Forensic Assessment Evaluation of the Sexual Murder

Background

The method of evaluating criminal defendants in order to determine their state of mind, dangerousness, competency, or—in the case of a sexual murderer—to simply understand the criminal act is fundamental in forensic practice. In Chapter 1, the Cain-Abel murder case was used to illustrate the distinctions between a clinical assessment (as routinely performed in hospitals, mental health centers, and private offices) and a forensic evaluation. In this chapter, a more detailed comparison of the two types of evaluations will be presented as this is critical in understanding the criminal offender, in general, and the sexual murderer, in particular.

Mental health practitioners such as psychiatrists and psychologists are generally taught to evaluate their patients by first interviewing them, perhaps utilizing additional psychological or neurodiagnostic testing, and sometimes requesting supplementary interviews with family members. Hospital, school, and medical records or perhaps reports from prior therapists are also frequently reviewed. Following the evaluation, a diagnosis is made and a treatment plan developed. Clinicians are taught to listen to their patients. If a patient says that he feels depressed, anxious, or agitated, or that he has suicidal thoughts, the mental health professional usually accepts the patient’s symptom description as valid unless there is a good reason not to believe him. Lying, deceit, exaggeration, and malingering do occur and may be explored in clinical practice, but generally the main emphasis is on diagnosis and treatment.

Melton, Petrila, Poythress, Slobogin, Otto, Mossman, and Condie (2018) describe various differences between a forensic and a clinical (or what they refer to as a therapeutic) assessment (see Table 2.1). They note differences in the scope of the evaluation, the client’s perspective, voluntariness, autonomy, threats to validity, relationship and dynamics, and pace and setting. The fundamental distinction, however, is that, in forensic assessments, there is a high likelihood that the defendant will not always be truthful as he has an obvious motive to lie, exaggerate, or distort symptoms and events. Thus, the traditional clinical approach (in which mental health professionals have been trained) cannot be used for forensic assessments. Forensic psychology (or psychiatry) is not simply the practice of clinical psychology (or general psychiatry) in a forensic setting (Schlesinger, 2003, 2005). Forensic psychology is a separate specialty that requires a modification of the traditional clinical approach. Unfortunately, this distinction is not stressed enough in books on forensic psychology/psychiatry. In fact, several well-known texts do not even mention the basics of a forensic examination (Blau, 1998; Bluglass and Bowden, 1990; Cook, 1980; Gunn and Taylor, 1993; Guttmacher and Weihoffer, 1952; Hess and Weiner, 1999; Irvine and Brelje,

Table 2.1 Dimensions Distinguishing a Therapeutic from a Forensic Assessment

Source: Adapted from Melton, G.B. et al„ Psychological Evaluations for the Courts, 4th ed. Guilford Press, New York, 2018, pp. 43-46.

1972; Power and Selwood, 1987). Instead, these volumes focus on various laws, legal tests, and legal standards that forensic practitioners need to know.

As the criminal defendant’s version of events (as well as background information and symptom description) has to be corroborated, a review of the facts of the case is fundamental to a forensic assessment. This is very important with all criminal defendants and sexual murderers in particular because they are notorious for being untruthful (Schlesinger, 2001b). Earlier books on forensic psychiatry do recommend the use of corroborative information in conducting assessments. For example, Davidson (1965) cautions that one should not attempt to evaluate a criminal defendant before reading witness statements and investigative reports. Otherwise, the examiner

will certainly be embarrassed if he examines a defendant in the absence of the whole story.

He then has to rely on the patient’s own explanation of events, and, as often as not, this explanation is factually incorrect. Many defendants are psychopaths, and many psychopaths tell untruths with glibness and assurance, so that only a naive examiner accepts as fact the information furnished by the patient, (p. 38)

MacDonald (1969) urges examiners to obtain information from outside sources such as family, employers, military personnel, police, probation officers, and hospitals. Sadoff

(1975) advises a first interview without review of corroborating information, followed by a second interview after the review of such material:

By obtaining statements of confessions read to the police, by examining others who may have seen the defendant at the time of the alleged offense, or near that time, by discussing the problem with mother, spouse, or other close family members, the psychiatrist will have the ability to corroborate certain information received from the patient or to negate it by inconsistent material from others. Certainly, inconsistencies in what was obtained in the clinical interview, and what [the defendant] allegedly told the police or authorities, should be checked into in close detail during the second interview. Methods by which the patient handles this direct assault on his credibility should be noted and forms a part of the examination, (pp. 27-28)

