The Nigerian Military and Political Apparatus

To counter Boko Haram’s terrorist insurgence, the Nigerian government employs the might of its military. At various periods in the fight, the Nigerian military has been aided by the Nigerian Police Force and other national security agencies in a collaborative operational outfit known as the Joint Task Force (JTF). The JTF has also been assisted by the African Union instituted Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising troops from Niger, Benin, Chad and Nigeria. The Nigerian government and its military adopted social media for diversified purposes and in distinct contexts within the framework of counter-terrorism measures against

Boko Haram. More often than not, both the government and the security agents align their positions and postures especially regarding information disseminated on social media. Consequently, in the context of Boko Haram, the Nigerian government and its security apparatus are one and the same in the eyes of the Nigerian populace. Social media dynamics for the military have ranged from being used as an information/propaganda avenue, to being employed by disgruntled elements as a tool to channel grievances.

Information/Propaganda Sharing: The headquarters of the Nigerian army has both a Facebook and a Twitter Handle (@H QNigerianAr my) with about 570,000 followers. Among other news, these accounts are designed to chronicle the military’s counter-insurgency operations such as pictures of insurgents killed and captured, triumphant overruns of insurgent bases, recovery of arms and ammunitions, rescue operations for women and children and so on. These handles rarely share news about military losses or fatalities suffered in counter-insurgency operations. Accounts rendered from the handles present the Nigerian military and its apparatuses as “on-top” of the insurgency even though the concrete insecurity situation in areas affected by Boko Haram belie these assertions. Although legacy media outfits quote press releases from the army’s social media accounts for official documentation, many analysts do not rely on the military’s “one-sided”, “consistently winning” renditions of events on the ground. The army’s culture of classifying relevant information has further made it impossible to verify the veracity of information shared on these social media handles. The fact that the Nigerian government substantially re-echoes the army’s version of events especially in regard to casualty numbers on the side of the army has cast further aspersions on the use of information garnered from the army’s social media platforms.

Channelling of Grievances: Quite unexpectedly, and also through social media, the populace was gifted with information which the army would rather not share. Soldiers and army officers have taken to their Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts to send picture and video records of their counter-insurgency experiences to their families, friends and social media followers. From these records, evidence emerges of an acute lack of effective weaponry to combat Boko Haram, lack of adequate welfare for soldiers on the battle front, low-morale in troops due to non-payment of salaries, entitlement and allowances, non-granting of leave and unending deployment to conflict areas, maltreatment by senior military officers who were directly and indirectly accused of corruption, nepotism, funds diversion and collusion with insurgents. The rumblings in security ranks have resulted in soldiers mutinying against superiors (July 2014, 2017 and December 2018). Some of these mutinies and revolts were also captured and posted on social media by the soldiers or their family/friends. Also, the death of a soldier or an officer on the battlefront becomes known to family members and the public almost immediately it occurs because military colleagues usually take to their social media accounts to “mourn their fallen comrade” with eulogies and grieving words. Most times, such eulogising posts become public well before the Nigerian military acknowledges attacks in which the death occurs or officially sends a writ to notify the family of the dead.

The use of social media by “rogue soldiers” became such a thorn in the military’s flesh that in August 2018, the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff issued a statement to warn service personnel that using social media to share classified information, to air complaints, or to share “gory pictures” is “unfortunate”, “unprofessional” and embarrassing to the Army (Maina 2017).

The Army further claimed that the wrong use of social media by soldiers had exposed some of its operations to the insurgents and put the lives of troops in danger (Kilctc 2018). Although many observers applaud the alternative measures used by soldiers to bring their situation to the front-burners of national discourse, there are also fears that making such matters public through social media exposes weaknesses which insurgents could (and have) capitalise on. This does not however justify' the inactions of the Nigerian government and military service chiefs in the provision of better equipment and welfare for troops.

