In Sum

Having outlined basic elements of a non-criminal-law definition of crime, one that we hope has independent validity and contains an objective argument about the nature of crime and how the nature of crime should determine the definition of crime, and having expanded on and addressed criticisms of our argument we believe might be offered, our defense of our definition of crime now comes to an end.

At this point, we should name our definition of crime simply for the purpose of making it easier for those who might wish to do so to refer to this definition. We have no real preference for a name and, in some ways, object to naming this definition of crime. Our objection to doing so is that we do not see that our view ought to be considered immutable and definitive. It is, in our view, a work in progress, a work to which we hope other criminologists will contribute. Since we view this work as belonging to criminology, we do not wish to name this view in a way that makes it appear to be our individual contribution that ought to be continually referenced to us. We have decided to call this definition of crime Crime Definition 1.0, and invite those who modify this definition to change its name as they do with software (e.g., 1.1, 1.2).

Our goal in naming our definition in this way is to create a reference point for the development of an emerging objective criminological definition of crime detached from what we have argued is the arbitrary legal definition of crime to which criminology has long bowed. As previous chapters noted, there are numerous—and what we believe are serious—limitations in the criminal-law definition of crime, one that has had and continues to have adverse and largely unanticipated effects on the ability of criminologists to develop a scientific field for studying crime and its causes. The way out of this dilemma is to create a new definition of crime that is scientific, objective, and detached from the political process involved with the construction of the criminal law. This chapter has provided an example of one way in which such a definition can be constructed.

To be sure, constructing a new definition of crime on which future developments in the field of criminology will be based will change the nature of criminology. Much of that change has already been undertaken by scholars who have, throughout the history of criminology, posed objections to the traditional legal definition of crime. As we have noted, much of that background work has been undertaken by scholars interested in expanding the scope of criminology to white-collar, corporate, state, state-corporate, and green crimes. It is, at this point in history, time for criminologists to seriously consider that what these scholars have proposed is part of the larger project of critiquing the traditional criminal-law definition of crime and an effort to discover a better, discipline-specific definition of crime that transforms the nature of criminology.

This is no small task, and for this outcome to be achieved, a broad spectrum of criminologists will have to agree with our argument that the traditional legal definition of crime as a violation of the criminal law is problematic. They will also have to agree to offer alternative definitions similar to the one we have proposed and to begin to reexamine what criminologists know about crime. This will require retesting theories of crime with a new dependent variable and new visions about the scope and meaning of crime in society and within criminology.

In the final chapter, we offer some discussion of what this means for criminology.