Conceptualising ecological civilisation
Over the course of my fieldwork from 2012 to 2016, I started with a simple question: what is ecological civilisation? On the one hand, a leading expert in eco-civilisation at Peking University asserts that eco-civilisation is an ideology to justify the legitimacy of the current leadership and the ruling party;11 on the other hand, an official from the Ministiy of Environmental Protection insists that “regarding eco-civilisation as an ideology only ruins this idea” because it provides fertile soil for the growth of the conspiracy theory that China has the ambition to export its civilisation and ideology to the outside world.12 And yet the political significance of EC gives rise to the proliferation of discussion in the academic and public domains. Within a decade of its introduction, over 4000 ecological civilisation-related articles and books have been published, and the media has produced more than 170,000 pieces in order to mainstream EC.13
Academic efforts to conceptualise EC offer ways to navigate the proliferation of EC-related pieces. Geall and Ely argue that EC is an official narrative which has the potential to “influence pathways to sustainability”.14 The political and nonnative significance of the narrative makes EC “a site for negotiation among different actors, institutions and discourses”.15 Aiders and Hansen add that EC provides an ideological framework for authorities to push through stringent environmental laws and policies.16 In other words, a top-down ideological signal is sent via EC to legitimise change in environmental governance. The materialisation of official narrative into environmental decision-making is smdied with reference to a “pathway” in which power holders narrow down possibilities of interpreting the narrative and insert a definitive reading into it.17 In fact, Geall and Ely pinpoint components which win the EC debate: “technological innovation”, “the need to develop green industries” and the adoption of “advanced and applicable energy- efficient, low-carbon and environmentally friendly technologies to transform and upgr ade traditional industries”.18
The heavy emphasis on technology within the EC discourse echoes the conceptualisation of EC as a “socio-technical imaginary for the future”.19 Hansen et al. advance our understanding of EC by contextualising the focus of technology in the discourse. Ecological civilisation is “a state-initiated socioteclmical imaginary in which cultural and political-moral virtues constitute key components that are inseparable from technological, judicial, and political values”.20 This conceptualisation is mindful of the “selective, reductionist, and contested interpretation of the Chinese philosophical past” which amis to construe “a vision for the global future that is rooted in national identity”.21 Technology, in this regard, is a means to achieve the imagined vision which advocates “national pride in ancient Chinese tradition and support for socialism”.22 EC, to a large degree, is not only geared towards domestic reform of environmental governance. Moreover, it construes a picture of “a utopian harmonious world in which production and consumption continue to grow, where technological and science have solved the basic problems of pollution and environmental degradation”.23 The dissociation between environmental governance and liberal democratic values fits the agenda of using EC as the epitome of soft power24 to promote an alternative norm which may potentially facilitate the diffusion of the Chinese vision and practice in environmental governance to the international community.
The juxtaposition between domestic debate and international ambition within the evolution of ecological civilisation pose the question, which is left unaddressed in the existing academic work, of how domestic power (re)configuration enlightens the parameter of external engagement. The consultation of the concept of composite ideology benefits a deeper understanding of the dimension of interests, ideas and identities in the EC discourse.
