The coding of the data
The third step was to make a content analysis of all the collected poll questions and code for the absence or presence of certain elements in each question. We coded each single question for the absence or presence of a reference for each of the following categories, depending on the wording used: the type of action required, the main goals of the action, the reference to humanitarian purposes, the reference (or lack of) to legitimacy, the reference to the multilateral or unilateral nature of the action taken, the kind of military force to be used (either air strikes or ground troops), the nature of the threat, and the explicit reference to casualties.14
The percentages reported here, to begin with Tables 6.4 and 6.5 below, represent the average support for the use of force for those questions that have been assigned to each category, covering all the different elements that were distinguished. They have been used to code all 3015 observations.
Table 6.4 Support of military action under different conditions, individual variables (all; average % support)
% yes |
(N) |
|
Type of action |
||
Take action- unspecified |
40,0 |
295 |
Military presence |
59,7 |
20 |
Action with emphasis |
54,8 |
197 |
Action not 'a mistake' |
51,6 |
105 |
Invasion/attack/intervention |
41,6 |
843 |
Reprisal action |
59,4 |
62 |
Resume action |
64,5 |
23 |
Continuation of military action |
49,3 |
105 |
Peacekeeping |
55,7 |
54 |
Escalation |
53,7 |
264 |
Military assistance |
46,0 |
45 |
Action worth the costs |
54,0 |
92 |
Kind of forces |
||
General military action, unspecified |
51,6 |
1911 |
Air strikes/Bombing |
54,9 |
337 |
Ground troops |
50,8 |
584 |
Other military action, special forces, commandos |
66,3 |
12 |
Use of nuclear forces |
43,8 |
8 |
Use of biological chemical weapons |
5,0 |
1. |
Actors/participants Reference to other countries' forces (mostly US) |
38,8 |
876 |
Reference to (own) country's forces |
53,1 |
2057 |
Goals/purpose of action Humanitarian (protection of civilians) |
56,3 |
39 |
Peacekeeping or enforcement of peace |
49,0 |
63 |
To coerce head of state (Milosevic, Saddam Hussein) |
43,3 |
610 |
Name of head of state mentioned as target Milosevic |
59,7 |
23 |
Saddam Hussein |
54,0 |
530 |
Taliban/Osama bin Laden |
58,8 |
39 |
Fight against terrorism/terrorists |
56,0 |
485 |
Target believed to be involved in terrorism |
57,0 |
230 |
If opponent (not) in compliance with request |
49,1 |
126 |
Of US |
40,0 |
3 |
Of NATO |
44,3 |
4 |
Of UN |
45,5 |
114 |
Relations with terrorists unclear |
54,5 |
14 |
To counter/remove WMD |
54,0 |
184 |
Positive legitimacy |
||
With mandate and support of UN and/or NATO and/or allies |
50,8 |
418 |
To support Americans |
40,2 |
153 |
Action by NATO |
46,9 |
432 |
(Continued)
Table 6.4 Continued
% yes |
(N) |
|
Action by international/allied force |
44,4 |
255 |
Action by UN force |
61,0 |
24 |
Reference to support of |
||
Allies |
50,1 |
124 |
NATO |
54,6 |
112 |
UN |
40,8 |
362 |
Other aspects of legitimacy |
52,2 |
54 |
Negative legitimacy |
||
Without mandate and support of UN and/or NATO |
40,0 |
301 |
and/or allies |
||
Leadership |
||
Decisions by (name of leader) |
||
Clinton |
42,2 |
21 |
George W. Bush |
60,3 |
63 |
US Congress/Parliament |
50,8 |
5 |
Government decision |
43,0 |
150 |
Other aspects |
||
If WMD found |
53,3 |
74 |
Last resort/if diplomacy fails |
44,2 |
6 |
If air strikes insufficient |
46,8 |
39 |
To counter danger of escalation |
53,4 |
297 |
Retaliation/Self-defense |
60,1 |
154 |
More time for diplomacy necessary |
34,9 |
98 |
Costs |
||
Duration |
||
Short war |
57,0 |
42 |
Long war |
52,8 |
9 |
Other negative implications/opposition/retaliation |
