The coding of the data

The third step was to make a content analysis of all the collected poll questions and code for the absence or presence of certain elements in each question. We coded each single question for the absence or presence of a reference for each of the following categories, depending on the wording used: the type of action required, the main goals of the action, the reference to humanitarian purposes, the reference (or lack of) to legitimacy, the reference to the multilateral or unilateral nature of the action taken, the kind of military force to be used (either air strikes or ground troops), the nature of the threat, and the explicit reference to casualties.¹⁴

The percentages reported here, to begin with Tables 6.4 and 6.5 below, represent the average support for the use of force for those questions that have been assigned to each category, covering all the different elements that were distinguished. They have been used to code all 3015 observations.

Table 6.4 Support of military action under different conditions, individual variables (all; average % support)

	% yes	(N)
Type of action
Take action- unspecified	40,0	295
Military presence	59,7	20
Action with emphasis	54,8	197
Action not 'a mistake'	51,6	105
Invasion/attack/intervention	41,6	843
Reprisal action	59,4	62
Resume action	64,5	23
Continuation of military action	49,3	105
Peacekeeping	55,7	54
Escalation	53,7	264
Military assistance	46,0	45
Action worth the costs	54,0	92
Kind of forces
General military action, unspecified	51,6	1911
Air strikes/Bombing	54,9	337
Ground troops	50,8	584
Other military action, special forces, commandos	66,3	12
Use of nuclear forces	43,8	8
Use of biological chemical weapons	5,0	1.
Actors/participants Reference to other countries' forces (mostly US)	38,8	876
Reference to (own) country's forces	53,1	2057
Goals/purpose of action Humanitarian (protection of civilians)	56,3	39
Peacekeeping or enforcement of peace	49,0	63
To coerce head of state (Milosevic, Saddam Hussein)	43,3	610
Name of head of state mentioned as target Milosevic	59,7	23
Saddam Hussein	54,0	530
Taliban/Osama bin Laden	58,8	39
Fight against terrorism/terrorists	56,0	485
Target believed to be involved in terrorism	57,0	230
If opponent (not) in compliance with request	49,1	126
Of US	40,0	3
Of NATO	44,3	4
Of UN	45,5	114
Relations with terrorists unclear	54,5	14
To counter/remove WMD	54,0	184
Positive legitimacy
With mandate and support of UN and/or NATO and/or allies	50,8	418
To support Americans	40,2	153
Action by NATO	46,9	432

(Continued)

Table 6.4 Continued

	% yes	(N)
Action by international/allied force	44,4	255
Action by UN force	61,0	24
Reference to support of
Allies	50,1	124
NATO	54,6	112
UN	40,8	362
Other aspects of legitimacy	52,2	54
Negative legitimacy
Without mandate and support of UN and/or NATO	40,0	301
and/or allies
Leadership
Decisions by (name of leader)
Clinton	42,2	21
George W. Bush	60,3	63
US Congress/Parliament	50,8	5
Government decision	43,0	150
Other aspects
If WMD found	53,3	74
Last resort/if diplomacy fails	44,2	6
If air strikes insufficient	46,8	39
To counter danger of escalation	53,4	297
Retaliation/Self-defense	60,1	154
More time for diplomacy necessary	34,9	98
Costs
Duration
Short war	57,0	42
Long war	52,8	9
Other negative implications/opposition/retaliation	49,5	70
Trade-offs	50,1	39
Casualties
Military casualties	49	150
Civilian casualties	38	68
Average support	50	3015

The content analysis allows us to make three types of considerations. First, multivariate regression analysis allows us to explore the impact of specific societal or contextual conditions, keeping the impact of other factors constant. Here, the general hypothesis is that the effects of the societal variables is universal both in the sense of observable in all coun- tries/societies and to the effect that their direction can be assumed to be

Table 6.5 Support of military action under different conditions, aggregated variables (by groups of countries; average % support)]

	All	diff*	(N)	US	diff*	(N)	EU	diff*	(N)	Oth	diff*	(N)
Overall support score	49,8		3015 59,3			1497 42,4			1103 35,0			415
All cases (N = 3015)
Type of action Form of military action	50		2565	60	1	1188	42		974	35		403
mentioned
Troops (troops and	51	1	608	55	-4	394	44	2	184	43	8	70
special forces) Purpose of military	53	3	643	60	1	413	41	-1	170	38	3	70
action mentioned
Action by whom Unilateral action	53	3	2050	59		1284	44	2	563	37	2	203
Multilateral action/	43	-7	1316	54	-5	294	43	1	688	34	-1	334
allied force
Objectives/purposes National objectives	50		2747	60	1	1327	42		1013	35		407
mentioned
International goals:	46	-4	208	55	-4	136	35	-7	47	21	-14	25
Humanitarian
purpose/protection of civilians
Legitimacy Positive legitimacy/	53	3	561	57	-2	270	51	9	214	43	8	74
self-defense
Negative legitimacy/	40	-10	301	49	-10	166	29	-13	114	29	-6	21
no support
Risks of action Risky military action Low risk	56	6	286	59		136	54	12	129	40	5	71
High risk	51	1	608	55	-4	394	45	3	184	41	6	70
Prospects for success, benefits
Prospects for success	53	3	285	55	-4	199	48	6	77	32	-3	9
Perceived benefits	40	-10	330	57	-2	71	36	-6	203	33	-2	56
Costs Expected costs	44	-6	264	51	-8	191	31	-11	50	19	-16	23
Anticipation of possible	54	4	555	60	1	363	45	3	152	37	2	70
threats
Duration	56	6	50	57	-2	43	52	10	6	41	6	1
Casualties Military casualties	49	-1	150	50	-9	128	46	4	72
Civilian casualties	38	-12	68	54	-5	17	18	-24	28	19	-16	23
Total deviations from average support in each group		80			63			114			98

difference with overall score within each regional group

NB No observations available for 'military casualties' for 'Other countries' identical in all cases. However, the size of the impact of each separate factor may differ among countries depending on the contextual specifics.

Second, we can also explore national differences between countries that cannot be explained by the model and its universal constituent parts. Last, in principle, because the issue is more complicated, we could also explore the impact of the evolution of time or the phase of the conflict concerned on the relative impact of particular factors, such as the incidence of casualties or the absence of success. As noted before, such an impact may increase or decrease as time passes by, or may be different in the early or later stages of an armed conflict.