Many mental health professionals who practice in a forensic setting do not follow these recommended procedures or may not even be fully aware of the distinctions between a clinical and forensic assessment. They conduct a forensic evaluation in the same way as they would evaluate a patient in a hospital, mental health center, or private office. They rely on what the criminal defendant tells them about the offense as well as their symptoms. In their study of forensic assessments, for instance, Heilbrun, Rosenfeld, Warren, and Collins (1994) found that most of the evaluators they questioned said that they did “incorporate” third-party information, but they did not explain how or whether they made use of this information in the process of arriving at conclusions and opinions. To the extent that they relied largely on the defendant’s own reports, the validity of their conclusions must be called into question; moreover, such an approach does not contribute to our understanding of rare crimes such as sexual murder in which every case needs to be thoroughly and competently examined.

The following case exemplifies the improper way to conduct an evaluation of a man charged with murder.

Case 2.1: Expert Relied Solely on Defendant’s Statements

While fishing after school, two adolescent boys detected several partially wrapped packages which had washed ashore. With a stick they rolled one package a short distance from the river, opened it, and found two plastic bags that appeared to contain the torso of a human. The boys immediately went home and notified their parents, who called the police. A search of the area turned up additional bags containing an arm, legs, and a human head.

The medical examiner determined that the deceased was a woman in her 50s with a deformed left hand, the result of a birth defect. The authorities released this information to the media, hoping that the deformity could serve to identify the victim. After hearing the story on the evening news, a friend of the deceased (B) called the authorities. The victim’s 66-year-old common-law husband (AA) was arrested after he gave the following statement to the police:

I was living with her. I couldn’t take her anymore. She was senile and I cracked up. We had a fight. I stabbed her two or three times. I don’t remember where. It was a kitchen knife that I used to stab her with. I chopped her up. I used an axe. I put the pieces in plastic bags and then put portions of the body into the refrigerator. I left them there a couple of days. Then I threw them off the Smith Street Bridge. I took the pieces there in a shopping cart. I then moved out of the apartment and got a new apartment in the next town. I changed my name. I threw all her clothes out in the garbage. I wiped up the blood with a rag. I don’t remember if I painted the apartment or not, but I think I did. She was always screaming at me. I just couldn’t take it anymore. It shouldn’t have happened, but I just couldn’t take her anymore. She was falling down all the time. If anyone asked, I just told them В went to a nursing home.

To evaluate his client, the defense attorney retained a hospital-based general psychiatrist who had substantial experience in conducting forensic assessments. The psychiatrist first took the offender’s history and then conducted “a psychiatric examination and a mental status examination.” He reported the following findings:

The defendant attributed a considerable amount of his difficulties to a mugging which occurred some years ago and he pointed to a scar on his scalp, on the back of his head. Actually, AA did not know whether or not he killed B, but he ultimately was arrested and incarcerated. Here is a man who is thoroughly confused and is suffering from obvious organic brain disease (brain tissue injury) which has produced memory loss, both for recent and remote events. He has little recall of any events, no less the ones that caused him to be incarcerated. He has a long history of alcoholism and was institutionalized at a rehabilitation program on at least one occasion. He is poorly oriented as to time. He does not know the exact hour of the day or the date. However, he did know the year and month. Associative thought processes are in question. He did not answer questions without prodding, nor did he answer them directly and relevantly. Affective behavior was also unusual. Insight as to how he affects others is impaired. Reality-testing functions, however, appeared to be intact, in that he is not overtly hallucinating or delusional.

The psychiatrist offered a diagnosis of “organic brain syndrome due to alcohol (toxic)” and gave the following final opinions and recommendations:

Here is a man who has actual physical brain impairment and it is extensive. Moreover, AA is very credible in his replies (whatever they may be), inasmuch as he frankly stated that he did not know whether he killed В or not. He has no recollection of it. This examiner is of the opinion that he certainly falls within the purview of the M’Naughten Rule and that he did not know the nature and quality of his acts by reason of his brain disease.

