Differences between Habermas and Taylor
Briefly, then, the differences between Habermas and Taylor involve the intersubjective and objective role that is performed by language; that is, it involves understanding how conversation, discourse and language cultivate the possibilities for a good life (Taylor, & Habermas, 2009). Taylor’s political strategy is cultivated within a civilising society that is committed to moral progress and development (Taylor, 1991d). Intriguingly, their very different proposals are based on the work of Herder and Humboldt even though they project different solutions and proposals. As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this chapter, Habermas maintains that language offers a unique opportunity to construct a decision model where differences can be solved once and for all by setting and applying a rule in the discourse arena (Habermas, 1991a). Here, the purpose of Habermas’s model is to assess communication that is incompatible with rhe good or better life. Habermas sets a procedural test that substantive claims must pass in order to be normatively valid. This test consists in universal rules of discourse -reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to presuppose counter-claims, non-coercion/ These reflect the legitimate procedural constraints that we are entitled to make, that indicate the basis for rational agreement regarding the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and of assertoric statements. Taylor (1991c), however, responds with the argument that language discloses new worlds through an ongoing conversation of humanity and opens up new attitudes towards the other.
For his part, Taylor (Taylor & Habermas 2009) believes that Habermas ignores the nexus between the structure and practice of language and thereby seriously under-theorises the background contexts and nuances which shape people’s very being in the world: where the nuances of culture and the life-world impact on the formation of a language. Habermas responds and maintains that:
Of course Humboldt is not an empiricist trying to pull the rug out from under the feet of the process of reaching understanding and hold the identity of linguistic meanings to emanate from the randomly iterated intentions - constantly superseding each other - of single, isolated speakers. For him, the intersubjectivity of a common perspective does not dissolve, for example, into a series of isolated I-perspectives which are merely reflected in one another; rather, it arises at the same time; and from the same source as intersubjective validity of semantically identical linguistic expressions and is of equal origin (gleich-ursprunglich).
(Habermas, 1991a, pp. 216-217)
Habermas (2009) argues that Taylor’s Hegelian focus is on the ‘we’ perspective implicit in language, which leads to the socialisation of individuals within practices that abrogate personal rights. Habermas argues that this focus leads Taylor to support claims concerning cultural ‘survivance’ at the expense of individual rights. Habermas explains:
The ecological perspective on species preservation cannot be transferred to cultures. Cultural heritages and the forms of life articulated in them normally reproduce themselves by convincing those whose personal structures they shape, that is, by motivating them to appropriate productively and continue the traditions. The constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the cultural reproduction of the life-worlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage. When a culture has become reflexive, the only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their members while at the same time subjecting themselves to critical examination and leaving later generations the option of learning from other traditions or converting and setting out for other shores.
(Habermas, 1994, pp. 130-131)
For Habermas, it is the search for universal principles in the chaotic and ultimately indeterminate universe, which must be the focus of politics. As noted earlier, Habermas develops a procedure in which substantive claims must pass to be normatively valid. This test consists of universal rules of discourse - reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to presuppose counter-claims, and non-coercions (Habermas, 1993).6 These reflect the legitimate procedural constraints that citizens are entitled to make, which indicate the basis for rational agreement regarding the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and that of other assertoric statements.
One difficulty that researchers may encounter is how Laughlin’s ISS work combines with middle-range thinking. This involves examining the extent to which middle-range research reveals the social forces that operate in organizational and synchronic social space. These forces involve how power and influence can alter the political structures implicit in the ideal speech situation (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Lehman, 2002, 2017).
