reasons as such, a creature must be able to stand back from a purported reason and reflect on its cogency - to ask herself, for instance, whether a perceptual experience she is enjoying is to be taken at facevalue - even if one many, perhaps most, occasions she does not exercise this ability. Insofar as the given cannot meet such a requirement unless it is pregnant with generality, a conception along the lines of Lewis’s is faced with a dilemma. Either the generality displayed by the given accrues to it off its own bat, or the given owes it to some concept under which it is apprehended. In the latter case, the given does not constrain conceptual activity from outside the logical space of reasons after all, contrary to the hypothesis. In the former case, the given is mythically construed, on Watkins’s own preferred understanding of the Myth of the Given. This Introduction 19 diagnosis is evidently congenial to Hamawaki’s, although they arrive at them through different routes. Quentin Kammer’s contribution, “Goodman and the Given: What Goodman Inherits From C. I. Lewis,” resonates with J. O’Shea’s and Thomas Land’s efforts to clarify the nature of the Myth of the Given that Lewis adheres to. Kammer argues that Nelson Goodman’s criticisms of the indubitability ascribed by Lewis to the recognition of the given are internal, in the sense that they are ultimately rooted in pragmatist theses that Goodman owes to Lewis himself. According to Kammer, Goodman’s rejection of the notion of the indubitability of the given can be traced to Lewis’s enterprise of delineating the necessary conditions for knowledge and to his account of the distinction between appearance and reality. Our knowledge of the properties that we attribute to objects is a matter of our predicting their future appearances. The distinction between appearance and reality thus lies within experience. Not only our discourse about properties of objects must fit our statements about what is given, but also, conversely, and pace Lewis, our reports of experiences must fit the remaining part of our knowledge. The indubitability of the latter is unnecessary to account for knowledge as we possess it. As for Goodman’s rejection of the notion of the given as such, Kammer shows that it can be traced to Lewis’s dissolution of the problem of order. Goodman’s treatment of the “New Riddle of Induction” dwells on this dissolution. Since, as shown by Lewis, experience cannot fail to be ordered come what may, the traditional task of securing our inductions in the face of the specter of a possible chaos turns out to be an empty problem. The true question is how we can know which regularities count as belonging to the world order (i.e., whether it is those involving “green” or those involving “grue”). Kammer maintains that the “New Riddle” extends to Lewis-ian qualia and their repeatable character. Far from being purely given, appearances are no less a function of the concepts frequently projected onto experience than are objective properties. Thus, on Goodman’s reading, we must relinquish Lewis’s notion of a pure given, whose recognition is unmistakable, on behalf of Lewis’s own most profound pragmatist insights. While Thomas Baldwin also engages with Lewis’s account of the given in his chapter, “C. I. Lewis: The Red and the Good,” he does so with a different aim, namely that of presenting a critical overview of Lewis’s conception of value, a conception that has received scant attention to date. Baldwin underscores the originality of Lewis’s conception: in claiming that the ascription of value is empirical in nature while rejecting Ayer’s emotivism on the ground that it dissolves value in psychology, Lewis puts forward a form of ethical theory that is unique to the twentieth century. Baldwin’s reading follows Lewis’s own account of the genesis of his ethical work and the structure of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lewis 1946). In the course of developing his ethical theory, Lewis felt the need to improve on his epistemological conceptions. Accordingly, he presented his ethics in the last part of the 1946 book, after amending his theory of knowledge. Baldwin rehearses the aspects of Lewis’s epistemology that are especially relevant for understanding the key features of Lewis’s theory of value. One point of comparison plays a pivotal role. Somewhat in the way that the ascription of physical properties to objects admits a touchstone in the unmistakable presentation of their appearances to us, the ascription of objective values to objects is derivative from the intrinsic value of immediate value experiences. There is a crucial difference, however. 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