Here, the psychiatrist disregarded the facts of this case (although his report indicated that he had read all the police and witness reports) and relied totally on what the defendant told him. He evidently ignored AA’s statements to the police that he had killed В following an argument, dismembered her, packed the body parts in a methodical fashion, placed them in his refrigerator, and then, over the course of a week or so, dropped the various body parts off a bridge, hoping that they would drift out to sea. AA then cleaned the apartment, painted part of it, changed his name, and moved. When examined, the defendant told the psychiatrist that he had no idea what had happened, and the psychiatrist evidently believed him.

When the prosecution expert evaluated AA, he was uncooperative and unpleasant, with anger right at the surface. He reported that he never had arguments with anyone and that he had never previously been in trouble with the police. When it was pointed out to him that he had been arrested several years earlier for armed robbery, he denied any knowledge of such an incident. He said that he did not remember murdering anybody and that he had never heard of B, even though he had lived with her for 8 to 10 years. He also insisted that he did not remember disposing of the evidence, moving to a new location several miles away, changing his name, and telling those who inquired about the victim that she had gone to a nursing home.

The defendant was also uncooperative with psychological testing and refused to do many of the tasks. When asked to name the three colors of the American flag, he said, “Red, white, that’s all I know.” He also stated that the shape of a ball is “square.” When asked to name four recent U.S. presidents, he said, “The hell with the presidents, they never gave me nothing.” He did, however, provide an interesting response to Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) card 13MF, which gives some inkling of the possible motivation for the homicide:

He is standing there, or maybe he killed her. Maybe they were fighting or something. Maybe he just hit her or stepped on her. He killed her, that’s all I know. Maybe she kicked him or something like that. They had a fight, she kicked him, and then he killed her, I guess.

The psychiatrist retained by the defense attorney approached this case as if the defendant were a newly admitted patient in the hospital, in which case the psychiatrist would seek to describe the presenting problem. Although the psychiatrist indicated in his report that he had reviewed the various police reports, he did not explain why the defendant gave a detailed statement to the police but told him that he had no memory of the events. The psychiatrist concluded, as a result of the defendant’s reported lack of memory, that the offender had an organic brain syndrome caused by alcoholism. Evidently, this psychiatrist believed that anyone who would have killed his lady friend in such a manner must have been insane; he thereby demonstrated his lack of understanding of the legal standard, as well as his general uninformed approach to the evaluation. The prosecution expert, by contrast, relied on the facts of the case and integrated these facts with the offender’s responses. The defendant eventually pleaded guilty, and in a statement to the court, gave a detailed account of the murder and surrounding events. Complete neurological evaluation was negative.

Case 2.2: Multiple Experts Relied Solely on Defendant’s Statements

A 55-year-old male became involved in a long-term tumultuous relationship with a woman a few years younger. He was jealous, argued, and fought with her, had two arrests for domestic violence, and stalked her.

The defendant described the homicide as follows:

Wednesday morning, that evil day. A. was lying in bed. I leave, gone for a good four to five hours. I came home through the door. I heard A. in the kitchen, beer on the table. I got angry at that: “Why are you drinking?” A. snapped, “You lying bastard.” She grabbed the big knife in the kitchen. We spinned, and whatever happened, happened. It was nothing but the devil.

... I caught her arm, we spun around, and wound up in the bathtub.

At this point in describing what happened, the defendant became agitated and angry. He yelled, ranted, screamed, and carried on in an animated way. He would not answer or discuss anything about the homicide itself. He just yelled, “Whatever happened, happened.” He screamed so loudly that he actually broke one of the speakers in the room where the evaluation was being monitored for security purposes. His yelling and screaming went on for about 45 minutes; he then calmed down and participated in all other parts of the evaluation. J.A. was evaluated multiple times by at least six different mental health experts. In fact, the defendant testified in a pretrial court hearing and provided the same account of what happened. “She grabbed the big knife in the kitchen. We spinned, and whatever happened, happened.”

The problem with this case is that the six experts relied solely on what the defendant told them. However, what the defendant told them did not at all accord with the behavioral evidence. For example, there were multiple knives used, not just one: three bloody, broken knives were found in the kitchen sink. When the prosecution expert asked about the three knives, the defendant did not answer but just began to yell and scream, “Whatever happened, happened.” In addition, the defendant said multiple times that A. came at him with the knife, he caught her arm, they spun around and wound up in the bathtub. However, this description also did not agree entirely with the crime scene evidence. Specifically, there was extensive blood throughout the kitchen—on the table, chair, floor, cabinets, countertop, and walls. Accordingly, it would seem that the victim was stabbed for the most part in the kitchen because that was where all the blood was (as well as in the bathroom) with her body finally winding up in the bathtub.