The characteristics of ideology hi the modem political system are that it is composite or aggregate, or composite ideology’, as termed by Woodruff Smith.25 It refers to “a set of ideas employed to facilitate the accomplishment of political action and to justify particular social orders—past, present or future—by associating such actions and orders with a notion of the general good”. Ideology may be comprehended concerning functions,26 structures,27 and a cultural system.28 The structural aspect of an ideology means that the philosophical roots of ideology are a blueprint of the political architect. The sociological layer of the ideology has neo-utilitarian underpinnings, as the ideology is depicted as “a mask and a weapon” to pursue individual interests and “a symptom and a remedy”, which means a “symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium”.29
Smith focuses on the examination of ideology through the lens of function and reveals the potential of ideology to be used as “a disguise for the particular interests of social classes and groups of political participants or as a means of transforming narrow interest into a general, objective-seeming worldview”. Composite ideology not only addresses the social transformation from the past to the future but also attends to contradicting interests. Constituents in the composite ideology are independent of each other before being included. The logical connections between each element are loose and artificially contingent on “similarities in image and impression, non-rigorous analogies, the employment of symbols, and similarities in descriptive language”.30
The weak logical structure is strengthened by a perpetual repetition of two discrete statements until they sound as though they belong to each other. Furthermore, each component of the composite ideology justifies other elements and is meanwhile justified by them. In other words, a composite ideology is not falsifi- able and therefore detached from reality. The illogicality and inaccuracy in the composite ideology must be hidden. When there is a problem with the ideology, a scapegoat is necessaiy to shoulder the unfavourable consequences. The absence of a sound logic, meanwhile, is compensated for by “emotional images and ill- defmed vocabulary”.31
A composite ideology, precisely because of its logical frailty, is intended for action and capable of being used for popular mobilisation. The reason ideology has the potential to mobilise the public is that it contains unsophisticated and accessible ideas. A composite ideology construes a sharply defined reality with a crystal-clear identification of the problem and the diagnosis of the society. Sinologists such as Lucian Pye contend that the purpose of ideology in China is to “make reality safe”. When reality is fiill of confrontation and disorder, it can still be perceived as peace- fill and harmonious.32 Nationalism is the epitome of such a composite ideology. Since the 1990s, it has been used as “a spiritual instrument” to guide “the reform and to control enormous changes resulting from the reform policy”.33
During the theorisation of composite ideology, Smith demonstrates that the purpose is to reach a consensus rather than addressing real problems. It disguises reality and construes an illusion that is supported by myths. The weakness in a composite ideology does not prevent it from being successfi.il hi reaching a consensus. When an ideology achieves its purpose, it can “take on a life of its own over tune”,34 and the longevity of a composite ideology further relies on socialisation and education in a society.
The concept of “composite ideology” bears direct relevance to our understanding of ecological civilisation, particularly regarding how conflicts are reconciled and how realities are construed. The essential conundrum eco-civilisation aims to address is between economic growth development and environmental protection, and this conflict is reinterpreted in the rhetoric of eco-civilisation as a harmonious coexistence. This can be seen in a defining policy document of eco-civilisation introduced in 2015 which “systematically addresses the obstacles to effective policy by setting out standards, mechanisms and assessments”35 and provides a timetable and roadmap to implement eco-civilisation.36 Included under the banner of eco-civilisation are the national policies of “resource conservation and environmental protection", “green, circular, and low-carbon development”, “ecological culture”, “green lifestyle” and “beautiful China”.37
The conceptual hierarchy within eco-civilisation is listed in the “basic principle” section: “resource conservation and environmental protection” is the guideline which is realised by the means of “green, circular, and low-carbon development”, motivated by “deeper reform and innovation” with combined work of the market and the state and supported by ecological culture which incorporates eco-civilisation into the socialist core value system. This narrative is a discursive compromise in which both environmental protection and economic development are priorities that can mutually benefit each other over the course of constructing eco-civilisation.
This assumption of a co-existence of economic growth and environmental protection leads to another two features of a composite ideology: usage of simplistic ideas and the effect of displacement. The simplification of originally complicated ideas is aimed to achieve the “low common denominator of understanding” to produce “clear-cut, simple diagnoses of what is wrong with society and how, in straightforward, pragmatic terms, things can be changed”.38 To make the simplistic ideas convincing is to distract the audience’s attention to another time or other places. Smith refers to imperialist displacement as a geographic focus which justified overseas colonies in the Nazi imperialism ideology. The displacement regarding eco-civilisation is, however, cognitive, reflected in the salience of traditional Chinese culture. The upshot of this cognitive reorientation is a refraining of the environmental problem through the lens of culture, which not only legitimates a culmrally specific solution but also establishes a cuhurally rooted confidence in the ruling party to manage the environmental crisis.
The culniral essence of eco-civilisation has changed from being the unity between human beings and namre (tianrenheyi ^Ap—) to the so-called two mountains theory (Liangshan lun № iJLl iff) advocated by Xi Jinpiug. “Tianren- heyi' as a version of C'onfucian thought, has been widely discussed and debated. The linkage between “tianrenheyi” and eco-civilisation is made manifest in the political discussion by Pan Yue in his article “Eco-Civilisation Will Promote the Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.39 Yet different interpretations of this Coufucian thought lead to a contradictory conclusion regarding the relationship between “tianrenheyi” and effective environmental governance.
