Visibility of interests and invisibility of interest groups
Interest groups are frequently criticised by the public in China, as they are seen as the root cause of stagnated environmental policy implementation. Yet then- image remains blurred, and the discussion of their role in both China’s domestic and foreign policies is constrained.17 Only by understanding how domestic groups take part in China’s foreign relations can we better comprehend their role and behaviour in global environmental governance.
Interestingly, the discussion of China’s role in international environmental cooperation is constantly about interests, from those of business groups to those of government agencies. However, the idea of interest groups playing a part in Chinese engagement with global environmental governance is an alien concept. After all, why do domestic groups matter in China’s foreign relations, considering China is an authoritarian regime characterised by top-down decision-making?
Carter and Mol compare the similarities and differences between China and other developed countries in environmental governance and conclude that decentralisation, the waning commaud-and-control system and a growing role of the market all create space for non-state actors to participate in the policy-making process.18 Yet the interest group perspective is underestimated, partly because the very idea of special interests is traditionally neither justified nor recognised in the political culture of China. The general public has been instilled with the tenet that “it was improper and dangerous to assert self-interest in making any claims upon the political system”.19 In addition, the literature on China’s domestic environmental governance is about interests without interest groups, largely because interests are not channelled in an institutionalised fashion with any degree of durability.
The categorisation of “interest” is so broad that it is impossible to tease out what kind of groups and the type of interests they represent. It is either between “economic” and “environmental” interests, with the conclusion that all levels of government prioritise the former,20 or “domestic” versus “foreign” interests, which put Chinese environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) in a position to balance requests of international donors against domestic needs.21
A more skilful investigation of interest representation maps out the role of individuals, social organisations, business groups and the state bureaucracy. In Goodman’s analysis, the function of key individuals includes “political broker and middleman”, such as local governors;22 Meitha conceptualises the non-state sectors as policy entrepreneurs—those who are willing to invest their resources for a political decision in then favour. To identify who is important as the authoritarian regime becomes increasingly pluralised, he teases out three types of policy entrepreneurs: peripheral officials, journalists and non-governmental organisations.23
The plurality of new actors leads to the question of how “interest” is culturally perceived in China. “Interest” (liyi) contains a multitude of interpretations in the Chinese context.24 Hong Yuanpeug and Gao Fan offer a comprehensive overview of current interpretations, which coucepmalises interests as 1) benefit, 2) need, 3) value, 4) rights, 5) capability and 6) relationship/g/м/ш.25 Two observations merit attention: first, interests have a nonnative dimension, as they involve a subjective judgment, and second, the relational aspect plays an important part in the realisation of certain interests. These various and yet interrelated coucepmalisations of interest within the Chinese academic community are boiled down by Chen Sliuis- lieng to two generic categorisations: materialistic and value-related (jiazhixing
jftfittt).26
Locating the cultural specifics in the broad literature of interest groups allows us to provide a fine-grained typology. Interest groups are categorised by Clive on the criterion of membership, highlighting the identity of individual members (such as fanners and students), organisational interests (such as trade associations) and institutional interests (such as government agencies).27 The accumulation of interests and the emergence of interest groups in China are usually dated back to the introduction of reforms and gradual economic opening in 1978. The subsequent decades witnessed hyper-cliarged economic growth, and the opening up of the Chinese market unleashed entrepreneurial energy to maximise profits. Chinese academics build up the categorisation of interest groups based on broad criteria, such as class and social strata,28 as well as detailed benchmarks, such as objectives, degree of organisation and functions. Based on the objectives of organisations, interest groups are divided into economic, socio-political, public and government interest groups.29 Yang Guangbin and Li Yuejun differentiate groups based on the functional aspects: institutionalised, enterprised, associa- tional and unorganised.10
A class-based typology of interest groups is provided by Yang Jisheng as he summarises five classes based upon income, power and reputation: upper, mid-upper, middle, mid-lower and lower classes.31 Li Qiang captures the fluidity of interests, especially with regard to the Refoim Policy, classifying society along the spectrum of benefit versus harm resulting from this new economic initiative.32 This leads to a more nuanced classification by Wang
Shiyi which includes basic class, including the state apparatus management, workers, farmers and professionals; emerging class, including management and technical personnel of private enterprises, foreign venture firms, freelancers and agencies; reviving class, including self-employed (getihu 'bifcf') and private entrepreneurs and the marginalised class, including laid-off workers and retired staff.33 These typologies expose both the “winners” and the “losers” of the economic reforms and shed light on the often-overlooked group of the disadvantaged.
I will use social strata and class categorisation regarding the domestic context within which interest groups emerge. Based on the objectives and organisational features, Chen Shuisheng identifies four types of interest groups: enterprise-interest groups (such as real estate, telecommunication and energy), association-interest groups (such as industry associations and commerce chambers), institutional interest groups (bureaucracies) and public interest groups (such as environmental organisations).34 This categorisation is particularly useful when studying the subject of international environmental cooperation, because it allows us to examine all relevant actors, and, more interestingly, the conflicts between these four groups help us explain how domestic conflict is linked to international cooperation.
The power of interest groups is derived from their resource endowment.33 The institutional arrangement to manage diverse interests is reflected in the nomenklatura system. In this system, economic interests of business groups are bundled with political careers of the managers of those groups. Through personnel control by the Communist Party, economic liberalisation is delinked with requests for political reform from powerful business groups. Business elites, therefore, can make economic demands rather than political ones. Meanwhile, the economic success of business groups is used by the Party as a way to legitimise its one-party rule.36 In other words, the growth of business groups does not necessarily challenge the ruling party with political demands as we witness in Western countries. Instead, their relationship is symbiotic, and their interests are intertwined. Yet it is not suggested here that the central government has the capacity to micro-manage operations of business groups. In fact, the central government sends signals to provide guidelines and set targets as a result of the co-existence of strong authoritarianism and a high degree of decentralisation.37 Whereas previous research is interested in how interest groups influence domestic politics, this book explores their role in foreign relations.