Text messages sent by A. to a friend just weeks before the homicide were illuminating. A. wanted to call a victim hotline. She said the defendant stole money from her. She wanted a police escort because J.A. was following, stalking, and harassing her (when she left their apartment) with accusations about infidelity. She wanted to move out. On one occasion, J.A. went to the laundromat and brought A.’s clothes back to his apartment. When asked whether he, in fact, stalked or followed A., the defendant responded, “No, no, I wouldn’t stalk her. For what? How come she didn’t call the police and put a restraining order on me?” When asked about text messages indicating that she wanted to move out, the defendant said, “Why didn’t she go then?” And he essentially did not respond to other assertions in A.’s text messages.

The defendant was also probed regarding his desire to marry the victim. “I fell in love with A. I was trying to prove my faithfulness and friendship.” When asked why he wanted to marry someone he previously had called a Jezebel, the devil, and evil, J.A. offered no response other than to get angry and start yelling. And when asked about other aspects of the homicide such as the cuts on his hands and why he did not leave the apartment once he gained control of the knife (as he claimed), he just kept yelling and screaming.

Reasonable mental health professionals can disagree—and very often do—about diagnoses. The problem, in this case, was that the six defense experts relied solely on what the defendant told them. The offender was a religious individual and a deacon in his church. He had a strong religious background and referred to hearing God’s voice, Satan, the Holy Spirit, and the like. Forensic examiners must be culturally competent in taking factors such as this into account in arriving at an accurate diagnosis. The six experts, including the judge, incorrectly believed that the subject’s reference to hearing God’s voice was evidence of a psychosis, rather than being part of a religious experience. The defendant never experienced auditory hallucinations or any other symptoms of psychosis.

The primary defense psychiatrist who testified at the trial concluded that the defendant was psychotic and found “his mental distress contributed to an inability to form a requisite knowing and purposeful state of mind. Taken in conjunction with each other, the burden of incapacitation appears readily reached” (a phrase that he used in almost all his reports, notwithstanding the facts of the case). In fact, there was no evidence of any psychotic-level disorder, but there was evidence of depression caused by J.A.’s circumstances and of a personality disorder with antisocial and borderline traits (following DSM-5 criteria).

Many forensic experts believe that if they diagnose a psychotic-level condition such as schizophrenia or any form of psychosis, the defendant is incompetent in all areas and meets the standard for either diminished capacity or insanity. Nothing could be further from the truth. An incorrect diagnosis is not the only issue. The DSM-5 (2013) makes it clear that “the clinical diagnosis ... of a mental disorder ... does not imply that an individual with such a condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder, or a specified legal standard” (p. 25). Yelling, screaming, calling A. the devil, and referencing the Bible are not, in themselves, evidence of psychosis, most notably when it occurs in selective circumstances.

J.A. testified at his trial, along with the primary defense expert; it did not go well for either individuals. The jury convicted the defendant in a record 44 minutes. There had been a 7-year delay since the time of the homicide as they found J.A. incompetent, a result of (a) various examiners’ incorrect belief that if you say you hear God’s voice—no matter what the circumstances or your cultural background—it is a psychotic symptom, and (b) the examiners’ reliance solely on what the defendant told them, not on a careful examination of the behavioral evidence.

The next case raises another important issue frequently encountered in forensic work. A defense attorney, for example, will retain an expert who has extensive knowledge and experience with a particular condition such as substance abuse, sex offenses, eating disorders, juvenile delinquency, or posttraumatic stress disorder. But this expert may not understand the basics of conducting a forensic examination and, therefore, as in the preceding examples, approached the case as if the defendant were a patient being evaluated in an office setting or a hospital.

In Case 2.3, the defense-retained psychologist had extensive expertise (obtained through the treatment of patients in her private practice) in battered woman syndrome. She also had served as a consultant in numerous court cases addressing the issue of battered woman syndrome, but unfortunately she approached all her assessments from a traditional clinical, as opposed to a forensic, perspective.

