Spontaneity, Sensation, and the Myth of the Given
Thomas Land
In Mind and the World Order (hereafter MWO), C. I. Lewis famously draws a distinction between two basic elements in empirical thought and knowledge: “the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of thought” (Lewis 1929,38). He goes on to argue that almost all philosophers are committed to this basic distinction, even those, such as hard-core idealists, who appear to deny it. Surely, he is right: there is a “given element” in experience, contributed by the senses, and there is the contribution made by the activity of thought. These are not identical. Problems arise, however, as soon as one attempts to articulate what this distinction comes to.
In his classic 1956 essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (hereafter EPM), Wilfrid Sellars articulates a desideratum on any philosophical theory that does: it must avoid what he calls the Myth of the Given. That is, it must avoid conceiving of the given element in empirical thought in a way that makes its existence a myth, not a reality. In Sellars’s view, Lewis’s own conception of the given element is an instance of the Myth of the Given (see Sellars 1981, 20). Although Sellars agrees with Lewis on the need to distinguish the two basic elements, he rejects Lewis’s way of articulating the distinction.
Many philosophers working today accept Sellars’s desideratum. They hold that the Myth of the Given really is a myth and needs to be avoided. It is, however, far from clear exactly what the Myth consists in and, consequently, what it takes to avoid it. As a consequence, some philosophers who take themselves to be steering well clear of the Myth are seen by others as falling victim to it. Thus, John McDowell, whose work on perception arguably constitutes the most sustained recent discussion of the Myth, accuses both Sellars and such contemporary theorists as Bill Brewer and Charles Travis of falling victim to the Myth.1 It is an important task, therefore, to clarify exactly what the Myth of the Given is. In this chapter, my aim is to contribute to this project.2
To do so, I will focus on a recent discussion of the Myth by Eric Watkins, which is instructive for two reasons. First, Watkins distinguishes
Spontaneity, Sensation, Myth of the Given 217 two different conceptions of the Myth and argues that one of these is preferable to the other. Considering this distinction as well as the reasons Watkins offers for his preference help clarify exactly what it is that allegedly makes certain conceptions of the given mythical. Second, Watkins offers a theory of the given, and this theory bears a striking resemblance to Lewis’s account of the given.3 We may expect, therefore, that discussing Watkins’s theory will shed light on Lewis’s account. I shall argue that, although Watkins’s theory is intended to avoid the Myth of the Given, it in fact fails to do so. Furthermore, I shall argue that Lewis’s account also fails to avoid the Myth, and for basically the same reason.
Watkins attributes the two conceptions of the Myth that he distinguishes to Sellars and McDowell, respectively, and argues that the former is superior to the latter, in part because, according to Watkins, McDowell overlooks the availability of the position he himself develops.4 Watkins argues that this position can be found in Kant. While this may or may not be accurate as an exegetical claim - a matter I will not address in this paper - it is noteworthy that a version of the position can be found in Lewis.51 will argue, however, that the position Watkins recommends is based on a mistaken view of the nature of thought and that, therefore, his objection to McDowell misfires. Watkins does not accept the full implications of the idea, which he endorses, that thought operates in “the logical space of reasons.” In particular, he fails fully to appreciate what it takes for thought to be responsive to reasons supplied by the “given element,” and in doing so precisely mirrors a fatal shortcoming in Lewis’s position.
I begin by presenting the two different accounts of what the Myth of the Given consists in that Watkins attributes to McDowell and Sellars (Section 1). This sets the stage for considering his objections to McDowell’s account and sketching his reading of Kant - in other words, sketching his Lewisian proposal for avoiding the Myth (Section 2). I then argue that Watkins’s proposal falls afoul of the requirement that a thinker be able to regard what is given to thought by the senses as a reason for belief and therefore fails to do justice to the idea that thought operates in “the logical space of reasons”; that it is, in Kant’s words, spontaneous.6 I do this in two stages: in Section 3 I spell out what I take to be the implications of the claim that thought is spontaneous. In Section 4 I argue that, once these implications are spelled out, it becomes clear that Watkins’s Kantian proposal does not work because what he casts as the “given element in experience” cannot play the justificatory role he assigns to it. I conclude (in Section 5) that the Myth of the Given is best captured by a modified version of the characterization Watkins attributes to McDowell. Along the way - most extensively in Sections 2 and 4 - I bring out the similarities between Watkins and Lewis.