Li Zehou, a reputed Chinese Marxist philosopher, applies this ancient philosophy in the context of an industrialising China. He conceptualises tianrenheyi in the direction of the humanisation of nature in the Marxist language, claiming that tianrenheyi fits the era of post-industrialisation in which nature is restored and protected with the advancement of material civilisation.40 Based on the assumption that China is a Coufucian state, Li Zehou’s understanding of tianrenheyi through the lens of Marxism touts the Chinese state as a moral power in terms of environmental protection.
However, one cannot take the connection between tianrenheyi and environmental government for granted. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo contends that tianrenheyi and environmental protection are incompatible with each other, fiill of fundamental contradictions 41 Liu criticises Li Zehou’s theorisation to revitalise Chinese tradition with Marxism, as Li ignores the close tie between
tianrenheyi and the endorsement of the feudal society and political values which honour feudalism. Liu insists that tianrenheyi requires an absolute obedience to nature and generates an overreliance on ancient Chinese on emperors. Modern environmentalism acknowledges that human beings are separate from nature and recognises the conflicts between human beings and then environs. Consequently, environmentalism advocates a thorough understanding of nature and explores how nature can benefit the survival of human beings. Tianrenheyi, on the other hand, cultivates a passive China incapable of facing the challenges from nature.
Locating Liu’s argument to environmental pollution in current China, this passivity of the Chinese is not a solution to but a problem of the environmental crisis. The intellectual debate among the two greatest thinkers in contemporary China indicates that ancient wisdom is usually massaged to fit the political agenda, and each interpretation is more political than cultural.
Xi Jinping’s two mountains theoiy further simplifies the cultural contestation and replaces the philosophical debate with visual images, as the theoiy is literally translated as “clean water and green mountains are golden and silver mountains”.42 The two-mountain “theoiy” was quickly picked up and studied in the academic community and by local governors, entrepreneurs and other domestic political actors.
The last characteristic of a composite ideology is that it is oriented towards action, which echoes Ely and Geall's argument that the official narrative may provide concrete pathways to environmental reform. Eco-civilisation calls for local governments to explore a new development path and encourages demonstration zones to generate a template of eco-civilisation guided growth. In this respect, it is significant that the names of such zones changed from “ecology demonstration zones” (shengtai shifanqu jfeifezririlE) in 1995 to honour the national strategy of sustainable development at that time, to “ecology construction demonstration zone” (shengtai jianshe shifanqu in 2009,
to “ecological civilisation construction demonstration zone” (shengtai wenming jianshe shifanqu jfc1Уj M; ix>JGil IK), approved by the Party Central in 2013, to implement ecological civilisation.43 This zoning of eco-civilisation reflects the cluster effect, which is a strategy deployed in developmental states in East Asia, including China.44
In addition to such changes, the associated demonstration projects were (imtil the 2018 cabinet reshuffle, which will be explained later) fragmented, and ministries had overlapping responsibilities and functions. Although the Ministry of Environmental Protection is in charge of the “ecological civilisation construction demonstration zone”, six other ministries are tasked with approving and facilitating projects. The National Development and Reform Committee, Ministiy of Finance, Ministiy of National Land and Resources, Ministiy of Water Resources, Ministiy of Agriculture and State Forestry Administration all jointly approve, oversee and monitor “ecological civilisation pilot demonstration zones” (shengtai wenming xianxing shifanqu '-il & >C Hj J it If /ri Ш If.), aiming to generate a template that can be replicated and emulated nationwide. The co-existence of differently titled demonstration projects gives us an inkling of what happens when a political slogan is hastily converted into action through the implementation of projects.
As eco-civilisation becomes a priority set by the highest authority, a slogan is turned into concrete policies by a plurality of players. What does ecological civilisation mean for domestic power configuration, and how can a consensus be reached among interest groups whose benefits will be discounted? We explore this question in the following section to look at the debate on ecological civilisation and how heterogeneous groups reflect then interests hi the meaning of eco-civilisation.