Case 2.3: Expert Practiced Clinical Psychology in a Forensic Setting

A 38-year-old female (B), with a 20-year history of drug abuse and drug-related offenses (including drug selling and prostitution), rented a room in a boarding house occupied mainly by other drug addicts. There she met a 42-year-old drug dealer (A) and began a 5-month intimate relationship with him. A continued to sell drugs, and В became known as his “enforcer.” She carried a gun and was frequently observed intimidating other drug buyers. On several occasions, she hit buyers over the head with a pipe for not paying A on time. She pistol-whipped at least one drug user in front of others and routinely threatened almost everyone who frequented the boarding house, a known location for buying and using drugs.

Two drug users (C and D), who frequented the house regularly, owed A $600. В decided to look for the couple in order to get the money. She asked several drug addicts if they had seen C and D in the local area. One addict said she has seen them and В convinced A, after some arguing, that they should follow this individual who would take them to C and D. According to one witness, A was not greatly concerned about the money owed him and did not really want to look for the couple, but В convinced him to do so. When A and В located C and D, В forced both into their car at gunpoint, according to another witness.

Once back at the boarding house, A and В took C and D into a room. There, according to several individuals who were in the hallway at the time, В slapped D. One witness heard D “beg, for her life. D said she had a 13-year-old daughter to live for, and she also said, ‘Please don’t kill me.’” A held his gun on C while В shoved newspapers down his throat, which eventually caused his death. В then slowly strangled D with a stocking, causing her death; she also stabbed C multiple times with her knife. A and В then took both bodies to the basement. The next morning, they moved the bodies to a field several miles away and set them on fire.

Several days later, A and В were arrested. A refused to provide a statement, but В gave the police four different statements. First, she denied any knowledge of the murders. Then she implicated someone else who lived in the boarding house. Then she accused A. Finally, she admitted that both she and A were involved but said that A had killed the victims and that she had merely acted as his assistant. She did not say that she was afraid of A but explained that she had assisted him out of loyalty.

The defense attorney retained a psychologist with expertise in the treatment of battered women. Due to lengthy legal maneuvers, the psychologist first interviewed В in jail 3 years after the murders. Her conclusions were based solely on what the defendant told her. She did not rely on any of the relevant police reports, witness statements, or autopsy findings.

The psychologist began her interview by asking В to describe her relationships with prior boyfriends, including her relationship with A. В told her of numerous relationships, all of which she claimed involved abuse. She went into great detail explaining the abusive relationship she had with A. She said that A hit her when he was angry, knocked her down, slapped her, and struck her in the face with his fist. She described the violence as frequent and occurring in “cycles”; following the violence, A would make up to В by buying her flowers and expensive gifts. Upon questioning, В also reported being psychologically abused by A and said that he had even raped her on several occasions. She explained to the psychologist that she was “terrified” of A and believed that if she did not participate in the murders, A would have killed her as well: “I was petrified; I was scared I’d be next.” В then, upon questioning, “described becoming isolated in the relationship, which reinforced her sense of helplessness and As power and control over her. According to B, A would not allow her to see her friends or family members.” B’s account of events to the defense expert was at variance with witness statements, as well as her own statements given to the police.

The defense psychologist administered the TAT, wherein В gave repetitive stories of “women being beaten by the men, or even killed, and the women taking the men back with a promise that it will not happen again.” According to the psychologist,

В does not report the traditional signs of trauma associated with battered woman syndrome, although, based on B’s history, one would not expect to see signs of psychological trauma. In persons who have a history of abusing substances, the trauma is obscured by the drug use. In fact, it is likely that the alcohol and drug use were B’s way of coping with the psychological pain and trauma of her abuse.

The report continued:

The relationship В described with A is consistent with what occurs in battered woman syndrome. В was dependent on A both psychologically and economically. A had been violent with her and had manipulated her into compliance and submission. В was passive and compliant in interpersonal relationships, and she had no self-worth. Coupled with both her personality makeup and the abuse she suffered, plus B’s history of drug abuse, she had no options other than to remain passive and compliant and to continue to cope with whatever troubled her by using drugs and numbing the pain. She didn’t consider disobeying A. Further, in her mind she knew A was upset with both C and D, but she had no idea he would murder them. В has now learned by her attendance at a jail-sponsored domestic violence support group that hitting is always wrong and that she is beginning to understand what happened to her and the mistakes she made. When she stabbed C, she was following As orders. She was terrified. She heard C and D plead for their lives, and she was also afraid for her life at that time.

