Mysticism and Deep Ecology

Social ecologist Murray Bookchin rejects Deep Ecology because of that mysticism, apparent in the concept of intrinsic value. As noted in Chapter 11, Bookchin’s argument about ‘biocentrism’, ‘intrinsic worth’, and ‘biocentric democracy’ was seen to be ‘the deplorable verbiage of mystical deep ecology’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 34). As though human beings were equitable in terms of their ‘worth’ to, say, mosquitoes - and then ask human beings to bear a moral responsibility to the world of life - ‘is to downgrade the entire project of a meaningful ecological ethics’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 34).

Bookchin (1991, 1995) claims that intrinsic value is such a nebulous concept that it cannot be implemented successfully, and that deep ecology is

Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation 209 a doctrine urgently in need of pragmatic political recommendations. He claims that Deep Ecologists emphasise intrinsic value, but that the value that they emphasise is really just a reflection of their own personal subjective motivations. Interestingly, Naess (1989) has emphasised his own deep feeling of identification with Nature and the caring of other life-forms to a sense of estrangement from humans. He notes:

For thousands of years, and in various cultures, mountains have been venerated for their equanimity, greatness, aloofness, and majesty. The process of identification is the prerequisite for feeling the lack of greatness.

(Naess, 1989, p. 172; quoted in Taylor, 2001, p. 181)

Naess eventually named his personal philosophy ‘ecosophy T’ after his mountain hut which inspires many of his writings on the environment. Ecosophy was a shorthand word for environmental philosophy. His personal subjectivism is evident in his claim that:

Green philosophy or the philosophy of the deep ecology movement is largely an articulation of the implicit philosophy of 5 year old children who have access to at least a minimum of animals, plants, and natural places. These children experience animals as beings like themselves in basic respects. They have joys and sorrows, interests, needs, loves and hates. Even flowers in places are alive to them, thriving or having a bad time. The personal identity of the small child has environmental factors. They are a part of himself or herself, the personal, social and natural self being one and indivisible. Philosophers of the deep ecology movements have never found arguments to undermine those attitudes implicit in childhood.

(Naess, 1984b, p. 180; quoted in Taylor, 2001, p. 181)

Naess’s ideas can be implemented through the creation of a more substantive moral framework that promotes respect for environmental values, local values and depth experiences to inspire a contextualised form of accountability - one that is broad enough to critique globalisation and the internationalisation of neoliberal free-market ideology. Conceptions of human agency that underpin this imaginary of accountability and globalisation must be challenged to overcome what Part I of this book referred to as neoliberalism. It will be recalled that neoliberalism excessively relies on instrumental reasoning. Obviously, instrumental reasoning is the type of reasoning as utilised by economic technocrats to arrive at maximal outputs at minimal costs. In such a view, capitalism is obviously condemned.

This is to be achieved through a discussion of Nature’s meaning and fullness as these ideals affect issues of culture, environment, and identity. The point made is that governance and accountability frameworks must address the neoliberal profession’s inattention to these experiences of Nature, time, causality, duration, and freedom, and that moral sourcesshould inform and shape humanity. Is it a valid concern? What is the role it plays? Are the critics correct?