The citizenry

Influencers and Opinion Shapers: The democratising potential and accessibility' of social media presents it as a crucial apparatus adopted and mechanised to suit diverse uses in the hands of the Nigerian populace. Before its advent, legacy media (newspapers, radio and television) were the gate-keepers of information which meant that information was circulated with all the inherent filters and restrictions accompanying media outfits. With social media, such limitations are close to non-existent as long as the advisories of tech companies (which are less stringent) are abided by. Thus, with a Twitter, Facebook or Instagram account, eye-witness accounts of terrorist acts and aftermaths of terrorist attacks are shared generating “trending” conversations. A tweet can make the tweeter “popular” in seconds with thousands of retweets, likes and engaging comments. The “attention economy” as the back-bone of social media fuels the popularity' of social media “influencers” who have operationally crafted social media to become opinion shapers, and whose positions continue to influence the dynamics of Boko Haram in Nigeria. One such opinion shaper is Ahmed Salkida. He is the only journalist known to have had direct contact with Muhammad Yusuf and Boko Haram. His Twitter feeds contain regular updates with “insider” information about Boko Haram attacks and activities. Salkida had also shared the proof of life video for the abducted Chibok girls.

Eyewitness accounts of terrorist activities and insider information shared on social media by both users and influencers have become so influential that legacy media contemporarily look to social media for breaking news. They help to bridge the information gap especially on the activities of terrorists and keep the public not only updated but also alert (Ette and Joe 2018). Both also help to verify information shared by both the military and the government.

Citizen’s Use of Hashtag Activism: The Nigerian populace has also adopted the social media “hashtag” as a digital activism vanguard for participation, persuasion and pressure. In the context of the ongoing Boko Haram terrorist insur- gence, hashtag activism, especially on Twitter and Facebook, has been adopted by the populace to pressurise the Nigerian government to act (for example using #BringBackOurGirls and the #DapchiGirls to call for the release of the abducted Chibok and Dapchi girls). The #BringBackOurGirls campaign garnered 3.3 million tweets, with celebrities such as Michelle Obama also tweeting to support the cause. It also helped put pressure on the government to focus on ensuring accountability, making sure that all the girls abducted by Boko Haram are safely rescued and reunited with their families (Sadighi 2017).

Hashtag activism is also used to refute and counter the claims of security agents. In the case of Boko Haram’s attack on the army base in Metcle, Borno state, on November 18, 2018, the army did not put out an official report immediately after the attack, and when they did, casualty figures on its side were grossly under-reported. A video surfaced afterwards on social media which revealed the horrendous overrun of the military base with bodies of dead troops. The voices in the background (believed to be soldiers who escaped the attack) estimated the dead to be over 100. The hashtag #Metele began to trend immediately refuting earlier figures shared by the military. The army issued a statement five days later in damage control but its inability to give specific responses on aspects of the attack only served to further discredit its claims.

Citizens Redirecting Boko Haram Conversations: Because it opens the door to more direct and effective communication between Nigerians and their government, social media is considered to be a form of citizen’s participation in security operations (ibid). It has been used by Nigerians to redirect the conversation on certain aspects of the Boko Haram conflict. An example is the ongoing Twitter campaign about Leah Sharibu. She was the only girl not released by insurgents following the Dapchi abductions in February 2018 because she refused to renounce her Christian faith. Every May 16 (Leah’s birthday) since her kidnap, social media users put up her pictures on their handles to keep her abduction on the front burner of political discourse and pressure the Nigerian government into securing her release. Social media has also been used to redirect the conversation on Boko Haram to human rights abuses and extra judicial killings committed by the Nigerian military. Video footage of the killings, beatings and maiming perpetrated by security forces against suspected Boko Haram extremists became widespread on social networks. Amnesty International has also published a report which is a collection from eyewitnesses and likely perpetrators, captured mainly on cell phones and shared between individuals or on social media (Koettl 2015). In the Boko Haram context thus, the citizenry are no longer docile but have assumed the role of game changers (ibid), revolutionising fact-finding and opening up new horizons for discourses on Boko Haram’s terrorist insurgence.