Her report concluded:

В was intimidated at the time of the murders into helping A, and this fear would be considered reasonable for any person in that situation, even more so for someone who was battered and who was passive and compliant. In a sense one can accrue to her the status of being a kidnapping victim, or the victim of a terrorist. She was his victim and had to comply in order to save her own life. What was apparent to this examiner, over the 7-month period in which В was evaluated, was that she is benefiting from the services in the jail and is moving herself to a psychologically new place. Over the past 7 months, she has changed considerably.

Unfortunately, this psychologist, who had considerable experience in treating patients with battered woman syndrome, relied only on what the defendant told her. She did not question the defendant about contradictory witness statements which indicated that В took the leading role in the murders. Apparently, she also did not question В closely about specific symptoms of battered woman syndrome (or posttraumatic stress disorder). She simply assumed that the symptoms would be “obscured” by B’s substance abuse. Therefore, she diagnosed the disorder as battered women syndrome, even though В did not display the characteristic symptoms and had not used substances in 3 years.

When В was evaluated by the prosecution expert, she was uncooperative and hostile, especially when she was asked about the facts of the case or about prior statements that were inconsistent with what she had told the defense psychologist. В explained her relationship with A, stating,

He was good to me. He showed me nice things. I felt that he loved me. Now that I am clean and sober today, I realize he used me to make money. Standing at that door selling his drugs all day, all night, non-stop. I realize A used me. I realize now if someone loves you, they don’t beat you up, knock your teeth out, blacken your eyes. When he got angry he’d tear me up. When he got angry, at least once or twice a week, this happened.

When asked why she did not leave him, В responded, “I don’t know. I was caught up into the drugs and him. After he’d hit me or twist my arm, he’d always buy me something real nice.” However, she could not explain why, over a 5-month period, nobody saw or heard any of this alleged violence, even though the rooms in the boarding house were described as “paper thin.” The person who roomed next to A and В said, “I could hear everything. I heard them argue and I heard them have sex, but I never heard any violence between them at all. If anything, В was the violent one toward everyone else. A was real laid back.”

B’s arrest record showed that she had a long history of violence, but when asked about these incidents, she “could not remember.” When asked why she did not leave the abusive relationship, she stated, “I never thought about leaving, because he’d buy me flowers. I liked the relationship. A took me from the streets. I really ran the drug business. I was in charge and liked it.” She stated that she did not feel “psychologically trapped” and had no flashbacks, numbing of emotions, or other symptoms typical of battered women or of those who have experienced a trauma. В claimed that the people who gave statements indicating that she was the one who was violent, “the enforcer,” and the instigator of the murders were simply being untruthful.

When asked why she did not mention being frightened of A when she was initially arrested, В responded, “I don’t know why I didn’t mention it. Everyone knows I was scared. People knew A was in control.” Even after A was arrested and was unable to hurt her, В was still unable to explain why she expressed no fear of him; the reported fear of A supposedly experienced by В only emerged 3 years after their arrest during the defense expert’s evaluation.

Psychological test findings were helpful in understanding some of the dynamics of the case. For example, the Rorschach showed mild anxiety and depression, inner conflict, and a very severe personality disturbance, characterized by weak controls and lack of solid integration and cohesiveness. There were a number of aggressive, as well as regressive, perceptions, such as the following: “Looks like two people pulling the person in the middle apart. The person is holding someone’s hands up and pulling them. Separating him. It looks like blood ‘cause it’s red. Maybe their legs are bleeding.” “Looks like a sword separating something, splitting something in half. Splashed or splotched paint on the wall.” Her most primitive Rorschach response suggested that her functioning could become very regressive: “A monster. A big ugly monster. Claws and big feet; he is dropping something out of him. Maybe he is shitting, I don’t know what all that is, coming out of him.” The Minnesota Multiphastic Personality Inventory (MMPI) profile reflected a broodingly resentful person, who is angry and ruminates about real or imagined injustices done to her.

The jury found В responsible for both murders. They found no evidence of battered woman syndrome or anything even closely connected to it. The defense psychologist was not incompetent or untruthful; she simply did not know how to conduct a forensic evaluation. She was basically practicing clinical psychology in a forensic setting by interviewing the defendant in the same way she would interview a patient who came to her for treatment. Although this psychologist, like the defense experts in Cases 2.1 and 2.2, said that she had read the legal discovery, her final conclusions demonstrate that she ignored these findings or, at the very least, believed that her own interview with the defendant was more valid. Neither of these experts helped the defendant or provided much understanding of the offenders or their crimes.