Application to dispute the jurisdiction of the court: CPR rule 11(1)(a)

The application for relief must be made within 14 or 28 days, as the case may be, of filing an acknowledgment of service. The actual period for filing the acknowledgment, however, varies according to how and where the claim form and particulars of claim were served. A defendant who waits until the last moment to file the acknowledgment of service maximises the time period for making the application to dispute the jurisdiction.

The point of departure is the date of service of the particulars of claim. If service was made in England, the period for filing the acknowledgment of service is 14 days from the service of the particulars of claim. If service out of the jurisdiction was made in a case in which the permission of the court was not required, the period allowed for acknowledging service depends on where service was made. If service was made in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the period is 21 days. If service was made in a Lugano Convention territory within Europe, the period is 21 days. If service was made in a Lugano Convention territory outside Europe, the period is 31 days. If the

DISPUTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ENGLISH COURT defendant was served elsewhere, the period for acknowledgment of service is specified by a Table set out in Practice Direction 6B.^[1]

If service was made in a case in which permission was sought and obtained under CPR rule 6.36, permitting the service of the claim form out of the jurisdiction, the order granting permission must itself specify the period for filing an acknowledgment of service. This is set in accordance with the Table in Practice Direction 6B, which states the number of days by reference to the country in which service was made: the tabular number of days is counted from the date of service of the particulars of claim, whether served with or after the claim form.

As said above, a defendant who wishes to dispute the jurisdiction must do so within 14 (or in the Commercial Court, 28) days of acknowledging service, or must apply within that period for an extension of time if one is needed, to make an application disputing the jurisdiction. If no application is made before time runs out, the court still has discretion to allow the application to be made, out of time; but if the defendant has allowed time to run and has done nothing to suggest that he intends to dispute the jurisdiction, he runs the severe risk of being told that he appears to have abandoned the objection and that it is now too late in every sense. A defendant who applies for an extension of time for filing a defence is also at risk of being held to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, for the observant bystander may well read this as a step towards filing a defence on the merits of the claim, not as a challenge to the jurisdiction.

• [1] CPR r. 6.35(4). 2 CPR r. 6.37(5). 3 The actual periods for acknowledging service as set out in this Table are completely absorbing: the insight which gave rise to them is a complete mystery. A defendant served in the dreadful chaos of Iraq or Somalia has 22 days, in Yemen, 30 days, but if served in the sleepy comfort of Bermuda, 31 days, to acknowledge service. A defendant has 25 days if served in Australia, exactly the same as if he is served in Timbuktu (Mali). He has 50 days if served in the Cook Islands, but 31 days if on Tristan da Cunha; 24 days if served in China (a day less if served in Taiwan), but 31 days in Hong Kong or Macau, though 34 if served in Tibet. The 24 days allowed if served in South Korea are extended by four days if service is made north of the DMZ. The 22 days allowed if served in Singapore are reduced by one if service is made in Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. Though a defendant is allowed 31 days if served in Gibraltar, only 22 days are allowed if served in Paraguay or darkest Peru, and a truly punishing 21 days if process is served in the icy wasteland of the South Shetland Islands, part of the British Antarctic Territory, which itself contrasts oddly with the 31 days allowed to a defendant served in South Georgia, or in the Hispanic Mediterranean exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. That this magnificent curiosity should have survived, untouched by modern political geography, is oddly comforting. 4 Under CPR r. 3. l(2)(a), unless this can be agreed to by the claimant within the limited scope of CPR r. 3.8(3), (4). 5 Sawyer v Atari Interactive Inc [2005] EWHC 2351 (Ch), [2006] ILPr 129; CNA Insurance Co Ltd v Office Depot International [2005] EWHC 456 (Comm), [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 658. For consideration of the strictness or otherwise of these limits, see Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023, [18] [20]; cf SET Select Energy GmbH v F&M Bunkering Lirf[2014] EWHC 192 (Comm), [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 652. 6 It is a matter of the objective appearance which would have been given to an disinterested bystander, and so the answer will be fact-specific: Sage v Double A Hydraulics Ltd [1992] Times LR 165; Spargos Mining v Atlantic Capital Corp (unrep.), TheTimes, 11 December 1995; SMAY Investments Ltd v Sachdev [2003] EWHC 474 (Ch), [2003] 1 WLR 1973; Burns-Anderson Independent Network Pic v Wheeler [2005] EWHC 575 (QB), [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 580; Marketmaker Technology Ltd v CMC Group Pic [2008] EWHC 1556 (QB). 7 Global Multimedia International Ltd v ARA Media Services [2006] EWHC 3612 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1160. 8 Midland Resources Ltd v Gonvarri Industrial SA [2002] I LPr 74; Burns-Anderson Independent Network v Wheeler [2005] EWHC 575 (QB), [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 580; and see generally for the modern approach