49,5 |
70 |
Trade-offs |
50,1 |
39 |
Casualties |
||
Military casualties |
49 |
150 |
Civilian casualties |
38 |
68 |
Average support |
50 |
3015 |
The content analysis allows us to make three types of considerations. First, multivariate regression analysis allows us to explore the impact of specific societal or contextual conditions, keeping the impact of other factors constant. Here, the general hypothesis is that the effects of the societal variables is universal both in the sense of observable in all coun- tries/societies and to the effect that their direction can be assumed to be
Table 6.5 Support of military action under different conditions, aggregated variables (by groups of countries; average % support)]
All |
diff* |
(N) |
US |
diff* |
(N) |
EU |
diff* |
(N) |
Oth |
diff* |
(N) |
|
Overall support score |
49,8 |
3015 59,3 |
1497 42,4 |
1103 35,0 |
415 |
|||||||
All cases (N = 3015) |
||||||||||||
Type of action Form of military action |
50 |
2565 |
60 |
1 |
1188 |
42 |
974 |
35 |
403 |
|||
mentioned |
||||||||||||
Troops (troops and |
51 |
1 |
608 |
55 |
-4 |
394 |
44 |
2 |
184 |
43 |
8 |
70 |
special forces) Purpose of military |
53 |
3 |
643 |
60 |
1 |
413 |
41 |
-1 |
170 |
38 |
3 |
70 |
action mentioned |
||||||||||||
Action by whom Unilateral action |
53 |
3 |
2050 |
59 |
1284 |
44 |
2 |
563 |
37 |
2 |
203 |
|
Multilateral action/ |
43 |
-7 |
1316 |
54 |
-5 |
294 |
43 |
1 |
688 |
34 |
-1 |
334 |
allied force |
||||||||||||
Objectives/purposes National objectives |
50 |
2747 |
60 |
1 |
1327 |
42 |
1013 |
35 |
407 |
|||
mentioned |
||||||||||||
International goals: |
46 |
-4 |
208 |
55 |
-4 |
136 |
35 |
-7 |
47 |
21 |
-14 |
25 |
Humanitarian |
||||||||||||
purpose/protection of civilians |
||||||||||||
Legitimacy Positive legitimacy/ |
53 |
3 |
561 |
57 |
-2 |
270 |
51 |
9 |
214 |
43 |
8 |
74 |
self-defense |
||||||||||||
Negative legitimacy/ |
40 |
-10 |
301 |
49 |
-10 |
166 |
29 |
-13 |
114 |
29 |
-6 |
21 |
no support |
||||||||||||
Risks of action Risky military action Low risk |
56 |
6 |
286 |
59 |
136 |
54 |
12 |
129 |
40 |
5 |
71 |
|
High risk |
51 |
1 |
608 |
55 |
-4 |
394 |
45 |
3 |
184 |
41 |
6 |
70 |
Prospects for success, benefits |
||||||||||||
Prospects for success |
53 |
3 |
285 |
55 |
-4 |
199 |
48 |
6 |
77 |
32 |
-3 |
9 |
Perceived benefits |
40 |
-10 |
330 |
57 |
-2 |
71 |
36 |
-6 |
203 |
33 |
-2 |
56 |
Costs Expected costs |
44 |
-6 |
264 |
51 |
-8 |
191 |
31 |
-11 |
50 |
19 |
-16 |
23 |
Anticipation of possible |
54 |
4 |
555 |
60 |
1 |
363 |
45 |
3 |
152 |
37 |
2 |
70 |
threats |
||||||||||||
Duration |
56 |
6 |
50 |
57 |
-2 |
43 |
52 |
10 |
6 |
41 |
6 |
1 |
Casualties Military casualties |
49 |
-1 |
150 |
50 |
-9 |
128 |
46 |
4 |
72 |
|||
Civilian casualties |
38 |
-12 |
68 |
54 |
-5 |
17 |
18 |
-24 |
28 |
19 |
-16 |
23 |
Total deviations from average support in each group |
80 |
63 |
114 |
98 |
difference with overall score within each regional group
NB No observations available for 'military casualties' for 'Other countries' identical in all cases. However, the size of the impact of each separate factor may differ among countries depending on the contextual specifics.
Second, we can also explore national differences between countries that cannot be explained by the model and its universal constituent parts. Last, in principle, because the issue is more complicated, we could also explore the impact of the evolution of time or the phase of the conflict concerned on the relative impact of particular factors, such as the incidence of casualties or the absence of success. As noted before, such an impact may increase or decrease as time passes by, or may be different in the early or later stages of an armed conflict.